URSULA VON DER LEYEN'S DUAL MANDATE: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE (I) - LAYING THE GROUNDWORK (2019-2024)

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When Ursula von der Leyen (VdL) became President of the European Commission (EC) back in 2019, the economic situation was more stable than in previous years, enabling the Commission to look ahead and set targets for the coming decades. However, there were also significant challenges, such as Euroscepticism, Brexit, migration or global geopolitical tensions. Five years later, in 2024, VdL got reelected for a second term as President of the EC. Has the Commission really delivered on its promises over the past five years? How far, or how close, is the Commission to its objectives? How do the new priorities relate to the previous ones? Are they coherent or contradictory? Are they realistic or unattainable?

In order to comprehensively assess the coherence of the European Commission's strategic priorities over two consecutive mandates: “2019-2024 - A Union in search of more” and “2024-2029 - Europe's choice”, our analysis will be divided into two separate articles. The aim of this first part is to analyse the work carried out during the 2019-2024 period. The first article will begin by briefly explaining how the Commission works. Then, the six priorities of the 2019-2024 mandate will be examined separately, looking at the work done to achieve the objectives set, as well as the successes and shortcomings of each priority.

Introduction

The Dynamics in 2019

When von der Leyen took office in 2019, the recovery from the global economic crisis of 2008 and the eurozone crisis of 2009 was well underway. By 2019, the EU had experienced steady growth and unemployment rates were very low in many member states. This economic stability enabled the European Commission to focus on long-term strategic objectives. The European Green Market, one of the Commission's flagship projects, is a good example. Following growing public awareness, a political consensus has emerged on the need to combat climate change. This consensus has paved the way for greater cohesion and cooperation in developing environmental policies. This long-term vision marked a change from the previous President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who was often criticised for being reactive rather than proactive. 

But in other ways, there were important challenges ahead, coming from the inside and outside of the Union. Internally, the Brexit and the withdrawal agreement created a tense atmosphere, not only economically, but also by calling into question the unity of the Union. This has given greater weight to Eurosceptic and populist movements, directly threatening the integrity of the European Union (EU). The consequences of the 2015 migration crisis have also accentuated divisions within the EU over solidarity and burden-sharing. There were also debates on reforming the EU's institutions, with a view to achieving a better balance between the European Parliament (EU), the Council of the EU and the Commission, as well as greater decentralisation. However, this was and remains a controversial subject, as others seek to strengthen the Union and make it more integrated. Externally, the European Union was also aware that it was lagging behind in the global technology race. There were growing concerns about the EU's competitiveness and innovative power, as well as the concerns of major technology companies about data privacy and security. There were political tensions on the world stage. Trade between the United Sates (US) and China has weakened the global economy. The EU's relations with China and Russia have also been complex, on issues of security (e.g. Crimea, interference) and human rights (e.g. Uighurs). The EU has even seen its relations with its main ally, the US, deteriorate. As a matter of fact, the Trump administration has been reticent about trade agreements with Europe, as well as European Union countries’ investments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military alliance. It is in such a context, and guided by the Council's strategic agenda and following discussions with the various political groups in Parliament, that the six political priorities were defined for the 2019-2024 term of office.

The first strategy, “A European Green Deal”, revolves around the goal of being climate neutral by 2050. Based on a clean and circular economy, this deal should aim to decarbonize European industries, combat climate change and preserve the natural environment. The second strategy, “A Europe fit for the digital age”, focuses on the use of technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, supercomputers, 5G) to promote industrial competitiveness, research and innovation, as well as to protect the online rights of European citizens vis-à-vis the major internet platforms (e.g. Apple, ByteDance, Microsoft, etc.). Third, “An economy that works for people” strives for a greater social market economy through easier access to the labour market and better social protection. This includes upskilling and reskilling workers, improving their working conditions and setting a minimum wage. This strategy also aims to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), deepen the economic and monetary union and complete the banking and capital markets union. In simpler terms, these objectives include strengthening the banking sector (e.g., to protect depositors in all EU countries, or to avoid taxpayer bailouts), as well as achieving greater integration of financial markets in the EU (e.g., to facilitate cross-border transactions), making it easier for SMEs to raise funds and access capital. Ultimately, this would contribute to building a more resilient and stable financial sector. Fourth, “A stronger Europe in the world”, is about strengthening partnerships on the global stage, securing open and fair trade agreements and promoting a rules-based global order. It is crucial that the European Union remains an important player on the world stage, both economically and politically. The fifth strategy, “Promoting our European way of life”, aims to achieve a balance concerning legal migration. While it is important for the EU to defend human rights, promote tolerance and social justice and provide security to people seeking international protection, it is equally important to ensure that Member States have the tools to better manage migration (i.e.: better control of external borders, stricter time limits, faster and more efficient asylum, return and border procedures, integration of migration in European societies). Sixth and last, “A new push for European democracy” aims to defend and strengthen democracy (i.e: deepening relations with the European Parliament and national parliaments), fighting foreign interference (e.g.: cyber-attacks, espionage programs, disinformation campaigns) and protecting media freedom and pluralism.

Now that we've listed and explained the six 2019-2024 priorities, let's analyse them in more detail. In her policy guidelines document for her mandate, Ursula von der Leyen made several promises, set certain objectives and/or mentioned concrete policies to be put forward. In the following section, we will discuss these key promises and assess whether the Commission has made progress towards the goals it has set for the European Union.

Priority 1: A European Green Deal

Climate Neutral

VdL's strategy for a greener Europe revolved around five key points. Firstly, she wanted to ensure that Europe becomes the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. She promised to propose a European Green Deal in her first 100 days in office. And she kept her promise, as on December 11, 2019, the Commission presented a communication introducing the European Climate Law. Although the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was revised in May 2023, its scope was only extended to the maritime sector. The transport (road transport) and construction (buildings) sectors will be included in the ETS2, the next version of this system, which is scheduled for 2026 or 2027. A few months later, on October 1, 2023, the Carbon Border Adjustment Tax (CBAM), a tool for setting a fair price for carbon-intensive non-EU goods that do not meet EU climate standards, in order to encourage cleaner industrial production in these countries, came into force after years of negotiations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. However, many points of the regulation will not apply before December 31, 2024 and January 1, 2026. The revision of the Energy Tax Directive (ETD), the law setting common minimum tax rates for energy products to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, was also not achieved. After the Commission presented a proposal in July 2021, it failed to get the Parliament and the Council on board, which led to a further delay in the legislative process until 2025. The reason for this disagreement was that the proposal must be adopted unanimously by the Council. Yet, in addition to the technical and political complexity of aligning this European tax framework with national tax systems, EU member states depend differently on fossil fuels, which threatens the economic competitiveness of some countries and raises concerns about the directive's social impact on households.

A Just Transition

Secondly, she emphasised the importance of working towards a just industrial transition. In March 2020, the new industrial strategy was presented, which was then updated in May 2021. The new plan aligned with the objectives of the EU Green Deal, aimed to help SMEs and strengthened the single market by monitoring 14 industrial ecosystems (e.g. healthcare, electronics, textiles, agri-food, etc.). One month later, the Just Transition Fund (JTF) was set up, providing a total of €19.32 billion for the period 2021-2027. This was a program focused on regions and sectors, with those dependent on carbon-intensive industries benefiting from the funds to facilitate the transition to a green economy. Her promise to propose a European climate law was also kept. Following the adoption of the 2030 Climate Target Plan in April 2021, the Regulation on the European Climate Law was adopted in June 2021. This law established a framework for achieving climate neutrality by 2050 by setting clear stages. Some included a legally binding target of zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, an EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction trajectory for the period 2030-2050, or a commitment to negative emissions after 2050. The Commission must now submit a proposal for the new 2040 climate target plan.

A Sustainable Europe Investment Plan

Thirdly, she wanted to support European sustainable finance and investment. In this respect, the Commission adopted the Sustainable Finance Strategy in July 2021. Recently, the Regulation on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms replaced two proposals to amend the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) respectively. The aim of this new legislation was to ensure that climate change-related risks are consistently integrated into banks' risk management systems. At the same time, the Sustainable Corporate Diligence Directive has also come into force. It aimed to disseminate sustainable and responsible methods throughout the value chain of corporate activities. Her promise to present a European Sustainable Investment Plan aimed at supporting 1,000 billion euros of sustainable investment over the next decade has also been kept. This mobilisation aimed to finance climate-related projects such as transport (e.g. electric vehicles, electrification of public transport), clean energy (e.g. solar, hydrogen and wind power), circular economy projects (e.g. recycling, waste reduction), ecosystems and food systems (e.g. marine protection, reforestation efforts, reducing pesticide use, improving soil health). VdL's proposal to transform part of the European Investment Bank (EIB) into a European Climate Bank has also become a reality. The EIB has pledged to devote at least 50% of its financing to climate action and the environment, and to mobilise €1 trillion in climate-related investments by 2030.

More Ambitious 2030 Targets

Fourthly, the VdL encouraged other major emitters to go beyond the Paris Agreement by raising the 40% emissions reduction target for 2030 to 55%. She first ensured that the EU led the way by presenting the “Fit for 55” package in July 2021. This is a package of 13 proposals to revise legislation and six entirely new legislative proposals, covering the building, transport and energy sectors. Although several proposals are still under negotiation, it is to be believed that the “Fit for 55” package has also led to the adoption of new legislation (e.g. ETS, CBAM, and the Effort Sharing Regulation). The Commission President then tried to influence others to take more action too. For example, the EU played an important role in the global methane commitment, has a long-standing partnership with India on Climate Action and Clean Energy, supported developing countries through climate finance at COP 27, and launched the Africa-Europe Green Energy initiative in 2022.

Preserving Europe's Natural Environment

Fifthly, she wanted to protect Europe's natural environment, making many promises. In May 2020, the Commission presented the new Biodiversity Strategy 2030, setting out various objectives, which was voted favourably in Parliament in June 2021. However, to date, and as part of the biodiversity strategy, only the Nature Restoration Law was published in August 2024. The strategy's other central proposal (i.e. the revision of the 2009 Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides, or SUD) has had to be withdrawn for two main reasons: member states with large agricultural industries were concerned about the economic impact, and the agrochemical industry was lobbying, arguing that it would prevent farmers from producing as they do today. Other proposals, such as the EU Soil Strategy 2030 and the revision of the 2008 Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), are due to be negotiated and announced respectively. In May 2020, the “Farm to Fork” strategy was also adopted, comprising a total of 27 legislative measures to be implemented between 2020 and 2024. All legislation aimed to cover the entire food supply chain, from production (farm) to consumption (fork), with an emphasis on sustainable, environmental and public health protection. However, several proposals scheduled for 2023 were not presented by the Commission, calling into question the future of the strategy. A year later, in May 2021, the “Zero Pollution Act” was announced: “Chemical Strategy for Sustainability”, “Zero Pollution Action Plan for Water, Air and Soil”, and “Review of measures to combat pollution from large industrial installations”. As part of this action plan, the proposition for an ambient air quality Directive, the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, as well as the Water Framework Directive, the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive are about to be adopted. Only the mercury regulation has yet been adopted. The new Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP), also part of this section, was presented in March 2020 and focuses on sectors such as packaging, textiles, construction or food, among others. Since then, the Commission has produced over ten proposals, ranging from batteries and waste shipment to goods repair. Some have already been adopted, such as the batteries Regulation, the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR), the Right to Repair Directive or the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) of September 2023, which limits microplastics intentionally added to products. Others are still on the negotiating table, such as the revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD) and the Construction Products Regulation.

Remarks

Overall, Ursula von der Leyen's Commission has produced a large number of legislative texts. The strategies, revisions to existing policies and new legislation form a solid basis for Europe to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. Her ambitious European Green Deal has been a landmark, and she managed to deliver 12 out of her 15 promises. The new European climate law, the introduction of the CBAM and the EIB's role in the European Climate Bank are all major achievements. But there are also shortcomings.

The revision of the Energy Taxation Directive, which is essential to bring taxation fully aligned with climate objectives, has been postponed until 2025. The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS2) for the traffic and construction sectors will not be fully integrated until 2026/2027. The circular economy action plan is another example. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) report shows that the policies have only led to a substantial increase in circular economy activities in the Member States, still far from matching the expectations of the Commission. Moreover, there is not even clear evidence that the Circular Economy Action Plan is correlated with the slight increase in circular economy activities. The ECA says that the 2030 targets to double the share of recycled materials look difficult to achieve. As for food and biodiversity, these are areas that have been somewhat neglected. Despite an ambitious new biodiversity strategy, only the Nature Restoration Act has been adopted. There is no doubt that initiatives to preserve Europe's ecosystems have not progressed as planned.

In addition, several proposals forming part of the “Farm to Fork” strategy planned for 2023 have been delayed or have not been presented. As a result, there has been no innovation in food systems, and no support for farmers making the transition to environmentally-friendly practices. What's more, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently out of step with the aims of the

Green Deal. The necessary changes in the agricultural sector are therefore not fully taken into account. One recommendation, made in the report by the Institute for European Environmental Policy, could be to create an emissions trading scheme, as exists for roads and transport, for the agri-food sector, a heavy carbon footprint sector. Making polluters pay for the carbon they emit would therefore considerably reduce pollution and biodiversity loss, while promoting sustainable production and consumption.

Finally, the actual implementation of these policies by Member States has often been delayed. France, for example, has had difficulty implementing the ‘farmer to consumer’ policy. Bulgaria has also found it difficult to comply with EU policies on energy efficiency, particularly in the building sector. Germany has been criticised for its slowness in reducing the use of pesticides. Poland has even taken legal action against some of the legislation in the ‘Fit for 55’ package (land use and forestry law, new rules on car emissions, law on pollution allowances in the EU's carbon market stability reserve). Although work is still needed in various areas of the EU's Green Deal, the Commission could move forward by helping Member States to effectively implement the policies they have developed. The next step would be to put in place mechanisms that take into account the political, social and economic needs of specific countries, to ensure that national and local actors play their part.

Priority 2: A Europe Fit for the Digital Age

Digital Age Within Safe and Ethical Boundaries

Ursula von der Leyen promised to publish a coordinated European approach to the human and ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) within her first 100 days. She has kept her promise by making the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI available in November 2019. When it comes to AI funding, a significant amount comes from the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027. Indeed, several programs under the MFF have allocated billions to AI, such as the Digital Europe Program, Horizon Europe, InvestEU, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and even the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The EU could also count on public-private investments, such as the European Investment Bank's co-investment of €150 million in 2020. She also promised to regulate the digital market. She announced a Digital Services Act (DSA), which she presented in October 2022. Its complementary tool, the Digital Markets Act (DMA), was published a month earlier. Together, the DSA and the DMA aim respectively to protect the fundamental rights of users of digital services and to promote fairness and competitiveness within the European single market. Finally, the digital transformation of the Commission itself is difficult to assess. However, it is worth noting that in June 2022, the Commission published a strategic plan to support the implementation of a Digital Commission. This strategy is built around five main axes: digital partnerships, interaction, empowerment, sovereignty and autonomy, and security and resilience.

Empowering People Through Education and Skills

Building on the 2018-2020 action plan, the Commission proposed the new Digital Education Plan 2021-2027 (DEAP) in September 2020. Thirteen actions have been defined, revolving around two pillars: fostering the development of a high-performance digital education ecosystem and strengthening digital skills and competencies for digital transformation. Implementation of each of the DEAP actions is either completed (4 actions completed) or underway (9 actions underway). Last year, in April 2023, the European Commission also issued two recommendations, one on the key elements of digital education and the other on improving digital skills in education and training. This year, the Commission is expected to present its assessment of the DEAP and propose modifications and/or additional measures if necessary. In order to support students’ experience and formation, the Commission also revised the Erasmus + budget. VdL promised to triple the budget, but failed to do so. It increased by 78.2% instead of 200%, going up to 26.2 billion for the 2021-2027 period, compared to 14.7 billion for the 2014-2020 period.

Remarks

In the field of AI, the EU has taken numerous steps, the most important being the adoption of the world's first-ever AI law: the EU AI Act. Depending on the risk level of an AI system (minimal, limited, high and unacceptable risk), it is subject to certain rules such as compliance and risk assessment, a high level of cybersecurity, mitigation systems, human monitoring or prohibition of the AI system. In early 2024, the Commission also presented its AI innovation package to support innovators and startups. Yet AI is just one disruptive technology among many, such as data, the Internet of Things (IoT), smart cities, robotics, supercomputing, cloud computing, blockchain, Fintech, quantum, Web 4.0 and virtual worlds. In this respect, the Commission has proposed some very interesting legislation aimed either at harnessing the full potential of these technologies, or at regulating them. Examples include the Regulation on Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), the Regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructure based on DLT, the Data Governance Act or the Data Act. The Commission has also taken concrete steps, such as the creation of Simpl, the open-source platform supporting data access and interoperability between the European data spaces defined in the Data Act. The EU's supercomputing capacity of 500 machines has almost doubled since 2018. To date, the EU is home to nine supercomputers under the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (LUMI in Finland, LEONARDO in Italy, MARENOSTRUM in Spain, MELUXINA in Luxembourg, KAROLINA in the Czech Republic, DISCOVERER in Bulgaria, VEGA in Slovenia, DEUCALION in Portugal and JUPITER in Germany), three of which rank among the top ten in the world.

However, too much legislation was aimed at regulating to protect European values (i.e. human rights, freedom, equality, the rule of law, democracy) or filling legal loopholes, rather than promoting an innovative environment. Yet growth and innovation are essential in the technology sector. What's more, this complex regulatory landscape, with its overlaps but also fragmentation, legal uncertainty, misinterpretation or poor implementation, contributes to holding back the potential of European industry. In addition, the European workforce is severely lacking in digital skills, a problem that the Digital Education Action is expected to solve. Using data from the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) to assess the level of DEAP success, improvements are observed. For example, from 2022 to 2024, the number of individuals with at least basic digital skills increased (from 53.92% to 55.56%), as did the number of individuals with skills above basic (from 26.46% to 27.32%) and the number of ICT graduates (from 3.90% to 4.50%). Given that the level of implementation varies according to differences in digital infrastructure and resources, it is also relevant to examine the state of digital infrastructure and the digitization of businesses and public services. Again according to DESI, from 2020 to 2024, Internet usage increased (from 89.68% to 93.03%), as did 5G spectrum (from 20.42% to 73.40%), the number of unicorns (from 98 to 263), electronic information sharing in businesses (from 35.90% to 43.30%) and digital public services for citizens (from 76.90 to 79.44). As set in the Digital Decade targets, in 2030, the percentage of individuals with basic digital skills should be at 80% (+24.44%), the number of unicorns should be around 450 (+187), and everyone should have access to key public services (+20.56%). So, even if these figures look good, they're not enough to enable the EU to achieve its objectives. This poses a direct threat to the EU's competitiveness and its hopes of being at the forefront of technological innovation and competing with the USA and China. The number of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) graduates remains too low. Yet it is crucial to have these experts available in critical areas such as cloud computing, cybersecurity, AI or software development. The gap between the skilled workers needed and those available in the current workforce is also still too wide, and the EU's investment in Research and Development (R&D) does not allow it to attract the world's best talent. So, while Ursula von der Leyen has kept her promises, she should now intensify and accelerate work on digital literacy, innovation clusters, talent creation and attracting experts. This poses a direct threat to the EU's competitiveness and its hopes of being at the forefront of technological innovation and competing with the USA and China. The number of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) graduates remains too low. Yet it is crucial to have these experts available in critical areas such as cloud computing, cybersecurity, AI or software development. The gap between the skilled workers needed and those available in the current workforce is also still too wide, and the EU's investment in R&D does not allow it to attract the world's best talent. So, while Ursula von der Leyen has kept her promises, she should now intensify and accelerate work on digital literacy, innovation clusters, talent creation and attracting experts.

Ursula von der Leyen promised to support reforms, public investment, stability and growth. Her work followed the proposal establishing the Reform Support Programme, introduced in May 2018, to support Member States with priority reforms with a budget of €25 billion. The objectives were to provide financial support for reforms (Reform Implementation Tool), to provide technical expertise (Technical Support Instrument) and to help Member States prepare to join the euro (Convergence Facility). In June 2019, the Commission proposed a governance framework for the Convergence and Competitiveness Budgetary Instrument (CCBI), a financial instrument of around €17 billion that Member States can use for reforms and public investment. However, both proposals were withdrawn because of the pandemic crisis and the urgent need to act. The Commission replaced them with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) in February 2021. The RRF finances reforms and investments for EU countries until December 2026, to make their economies stronger, more resilient and more sustainable, and to prepare them for the green and digital transitions. By February 2024, €225 billion had been used to fund cohesion, digital, health and other projects, out of a total of €648 billion in available funds. The TSI is the tool that provides expertise to Member States to guide them in the design and implementation of reforms. For example, Member States can request support in implementing the new Pact on Migration and Asylum by asking the TSI to provide analysis and recommendations to help them prepare their national implementation plans. The Commission also worked on economic stability and growth, focusing on the Stability and Growth Pact, a set of rules designed to manage the public finances of EU countries in order to make economic conditions more stable, began to be reviewed in February 2020, and a proposal for reform was presented in November 2022. The aim of the proposal was to improve the effectiveness of the economic governance framework, the tool that helps Member States achieve their economic and fiscal policy objectives. This is an urgent necessity, given the alarming levels of debt in some countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Poland) and the need to update the rules. Discussions were held on an ongoing basis and measures were taken, such as with the activation of the General Escape Clause in 2020. This was a tool enabling countries to spend more without breaching the deficit and debt limits in response to the pandemic (the deficit must be kept below 3% of gross domestic product and the national debt below 60% of GDP). However, the economic situation remains problematic and a more pro-growth fiscal stance has not been adopted. One of the arguments put forward is that governments are still responsible for budgetary policies, but are unable to reach agreement because of conflicts of interest. This directly undermines the work of the Commission, which sees its work significantly modified by the Council, reducing the scope and impact of legislation.

Banking Union is another key aspect of ensuring economic stability and integrity. It is a set of banking policies initially managed by the Member States, but which were transferred to the EU level after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 eurozone crisis. Its foundations are the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Together, they form the two pillars of the Banking Union, giving the European Central Bank (ECB) powers over the EU's financial system and creating a central institution responsible for ensuring that the failure of a bank does not harm the economy as a whole or cause financial instability. The Single Resolution Fund (SRF) was also part of the SRM Regulation to enhance the effectiveness of bank resolution with minimal cost to taxpayers and the economy, which the VdL has pledged to continue supporting. In this respect, the Eurogroup (the finance ministers of the EU countries) has agreed that the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) will support the SRF as a mechanism of last resort (i.e. if the SRF runs out of funds or in the event of a major crisis). Von der Leyen also promised to complete the Banking Union, referring to its third pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which was proposed in 2015 and has still not been completed. The Commission has also proposed to review the banking crisis management and deposit guarantee framework (CMDI) in 2023, to work on issues such as taking into account national and regional levels when assessing disruptions to the economy, and to make the framework more robust and credible. Despite the Commission's 2015 EDIS proposal and the 2023 proposal, discussions continue in the Council as governments are unable to reach agreement. Countries with strong national deposit systems, such as Germany, fear that stronger banking sectors will end up covering the risks of weaker sectors. They are therefore not dissociating their banking systems, which is preventing the completion of the Banking Union.

Finally, the President of the Commission also affirmed her determination to strengthen the euro's international role. The reality is that it has remained fairly stable rather than improving, remaining the second most important currency in the international monetary system and raising interest rates, but other indicators, such as outstanding international deposits and loans, and global currency exchanges, are tending to decline (Source: ECB). Work to deepen the Capital Markets Union has contributed to this, even if it remains fragmented. The EU has also pushed for the euro to be used as a reserve currency, encouraging greater use of the euro in global trade and financial transactions. The EU has also seen its green bonds grow, given the growing importance of environmental sustainability. A strong euro in the world is important because it reduces dependence on other currencies, protects the EU economy against exchange rate shocks, empowers EU consumers or guarantees lower transaction, financing and risk management costs for businesses.

To coordinate all this work, in 2010 the EU set up the European Semester, under which the Member States meet once a year to discuss their economic and budgetary plans and priorities. In June 2024, the Commission published the European Semester Spring Package, which focuses on long-term competitiveness, macroeconomic stability (i.e. the performance and behaviour of the economy as a whole), and structural change and challenges. As promised, it also examines progress towards the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) since 2020, particularly in the country-specific recommendations (i.e. reports addressing recommendations directly to a specific country). In fact, the Commission has started to use the SDG indicators in monitoring the performance of Member States, such as poverty reduction (SDG 1), education (SDG 4) and climate action (SDG 13). The Parliament has also been empowered, but with certain limitations. The European Parliament has access to a platform to examine and discuss these reports and their recommendations. The Parliament was also involved in the creation of NextGenerationEU, the recovery fund to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis. However, the EP's influence on fiscal and economic decision-making remains limited by the treaties, which means that MEPs have little influence on major decisions (e.g. Eurogroup decisions, the ESM, the Stability and Growth Pact).

Europe's Social Pillar

With regard to social rights, the Commission presented an Action Plan on the European Pillar of Social Rights in March 2021, setting out 20 principles organised around three chapters: more and better jobs and equal opportunities, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. The plan aimed to achieve a 78% employment rate by 2030, a 60% participation rate in annual adult training by 2030, and a 15 million reduction in poverty and social exclusion. In terms of specific actions, the Commission worked on improving employment opportunities and conditions for young people through the reinforced Youth Guarantee. The aim was to respond to the criticisms levelled at the previous version of the Youth Guarantee by helping young people to continue their studies, take part in skills enhancement programs and find apprenticeships and traineeships. It also facilitated youth organisations' access to the European Social Fund + (ESF+). Ursula von der Leyen also promised to work towards the creation of a European Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme (EUBRS) to protect and support the unemployed. However, this was never presented due to the complexity of the negotiations and the fact that, at the same time, the 2020 pandemic required an immediate, large-scale response. As a result, it was replaced by the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) in 2020, as part of the response to the pandemic. It was intended to provide financial assistance of up to €100 billion to member states needing to cope with increased public spending to safeguard employment. The Commission President also promised to present a law guaranteeing a minimum wage for workers in the Union. This is the Adequate Minimum Wage Directive, proposed in October 2020 and adopted two years later. The aims are to introduce clear criteria for setting minimum wage rates, align wage growth rates with increases in the cost of living, and a collective bargaining coverage target of 80%. To support this objective, the March 2021 Recommendation on European Child Guarantee advocates access for children in need to a range of key services (e.g., access to appropriate housing, healthy food, education with school-based activities). The Commission has also encouraged the implementation of the 2019 Work-Life Balance Directive, which grants rights such as paternity leave, parental leave and carer's leave, as well as flexible working arrangements. In September 2022, after noting that eleven countries had not fully transposed the directive, the Commission sent them a reasoned opinion. Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain were given two months to comply. In November 2023, Belgium, Ireland and Spain were referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for failure to transpose the directive, and will have to go to court to face possible fines. Finally, Ursula von der Leyen's last promise was fulfilled when Europe's Beating Cancer Plan was presented in February 2021. This plan aims to support, coordinate and complement the efforts of member states at the stages of prevention, early detection, diagnosis and treatment, as well as to improve the lives of cancer patients and survivors. As part of this plan, a new Council Recommendation on cancer screening, offering breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screenings to the qualified population by 2025, was presented in 2022, as well as a Directive protecting workers from exposure to asbestos in the workplace, a mineral used in many industries, in November 2023. Proposals for recommendations on vaccine-preventable cancers and smoke-free environments are currently under discussion.

A Union of Equality

Ursula von der Leyen has promised to promote gender equality in the European Union. Although there was no comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, the Commission communicated the gender strategy in March 2020 and has been very active in its fight against gender inequality. In 2022, it finalised the Directive on improving gender balance on company boards, which sets quotas for the number of women and men in company management positions. In line with this objective, she has ensured equality at all levels of Commission management positions, with a percentage of 48.5% women by 2024 (source: Brussels Times), and 44% female representation in the College of Commissioners for the period 2019-2024. As part of her promise on gender equality, the Directive on pay transparency was adopted in 2023. It aims to promote equality for equal work between men and women in the private and public sectors, before and during employment, as well as the employer's obligation to communicate information on gender equality within the company (e.g.: the gender pay gap, including bonuses and benefits, the proportion of men and women). However, the first report is due in 2027, or 2031 if the company has between 100 and 149 employees. Another important achievement was the EU's accession to the Istanbul Convention in October 2023, following the Court of Justice ruling that the EU could accede to the convention without the consent of all member states and a year of pressure from the European Parliament. The first legal tool developed at EU level, the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence, was then adopted in 2024, condemning online and offline violence and strengthening victim protection, access to justice and support. One objective that was not achieved, however, was the addition of violence against women to the European Treaty. Although the Commission and Parliament strongly advocated this addition in order to provide legal protection for women, member states disagree on the definition of this notion, on what should be considered violence against women, and on the extent of the EU's involvement in national criminal law.

Fair Taxation

Another of Ursula von der Leyen's crucial objectives concerned corporate taxation in the EU. The Commission's aim was to tackle the tax practices of multinational companies, strengthen cooperation between member states and combat tax fraud. In addition to existing legislation, such as the 2016 ATAD Directive and the 2017 ATAD Directive (Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives), the Commission worked to complete the tax regulatory landscape. During VdL's first term, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC), which aims to combat tax evasion by encouraging the exchange of information, has been amended twice. Once in 2021, with DAC7, which focuses on information sharing by digital platforms, and a second time in 2023, with DAC8, which extends tax transparency rules to crypto-asset transactions. The 2021 Country-by-Country Reporting Directive (CBCR) requires multinationals to publish the taxes paid in each EU country, and the 2022 Minimum Corporate Taxation sets a global minimum of 15% for companies and has been agreed with the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). VdL has also pledged its support for the 2016 proposal for a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). As the Council was unable to reach agreement on this dossier, it remained blocked. The Commission therefore worked on a new proposal for a new legislative framework for corporate taxation (BEFIT), which proposes a single tax base to harmonise national taxes in EU countries for members of the same group. This dossier is currently under discussion in Parliament and the Council. The European Commission has also made considerable efforts to combat tax fraud, with the launch of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) in 2021. Working closely with Eurojust, Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), EPPO combats cross-border VAT fraud and other types of fraud affecting the EU's financial interests.

Remarks

VdL's work to deepen the Economic and Monetary Union has also been difficult. Whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility has been a good response to the common challenges faced by EU countries (e.g. energy crisis, COVID-19, socio-economic issues), and has helped to support green and digital transformations, it has also led to some problems. For example, the pace of financial progress is not constant, targets are difficult to achieve, grant allocations need to be revised, leading to delays in payment claims and impacting on the speed and cost of implementation. The effectiveness of the reforms is another point of contention, with varying levels of effectiveness and progress. The main factors are communication, lack of technical capacity and skilled personnel, labour shortages and disruption to supply chains and logistics. The European Semester could be the solution. However, it seems that the recommendations, particularly those relating to macroeconomic imbalances, made by the Commission are not always implemented, which undermines the effectiveness and relevance of the European Semester reports. With regard to the Banking Union and the international role of the euro, while the backstop of the Single Resolution Fund has been approved and completed, the Banking Union lacks its centrepiece, EDIS. This means that in the event of a major bank failure, the EU will be very vulnerable due to its fragmentation. It is essential that governments show greater commitment to strengthening the banking union before the next financial crisis erupts.

Another important point in her 2019-2024 political guidelines was to improve the conditions for SMEs to scale up in Europe. The Commission worked on the development of tools to overcome, or at least provide assistance, regarding the complexity of the regulatory landscape and recover from difficult shocks (i.e.: Covid-19, war in Ukraine, international trade tensions). According to the SME Performance Review Annual Report 2023-2024, despite inflation still being a problem, employment grew (+1.8%) and has fully recovered from the pandemic, the number of SMEs is growing (+2.2%), and growth rates are positive. The EU must keep on its efforts to help SMEs, if not do more and deliver its missing part; a private-public fund to support IPOs. With the aim of creating a more integrated Union, but in the face of considerable criticism, the EU has been working on the Capital Markets Union, which aims to improve the flow of capital, raise funds more easily across borders, and reduce dependence on bank financing by diversifying funding sources (e.g. crowdfunding, venture, equity markets). Over the past few years, the

Overall, the priority of improving the economic situation to create a more stable environment more conducive to SME expansion, while ensuring fair taxation and creating better social policies where women and men are equally represented, cannot be considered a success. This is not due to the fact that the Commission has not kept its promises or has proposed ineffective solutions, but mainly to the complexity of the issues and the unanimity required between Member States for the adoption of a large majority of the legislation.

One of the most difficult parts of this priority was in regards to fair taxation. Given the very complex nature of 27 decentralised and different tax systems, the work of the VdL Commission has been remarkable in trying to fill the gaps in transparency, collaboration and enforcement. The Commission has also been heavily involved in state aid investigations. But the results of the decisions have often run counter to the Commission's conclusions. For example, in 2019, the General Court of the EU rejected rulings that Starbucks had benefited from illegal tax advantages in the Netherlands. In 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that Amazon did not benefit from state aid. More recently, in September 2024, the CJEU ruled that Apple had benefited from state aid in Ireland and fined it €13 billion. This was a landmark decision, prompting the Commission to continue its efforts to ensure that multinationals pay their taxes.

Commission has drawn up a new CMU action plan, proposing 16 actions based on three pillars: making financing more accessible to EU businesses, making the EU a safer place to save and invest for the long term, and integrating national capital markets into a single market. For example, in 2021, the Commission presented four legislative dossiers: a Regulation establishing the European Single Access Point (ESAP), a Regulation amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIF), a Regulation amending financial market instruments and a Directive guaranteeing greater transparency, which were published in 2023 and 2024. Yet capital markets remain highly fragmented and have not been sufficiently deepened. The measures taken by Mrs von der Leyen will only take effect in a few years' time, and the measures taken previously in 2015 have not materialised or produced the expected results. A great deal of work and collaboration is therefore required to achieve this.

Ursula von der Leyen's social priority is difficult to assess in terms of responsibility, as the Commission has no direct competence to adopt social issues such as employment, social protection or working conditions. Instead, it proposes recommendations, which have no legally binding status and are implemented by EU countries. Yet VdL's Commission has achieved good results in social policy through coordination efforts and non-binding funding mechanisms. The European Social Fund +, worth some 99 billion euros, supports youth employment, childcare, social inclusion and skills development. What's more, the targets set by the European Commission are achievable, and EU populations are on the right track. Employment has risen by almost 5% since the 2020 pandemic, reaching 75.3% in 2023 (Source: Eurostat). This is just 2.7% short of the target set for 2030. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion represent 95.1 million EU citizens, or 21.3% (Source: Eurostat). By 2030, there should be no more than 80 million, reducing the number to around 17.9%. Wage growth also increased by 1.07%, from January 2020 to January 2024 (Source: ECB). Working conditions should also continue to improve in order to adapt to changes in the labour market, namely a growing number of women and a more skilled but ageing workforce. However, it is important to bear in mind that economic turmoil and inflation constantly threaten the stability of the labour market, which could have an impact on the long-term targets set by the Commission for 2030. As with the Work-Life Balance Directive, and given its limited capacity to legislate, the Commission must continue to supervise Member States to ensure that they apply the strongest national commitments on these issues, and that they implement social policies in a comprehensive and uniform manner.

Regarding the fight for women's rights, protection and equality in European societies, the Commission has done considerable work. According to the Gender Equality Index, equality between women and men has steadily improved since 2013, rising from 63.1 in 2013 to 70.2 in 2013 (100 meaning full equality). Internally, its 50/50 target was almost achieved by the end of its first term. However, where action needs to be taken outside the Commission's control, gender balance remains a challenge and improvements need to be made. The 2024 report on equality between women and men in the EU shows that women are represented at just over 30% in national parliaments, 33.4% among senior ministers, 40% in the European Parliament, just over 20% in the EU's financial institutions and between 15% and 40% in large companies (depending on whether the company has adopted non-binding measures, quotas or no quotas). These results are part of a wider context in which member states are reluctant to change and are unable to reach agreement. For example, violence against women has not been added to the list of EU crimes in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), mainly because EU countries have been unable to reach a consensus. In addition, six EU countries have not ratified the convention: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Poland has also announced its intention to withdraw from the Convention, but nothing has yet been enacted.

Supporting Small Businesses

Deepening the Economic and Monetary Union

There are 25 million micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU. That's 99% of all EU businesses, employing 100 million people and generating around 56% of the EU's total gross domestic product (GDP). To make Europe a more attractive place to start and grow small businesses, the Commission presented an SME strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe in March 2020. The strategy is based on three pillars. Firstly, to support the green and digital transitions, the Commission has set up European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIH). They act as bridges between businesses, the public sector and other relevant stakeholders to promote collaboration and knowledge transfer. They also allow companies to test technologies before making major investments and provide training to improve the digital skills of their employees. Secondly, to reduce the regulatory burden and improve market access, SMEs can receive support and advice through the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) and facilitate market access through Small Business Standards (SBS). Thirdly, to improve access to finance, the VdL promised to set up a public-private fund dedicated to the shares that SMEs can make available to the public for the first time, i.e. initial public offerings (IPOs). While efforts have been made to improve the Capital Markets Union (CMU), no specific fund for IPOs have been proposed. At best, the Commission published a report in October 2020 concluding that EU intervention was needed before, during and after the IPO.

Priority 3: An Economy That Works for People

Priority 4: A Stronger Europe in the World

Free and Fair Trade

When it comes to trade, Ursula von der Leyen logically called for a closer relationship with one of the EU's most important allies: the United States. After a period of trade tensions and tariff disputes under the Trump administration, relations have improved under the Biden administration. In 2021, two major disputes were resolved: no more harmful tariffs on Airbus and Boeing for five years and the suspension of tariffs on steel and aluminium. In 2021, the two partners launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which serves as a coordination platform for important global trade, economic and technology issues. Together they discussed areas such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, agreed to promote green technologies and a circular economy, and worked to introduce a global minimum tax rate of 15% for companies. The EU is clearly committed to deepening its transatlantic economic relationship based on shared democratic values.

The Commission has also concluded Fair Trade Agreements (FTAs) with other countries outside of Europe, notably with Singapore and Vietnam, and is also discussing new agreements (e.g.: with Mercosur, India, Thailand and the Philippines). Such FTAs are aimed at reducing barriers to the importation and exportation of goods (e.g.: reducing or eliminating tariffs, subsidies, quotas, prohibition). More importantly, the VdL promised to conclude bilateral agreements with New Zealand and Australia. A free trade agreement has been concluded with New Zealand and was signed in June 2023. This 27-chapter agreement covered sustainable food systems, cross-border data flows, animal welfare, energy and raw materials, among other things. The second FTA promised, with Australia, was suspended in October 2023, despite six years of work and the conclusion of agreements. No clear explanation has been given, but one reason could be that the EU and Australia traditionally behave in a protectionist way, which makes trade relations very difficult. Negotiations are not expected to be reopened before 2025. When it comes to transparency and sustainability requirements, the Commission has apparently also made considerable efforts. In fact, Chapter 19 of the bilateral agreement with New Zealand, Chapter 12 of the FTA with Singapore and Chapter 13 of the FTA with Vietnam are dedicated to sustainable development. The Commission also made available reports on negotiation rounds, information on meetings and dialogues as well as position papers and decisions. It is also important to note that sixteen events, including civil society dialog meetings, have taken place to provide responses to ongoing individual negotiations and the EU's overall trade agenda. However, it can also be argued that while considerable transparency efforts have been made during the negotiation phase, there is still room for improvement to increase transparency in the implementation phase. Yet, the implementation phase has been strengthened, with the appointment of a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) in July 2020. Mr Denis Redonnet, the first ever EU CTEO, was appointed to make sure that the trade rules are well implemented and enforced with the trading partners of the EU. Some of his tasks are to ensure that the EU has effective tools to settle investment disputes and protect itself from coercive measures, guarantee that trading partner countries respect the commitments they have made, launch investigations when more information on potential trade barriers is needed, or coordinate dispute settlement procedures between the EU and non-EU countries, for example in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Furthermore, one of VdL's goals was to lead the reform of the WTO which had been criticised for years for its inability to achieve consensus among its 164 members. This has prevented the organisation from updating and adapting the rules of multilateral trading systems to contemporary challenges, as well as resolving disputes, dealing with violations and countering protectionist measures. She wanted the EU to play a key role in lifting the organisation out of its existential crisis by updating trade rules, tackling unfair trade practices and setting labour and sustainability standards for trade agreements. Given the importance of the WTO (75% of world trade is subject to the rules set by the international trade organisation), this was a very important goal. To this end, the EU has put forward several reform proposals, such as those listed in the 2018 Concept Paper and the 2023 communication to address current policy challenges, which cover transparency, state-owned enterprises, state intervention, digital trade or inclusiveness. Initiatives have also been taken, such as the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), which introduces an alternative dispute settlement system, or the talks for stricter requirements in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) as part of the ninth triennial review. These measures reflect the EU's ambition to strengthen its leadership role, defend universal values and reform multilateral systems accordingly, as stated in the 2021 Joint Communication on the contribution to rules-based multilateralism.

A More Active Role

An important task for VdL was the partnership with the UK. In her 2019-2024 guidelines, her position was to maintain the Brexit agreement between the EU and the UK, or “Withdrawal Agreement” (WA), as it stood after its finalisation in October 2019. She argued that the deal, which covers separation issues, the financial settlement, UK and EU citizens' rights, Ireland, Cyprus and Gibraltar, was a good one. However, tensions had arisen during the transition period, with the EU and UK unable to agree on issues such as the free movement of people or, more importantly, the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP). There have also been repeated delays in checks on goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, after the UK requested grace periods in 2021 and 2022. In 2023, the “Windsor Framework” was negotiated, adjusting certain parts of the NIP, such as the easing of customs controls on goods from Britain, but keeping the basic structure of the Washington Agreement as it was. In fact, the EU never agreed to renegotiate the fundamental aspects of the agreement. And when the UK threatened to override the Withdrawal Agreement as a treaty, the EU considered this a violation of international law and took legal action against the UK.

The second goal for Ursula von der Leyen was to establish a strategy with Africa. The communication on this strategy was published in March 2020, expressing the need to establish a partnership in five areas: green transition and access to energy, digital transformation, sustainable growth and employment, peace and governance, and migration and mobility. Then, following the cancellation of the 6th EU-AU (African Union) Summit in 2021, the two Unions met in February 2022 to agree on a common vision for 2030. Together, they agreed on a common vision to renew the partnership until 2030. For example, they agreed on a budget of 150 billion euros to support the AU's Agenda 2063 in its work towards an equitable energy transition, digital transformation and sustainable growth on the African continent.

Regarding the Western Balkans (i.e.: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia), the president of the Commission, who wanted to increase relations with the region, participated in four EU-Western Balkans summits (2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023). These meetings represented the opportunity to discuss migration and financial assistance, to address disinformation campaigns and organised crime or to support the green and digital transitions. With its commitment to the enlargement process, a particular emphasis was also given to the need of these countries to carry out reforms to achieve the respect of European values and principles. In this respect, the Commission has been very active. In January 2020, it communicated a new methodology for the EU accession process, making the Western Balkans a priority, but also making the new merit-based enlargement process more dynamic and political. Two months later, the Commission also presented its new “Eastern Partnership Policy beyond 2020”, an agreement to increase cooperation with the EU's six Eastern partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) on specific themes (e.g. rule of law, climate). In September 2021, the EC also adopted the new Instrument for Pre-Assistance (IPA III), which defines who should benefit from this aid, for what purpose and how the 7-year, €14.62 billion program should achieve this. As part of this budget, the €6 billion new growth plan has been adopted for the period 2024-2027. This plan aims to stimulate economic integration with the EU and within the Balkan countries, support fundamental reforms and back them financially. The Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) is another milestone, which the IPA III budget will support to a value of €9 billion to fund 10 flagship investment programs (e.g. sustainable transport, clean energy, human capital).

Ursula von der Leyen also promised to increase the EU spending by 30% of the European External Action Service in the 2021-2027 MFF, which she did. The external-action budget was raised from €94 billion to €123 billion, its main objective being to support political and economic transformation of the EU partners towards a more sustainable, democratic, stable and fair model. This amount of money was used to finance tools such as the €300 million new European Instrument for Nuclear Safety, the €11 billion humanitarian aid instrument, the €89.2 billion Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), and also the IPA III mentioned above.

Defending Europe

To strengthen the defence sector, VdL promised to strengthen the European Defence Fund (EDF), the instrument to support Research and Development. This tool is a key component of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aimed at supporting SMEs through better cooperation between defence companies, providing investments, and developing cutting-edge and interoperable defence technologies and equipment. In April 2021, the Regulation establishing the European Defence Fund was established, setting a budget of nearly €8 billion for the 2021-2027 period. For example, the 2024 calls for proposals unlocked €1.1 billion for 8 calls to support projects, structured along 8 thematics covering 32 different topics (e.g.: advanced radar technologies, electronic components, next generation rotorcraft, countering hypersonic glide vehicles). In 2021, 2022 and 2023, a total of 3.063 billion has been allocated to 156 defence R&D projects.

Remarks

Overall, the Commission's work is good, but the results are balanced. The President of the European Commission has kept 8 out of 11 promises. The 3 unfulfilled promises were dealt with by the Commission but were not enough to achieve the expected goal, mainly due to geopolitical tensions and economic disagreements between the EU and other partners. Von der Leyen's efforts in the area of trade have been partially successful, as she has laid the foundations for sustainable and transparent trade agreements. However, there is a lack of a strong enforcement mechanism to ensure full compliance with such agreements. Economic relations with the US have improved significantly since 2021 under the Biden administration. But there are also disagreements over the taxation of US tech companies and energy security with the controversies over Nord Stream 2. On the global stage, the EU's efforts to reform the WTO have proven insufficient given the complexity of international trade policy. Since the first Trump presidency in 2017, the US has blocked reform of the dispute settlement process, China is trying to protect its state-owned enterprises and subsidies, and other countries oppose stricter labour or environmental regulations as this could negatively impact their exports. This shows that the EU needs to take a more diplomatic leadership role.

Secondly, the Commission's handling of its relations with Africa and the Western Balkans has been criticised. Although a cooperation initiative has been taken between the 27 European countries and 55 African countries, implementation has been slow. As a result, agreements on migration, trade or infrastructure have yet to be converted into tangible action. In addition, the EU has been accused of hypocrisy due to its double standards. The EU's green carbon tax, CBAM, is a case in point. While the EU initially launched a €300 billion program to support green and digital transition, as well as job-creating development in Africa, the introduction of this carbon tax could cost African governments €25 billion a year. Another example concerns trade. Due to European subsidies in the African agricultural sector, seen as a hidden form of protectionism, Europe is perceived as attempting to restore a kind of “top-down” post-colonial economic relationship with Africa. The Western Balkans are also a sensitive issue. In response to Russia's growing political influence and China's economic influence (New Belt and Road initiative) in the region, enlargement has become an important issue for the EU. Steps in this direction are important if the 2030 vision of enlargement is to become a reality, as stated by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in August 2023. Unfortunately, this vision comes with challenges and dissensus. This new geostrategic and geopolitical orientation, part of the EU's response to these threats, has also led the EU to make disproportionate concessions to certain countries, to the detriment of the Union's credibility. The division on the issue of Serbia due to their stance on Russia, their ties with China and slow progress on the rule of law and media freedom is a case in point. In addition, the Western Balkans is a region where ethnic issues remain unresolved, as do historical questions and fragile governance infrastructures. This creates tensions within the candidate country, but also with other candidates and some EU countries, leading to internal EU disagreements and bilateral disputes. Von der Leyen's work is remarkable, but as the European Parliament and some EU countries have pointed out, it is important not to move too fast, for the reasons mentioned above and because there is still room for improvement with regard to corruption, money laundering, terrorism and illegal immigration.

Finally, despite being the most promising initiative, the European Defense Fund, which was initially due to receive 13 billion euros, actually received 5 billion euros less, a considerable cut. In addition, the war in Ukraine has also revealed challenges. The European defence industry remains fragmented, production capacity is limited, there is no clear coordinated planning of equipment procurement policies, and investment is insufficient. However, given that defence falls within the competence of the Member States, with the EU playing only a supporting and coordinating role, the 27 countries are primarily responsible for the state of the European defence landscape. In this context, the Commission's work is a positive step towards European strategic autonomy, which must be strengthened and supported by the members of the European Union. It is also in line with the need to improve European defence efforts by increasing EU defence spending at national level, structuring and strengthening the defence industry, improving European integration (for example, by building on the PESCO framework) and intensifying cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Priority 5: Protecting Our European Way of Life

Upholding the Rule of Law

In order to protect the rule of law, Ursula von der Leyen promised to support an additional mechanism for the rule of law and to protect the EU budget against violations of the rule of law. In 2019, this mechanism has been strengthened by introducing an annual report on the state of the rule of law in all Member States. This report examines positive and negative developments and includes recommendations in four key areas: the judiciary, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism and freedom, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances. In 2020, Parliament and Council reached agreement on the proposed Regulation protecting the EU budget in the event of failure by Member States to uphold the rule of law, leading the Commission to suspend or reduce budget allocations from the Multiannual Financial Framework. In March 2021, Poland and Hungary attempted to annul the Regulation, but the Court of Justice of the European Union did not recognise their arguments, making this new legislation even more credible.

Strong Borders and a Fresh Start on Migration

In the last few years, migration has been such a hot topic at both European and national level. In November 2019, the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, or Frontex, gave the agency the means to act. The aim was to provide more support and assistance at the EU's external borders, to help people whose stay has not been accepted to return to their country and to strengthen cooperation to manage migratory flows more effectively. To achieve this, Ursula von der Leyen has promised to have 10,000 fully trained and operational Frontex standing corps by 2024. However, this target has not been met, as they account for 2.500 approximately in 2024, and has therefore been postponed until 2027. After nearly four years of negotiations, the new Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted in May 2024. The new migration and asylum policy is built around four pillars: secure external borders (identification, security and health checks, asylum and migration database, border return procedure, crisis protocols and action against instrumentalisation), swift and efficient procedures (clear asylum rules, guaranteeing people's rights, EU standards for qualifying refugee status, preventing abuse) ; an effective system of solidarity and responsibility (permanent solidarity framework, operational and financial support, clearer rules on responsibility for asylum applications, prevention of secondary movements), and the integration of migration into international partnerships (prevention of irregular departures, cooperation on readmission, combating the smuggling of migrants, promotion of legal channels for working, studying and training in the EU). To achieve these objectives, a number of legislative dossiers form the backbone of the new pact. The Regulation on Migration and Asylum Management (RAMM) establishes a solidarity-based asylum system that replaces the current Dublin III Regulation. One of the main changes is that all Member States are now involved in the management of asylum applications, either by relocating refugees or by providing support (financial or operational) to Member States facing migratory pressures. The Regulation on screening introduces a screening process prior to the entry of irregular migrants, covering their identity, state of health and safety. This screening process will take place before arrival on the continent, within seven days outside the EU's borders, or within three days if they are apprehended on EU territory. The Regulation on the Asylum Procedure and the Regulation on the Return Border Procedure respectively establish a method for deciding on an asylum application and a mandatory border procedure for the asylum and return procedure at the EU's external borders. The Eurodac Regulation builds on the existing database to include information on applications and their authors, provided it is at least six years old (i.e. fingerprints, facial image, identity data, copies of travel documents and identity documents). Depending on the type of data, it will be kept for five or ten years. Other legislative texts include the Qualification Regulation, the Directive on Reception Conditions and the Regulation on Situations of Crisis and Force Majeure. The revision of the Directive on Long-Term Residents (REFIT) is currently being negotiated. The creation of humanitarian corridors coordinated at EU level is the subject of considerable disagreement. But the EU countries have managed to find common ground and have agreed on a Regulation on a Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework. However, for this regulation to be effective, it will depend on the willingness of Member States to create humanitarian corridors to the EU with international organisations, such as the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

Internal Security

The European Public Prosecutor's Office was created in 2017 and was operational in 2021. The EPPO can only investigate and prosecute (cross-border) offences affecting the EU's financial interests, such as corruption, VAT fraud or money laundering. Ursula von der Leyen's intention to give it the power to deal with criminal offences relating to cross-border terrorism never materialised because of the legal complexity involved. Another explanation is that cross-border terrorism remains under the jurisdiction of the Member States, with the help of the cooperation mechanisms of Europol and Eurojust. To strengthen internal security, she has also promised to improve customs controls and risk management. To begin with, a new Customs Action Plan was presented in September 2020 with the aim of combating fraud and counterfeit goods entering the EU. The plan proposed 17 actions in four areas: risk management, e-commerce management, compliance promotion and collaboration between customs authorities. In 2023, the Commission revised the Union's customs rules, the EU free trade area with a common goods tariff for the 27 countries of the Union, which date back to 2013, and proposed a Regulation establishing a Union Customs Code and an EU Customs Authority. The aim is to modernise and harmonise current procedures by establishing an EU customs data centre that will share data in real time, enable AI monitoring and centralise all customs declarations. This project will be overseen by the new EU customs authority, which will coordinate the work with national customs authorities.

Remarks

In total, VdL has completely fulfilled five of its nine promises and partially fulfilled two others. The President of the Commission has done what she promised to protect the rule of law. Yet the Commission could have done more but decided not to endorse the Parliament's 2016 proposal to introduce a monitoring cycle extending the scope to all EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, considered as a major step towards greater transparency. The idea was that this monitoring would be overseen by an EU values working group made up of representatives from the Commission, Parliament and Council, thereby making the whole process more transparent and credible. But the European Commission did not see this as a priority and chose to discuss it at a later stage. Regarding her work on migration, it has been fragile and has faced tensions and criticism over human rights violations due to Frontex’s actions (e.g.: pushbacks, detention of migrants at borders, racial profiling) as well as disagreements over solidarity mechanisms between EU countries. While her new pact on migration and asylum has demonstrated the EU's ability to act on such a sensitive issue, it has also been criticised for focusing too much on deterrence and security rather than tackling the root causes of migration or creating effective legal pathways and humanitarian corridors. The first ten pieces of migration legislation will not come into force until 2026 due to the two-year transition period. Until then, civil society, activists, NGOs and international organisations are exerting great pressure to ensure that the protection and fundamental rights of people seeking safety will not be compromised by these measures. Some recommendations, as listed by Rescue, a humanitarian non-governmental organisation (NGO), are to stop push-backs at European borders, move away from prison-like detention facilities, invest in the reception, inclusion and integration of refugees from day one of their arrival, ensure that the European asylum system is people-centred, or monitor the application process in a fair and transparent way. On the contrary, the digitization of customs procedures is an important step forward, as the Customs Union's forward-looking approach has been very well perceived and is considered to be the most ambitious since 1968. The new legislation, which is better adapted to e-commerce will make customs management easier for the authorities, promote transparency and make supply chains more secure and reliable. It is expected to save up to €2.7 billion a year. However, it is important to note that implementation will take place over the next few years (for example, the e-commerce data centre is scheduled for 2028).

decade. In Poland, under the Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2015, public broadcasters were taken over by PiS loyalists and turned into government mouthpieces. More recently, in 2021, a law was proposed to restrict non-European media, such as the American channel Lex TVN. In Italy, the situation is a little more complex, as the influence and concentration of ownership by political powers is questionable (for example, Berlusconi's ownership of Mediaset and Meloni's influence over Rai). State controls, intimidation methods and legal reforms are also being observed in other EU countries, becoming a major European issue. The work carried out by the Commission over the last few years must continue in the same direction if we are to avoid any democratic backsliding.

Then, regarding the latter, numerous steps have been taken, and legislative files finalised, motivated by the Belarusian interference in EU airspace in 2021, Russia interference in elections and disinformation campaigns, the 2022 Qatargate scandal, the 2022 Chinese interference in Lithuanian politics following Lithuania’s decision to deepen ties with Taiwan, or the Chinese influence operations to promote pro-China narratives about Huawei’s 5G rollout and the Belt and Road Initiative. For the past few years, the Commission clearly worked on protecting European democracy from foreign actors' interests, such as cyberattacks, financial support of European political parties, or disinformation campaigns. But because it is always possible to do better, one recommendation, as proposed by the European Partnership for Democracy, could be to ensure more transparency on the concrete actions taken, as well as their implications, to empower the EU and member States. It is also crucial that the work is not taken as granted, and that the EU works towards even more robust and resilient systems, as well as ensuring better enforcement.

More Transparency and Scrutiny

In June 2023, the Commission presented its communication on the creation of an inter-institutional ethics body. Later, in 2024, eight EU institutions (the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Committee of the Regions) signed the Agreement establishing the inter-institutional Ethics Body. The three main tasks of the ethics body will be to draw up common minimum standards, exchange information on the institutions' internal rules and promote cultural ethics. It will also aim to facilitate understanding of the work and framework of the EU institutions by those outside them. However, it is important to note that it will have no investigative or sanctioning powers, these being devolved to the European Public Prosecutor and the European Anti-Fraud Office.

To protect democracy, VdL promised to present a European Democracy Action Plan, which she did in a communication in December 2020. It is based on three pillars and proposes 30 measures. First, to promote free and fair elections, the Commission has proposed a new Regulation on the funding of European political parties to increase their transparency and financial visibility. The proposal is currently being discussed in the Council. An initiative called the “European Cooperation Network on Elections” has been launched, bringing together Member State authorities responsible for elections and serving as a platform for the exchange of information and best practices in the areas of e-voting, data protection, cybersecurity, transparency and awareness-raising. There have been 21 meetings since 2019. Secondly, to strengthen media freedom, the Commission called for independent national support services (legal advice, refuges, psychological support) to increase protection and online safety for journalists under threat through a Recommendation in 2021. This was supported in 2024 by the Directive on improving the protection of persons engaged in civil matters (e.g. journalists and human rights defenders) from abusive legal proceedings (SLAPPs) and the Media Freedom Act, which aims to ensure the transparency of media ownership and state advertising on media and online platforms, the protection of journalistic sources from the use of spyware and the independence of the media. Thirdly, to combat disinformation and prevent foreign interference in general, the Commission, working with the European External Action Service (EEAS), has supported the strengthening of the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) toolkit, the establishment of the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FIMI ISAC). A key to combating disinformation for the Commission was to ensure greater accountability of online platforms as they are able to analyse and filter content on social media. To this end, the new Code of Practice on Disinformation was signed in June 2022 and the Digital Services Act was adopted in October 2022. Both laws aim to protect and strengthen users and their fundamental rights from very large online platforms (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSEs) such as Zalando, TikTok, Ali Express, Google, Apple or Meta. They also aim to expose disinformation, increase the transparency of political advertising and improve fact-checking in all EU countries.

Protecting Our Democracy

Remarks

The Commission's overall work to protect European democracy has been divided into two main areas: seeking improvements within the EU and preventing foreign actors from interfering. Regarding the former, it can be said that the creation of an EU ethics body was an important step towards greater transparency in the EU institutions. Other efforts have also been made to strengthen citizen engagement, such as the European Citizens' Initiative and the Conference on the Future of Europe, which enables citizens to meet and discuss key issues with EU decision-makers. Efforts to improve transparency have also been made, such as with the EU law tracker, the new tool to track a legislative act from the moment it is proposed until it is adopted. But concerns remain about transparency, credibility and accountability. Spitzenkandidaten has not been improved (despite VdL being the very first lead candidate to run an election campaign). Despite requests from the European Ombudsman and petitions from the Parliament, VdL did not disclose text messages exchanged with Pfizer's CEO for the purchase of vaccines. In 2022, Qatarargate also eroded public confidence when senior MEPs were implicated in a corruption scandal. Much remains to be done to close the transparency gap, address ethical concerns and convince part of the population of the credibility of European institutions. Another issue, despite efforts to tackle it, is the independence of journalism and freedom of expression. In Hungary, a media monopoly has controlled the narrative in favour of Orban's government for over a

The European Electoral Law of 1976, which lays down the rules for the election process of members of the European Parliament, has been the subject of several amendments, such as the legal voting age of 16 instead of 18, a common election day across the EU or a gender-balanced list. In 2022, the Parliament proposed to introduce transnational lists for the 2024 European elections and to allow EU citizens to vote for the Commission President as the main candidate (Spitzenkandidaten). While Ursula von der Leyen's Commission expressed its support for the Parliament's initiative on a transnational list, its position on allowing EU citizens to vote directly for the EC President was more nuanced. Not only she, but the member states are not prepared to relinquish their power over the Commission leadership selection process. In the end, the proposal was not adopted. It can be observed that while the VdL supported institutional reforms aimed at improving the EU's democratic accountability, it did not insist on improving the system of leading candidates. There have been no (significant) changes to make the Spitzenkandidaten 2024 (Ursula von der Leyen) more credible, to link the election of the European Parliament with the presidency of the Commission, and to encourage Europeans to see themselves more as citizens of the EU rather than of their home country.

Improving the Lead Candidate System (Spitzenkandidaten)

Relations between the Commission and Parliament have indeed strengthened. Although the Commission has not put forward any proposals or binding legal changes to give the Parliament a right of initiative, it has responded to several requests from the EP by drafting proposals on digital legislation with the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, making considerable progress on the European Green Market and setting up the Next Generation EU. When it comes to briefings and discussions between the EC and the EP, there is clearly room for improvement. For example, during Brexit, the EU's chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, made considerable efforts to brief MEPs on the ongoing negotiations and obstacles. But for other events, such as international trade agreements, MEPs expressed disappointment, arguing that they were not kept informed, that it was not easy to access detailed negotiating documents, or their participation in consultations. Nevertheless, the Commission has participated in a number of “question hours”. For example, since 2022, Commissioners have answered MEPs' questions twelve times, once in March 2024, four in 2023 (January, February, April and November), and seven in 2022 (April, May, July, September, October, November and December). However, the main problem is that the effectiveness of this method is limited by the fact that the commissioner's answers are all prepared in advance and by time constraints. The involvement and presence of Commissioners in EP committee meetings and in the trialogue between Parliament and Council is another promise made by VdL to ensure a more collaborative and transparent legislative process. Factual data constraints make it difficult to assess the extent to which this promise has been kept. One argument in favour of this promise is that some Commissioners have engaged in discussions on high-priority dossiers such as the environment, digital, justice, competition or tax policies. The counter-argument is that these discussions are only superficial, with MEPs expecting Commissioners to engage in critical debates, and that many meetings, including trilogues, are held behind closed doors, limiting access to information.

Special Relationship with the European Parliament

Her promise to organise a Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) and to involve citizens in it has been kept. From April 2021 to May 2022, citizens from all over Europe were able to share their ideas in a series of debates and discussions. The conference produced 49 recommendations and over 200 proposals on how to improve the EU. Some ideas required treaty change, such as the need to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in certain areas, to have a transnational list for European elections, or to give the Parliament the right of legislative initiative. Despite the rhetorical support of European institutions for these ideas, it has met with resistance from member states, who are unwilling to transfer more power to Brussels at the expense of their national power and sovereignty.

A Greater Say for Europeans

Priority 6: A New Push for European Democracy

Ursula von der Leyen's first term of office (2019-2024) was marked by major upheavals, such as Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, rising unemployment, the war between Ukraine and Russia, inflation, and the housing and energy crises. These events not only forced her to manage periods of crisis, but also constantly redefined her agenda, revealing her strengths and weaknesses. She was perceived as a confident leader, capable of managing rapidly changing situations while maintaining a strong vision of the future. In fact, she has managed the EU's response to crises quite impressively over the last five years, filling the void left by uncertainties, questions and doubts at times when clear answers were needed. Her political agenda was ambitious, with a particular focus on creating a Green Deal, working massively to digitise the continent, enlarging the EU in the decades ahead and reaffirming the EU's role on the world stage. In her manifesto for her term as president, she made a total of 78 promises, fulfilling 53 of them, achieving partial results on 19 others, and leaving “only” 6 outstanding. During her five-year term, the Commission has accomplished a considerable amount of work, adopting legislation every four days, for a total of 378 legislative dossiers adopted, 102 under negotiation, 41 about to be adopted and 21 blocked. But the Commission President has also had to face criticism, which began early on. A few months after taking office in 2020, she was criticised for the slowness of vaccine procurement, for not disclosing the content of contracts between the EU and pharmaceutical companies, and for not publishing her text messages with Pfizer's CEO. Two years later, when Russia began its war in Ukraine, she faced major criticism for the slow and lacking unity of the European response to the Russian invasion. She also faced a difficult period when the imposition of sanctions was delayed and, once adopted, the energy crisis began due to dependence on Russian energy. On the whole, she has succeeded in assuming a strong geopolitical role, strengthening ties with the United States and the African Union, but also opening up the EU to East Asia, with discussions and agreements with Japan, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. Nevertheless, her “de-risking” approach to China, while endorsed by her Western allies, has also been criticised, with her main supporters arguing that the EU needs to take a firmer stance against Chinese influence, business and market distortions.

The European Green Deal is a milestone in European legislation. The ambitious goal of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 is one of the reasons why she was welcomed. With a total of 138 legislative dossiers submitted and one adopted every 20 days, this is the highest priority. This places the EU in a position of global leadership on climate issues and encourages the international community to do more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Yet Green Deal policies have been slow to be adopted or implemented in EU countries. The EU has also been criticised for not doing enough in the agriculture and transport sectors, given their importance to the EU economy. Another criticism, from external partners, concerns the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Initially intended as a tool to ensure that competitors from non-European countries with less stringent environmental laws do not underperform European companies, it was seen as a disadvantage by African countries, which could cost them billions of euros in lost trade. At the same time, the EU has announced a €300 billion program to support Africa's digital and ecological transitions. This led considerably to accusations of hypocrisy and a form of economic protectionism reminiscent of post-colonial relations. The continent's digital transformation was another important topic on his agenda. With 99 legislative dossiers presented in total, 55 of which were adopted, it was the third highest priority. Her approach to technology highlighted how it could contribute to achieving the EU's climate goals. The dual transition (green and digital) earned it recognition for its avant-gardism and for combining innovation with environmental responsibility. VdL also recognized the urgent need to make it easier for European SMEs to operate on the continent and to avoid many of them leaving for the USA, where the regulatory landscape is more favourable. The Commission has also really focused on striking a balance between the need to harness technology for Europe's benefit and the need to regulate tech giants to promote a fairer digital economy in Europe. However, this has led to two contentious scenarios. Firstly, it is unclear whether regulation, which is supposed to be directed at these market giants, will not be to the detriment of other European companies, now or in the future. Secondly, taxation and the protection of users' rights have raised tensions with US technology companies. It became clear that the Commission President was also confronted with other issues such as immigration, defence and respect for the rule of law. One of the arguments put forward is that migration policies focus too much on border control and deterrence, rather than tackling the root causes of migration. There have also been allegations of human rights violations. Furthermore, underfunding of defence prevents the EU from becoming strategically autonomous, which is a problem, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, and at a time of tension and conflict in many parts of the world. Furthermore, violations of the rule of law, such as democratic backsliding, restrictions on media freedom or judicial reforms in countries like Poland or Hungary, have not been sanctioned rigorously enough, leading to the view that Ursula von der Leyen was too lenient.

Accordingly, several recommendations can be made for her next term of office (2024-2029) as President of the Commission. Now that the legislative landscape has been set, with a total of 567 legislative files proposed for the six priorities, it will be essential to focus on the implementation phase and prioritise tangible results. Particular attention should also be paid to enforcement, such as trade and green policies, as well as respect for the rule of law. It is important for the EU that Brussels slows down the creation of policies and starts to pursue the goals set over the last five years for the decades to come. The EU should also step up its efforts in the fields of defence industry and coordination, energy security, as well as transparency and accountability. It will also be important for the EU to avoid locking itself into a bubble it has created to protect itself. While strengthening its internal market and protecting its values, the EU must remain open to diverse perspectives, avoiding the temptation to demonise other narratives in global dialogues and on online platforms and media. This will preserve democratic plurality and strengthen the EU's role as a diplomatic leader on the world stage and a free and democratic society. Finally, the EU is currently facing a number of economic challenges that threaten its overall stability and growth prospects. Issues such as supply chain disruptions caused by ongoing geopolitical conflicts, inflation, low growth rates, competitiveness and innovation, as well as monetary, fiscal and banking policies will be of utmost importance for Ursula von der Leyen's next Commission.

Conclusion

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