Article - Rethinking EU-Syria relations following the fall of Bashar al-Assad

The history of Syria was marked by political, social, and economic upheavals that have shaped its regional and international positioning. Under the authoritarian regimes of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad, the country experienced widespread discontent, fueling internal tensions and leading to the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. Syria's regional and international relations, already complex, were profoundly redefined by these events. What began as a popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad's regime quickly escalated into a multifaceted conflict involving regional and international actors with diverse interests.

Before the war broke out, relations between Syria and the European Union (EU) were characterized by limited cooperation. However, the onset of the conflict radically transformed this dynamic. The EU found itself facing a strategic dilemma, torn between its humanitarian and diplomatic roles, staying true to its normative power, and its security concerns, related to defending its own interests and managing the consequences of the conflict. This situation highlighted the complexity of the relations between Syria and the EU, and the challenges the European Union had to confront in a crisis with global repercussions.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad last December 2024 opened a new chapter in this dynamic. While Syria's political future remains uncertain, this event could redefine EU-Syria relations in a post-Assad context. This analysis thus reflects on the evolution of EU-Syria relations, examining the different factors that have influenced these relations both before and after the outbreak of the conflict.

The objective of this article is to analyze the relations between the EU and Syria, as well as their evolution, particularly after the onset of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Firstly, the Syrian context will be examined through an analysis of its regional and international relations under the regimes of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad, before and after the outbreak of the crisis. Then, the interactions between the European Union and Syria will be explored, distinguishing between the periods before and after 2011. Three key aspects of EU-Syria relations will be examined: the EU’s diplomatic support, the security dimension of its engagements, and the humanitarian efforts deployed in response to the crisis. This work will thus assess the importance of EU-Syria relations in a prolonged and uncertain crisis context, to later offer a perspective on the challenges and opportunities that await the EU in the face of a Syria in reconstruction.

Syria was under French mandate from 1916 to 1946, following the First World War and the Sykes-Picot agreements, which divided the Middle East into zones of colonial influence. Although the country gained independence on April 17, 1946, its transition towards a stable state was marked by persistent political instability. The defeat of the Arab League two years later, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, was a turning point in regional politics. The inability of Arab leaders to effectively defend their countries' interests weakened Syria, as it provoked a series of military putsches and failed stabilization reforms. On March 8, 1963, after years of internal conflict, the Baath Party seized power and proclaimed the Syrian Arab Republic. While its aim was to unify the Arab world under the slogan of Arab nationalism, their seizure of power did not put an end to the instability. In 1967, the Six-Day War against Israel turned into another defeat, making Syria even more vulnerable than it had been, and reinforcing the radicalization of the regime and certain members of the Ba'ath party, such as Hafez al-Assad. On November 16, 1970, he seized power in a coup d'état, establishing an authoritarian regime characterized by a cult of personality and systematic repression of the opposition. This context of apparent stability concealed a policy of total control and repression of political freedoms. When Hafez died in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad took power. Initially seen as a potential reformer due to his Western education and background as an ophthalmologist, many Syrians hoped he would introduce political and economic reforms to modernize the country. This optimism led to the Damascus Spring, a short-lived period of political debate and openness, where intellectuals and activists called for democratic reforms, human rights, and a multi-party system. However, this brief opening ended abruptly in 2001 when the regime arrested leading dissidents and shut down political forums. Bashar ultimately maintained his father’s authoritarian model, reinforcing state control, suppressing opposition, and strengthening Syria’s security apparatus. While some minor economic reforms took place, political repression continued, leading to growing dissatisfaction that would later contribute to the Syrian uprising in 2011.

Syrian Regional and International Politics

Under the Assad regime, Syria became a key player in regional politics, gradually occupying a strategic position in the Middle East, yet with complex and sometimes conflicting relations with its neighbours and world powers.

Regional Relations

Syria represents a paradox of regional power. Although it has suffered from structural economic fragility, it has succeeded in establishing itself as a central player in the Middle East. As early as the 1970s, it adopted a strategic posture that enabled it to play a decisive role in a number of regional issues. This influence has manifested itself through its control over Lebanon, its support for Palestinian factions on its territory, and its relative autonomy in the economic and commercial spheres. Unlike other Arab states, it has never joined the US-led alliance system. Its opposition to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its actions to complicate the mission of American troops, bear witness to its independent stance. Similarly, between 2004 and 2008, Damascus opposed the policies pursued jointly by France and the United States in Lebanon regarding its presence in the country. Syria has skillfully navigated the complex regional dynamics and capitalized on the contradictions among major powers, particularly the United States and France, to strengthen its influence in the Middle East. The fragility of its neighbors, too, has provided Syria with strategic opportunities, allowing it to employ a combination of diplomatic and military instruments to preserve its regional role.

First, Hafez al-Assad pursued a foreign policy based on Realpolitik, meaning he conducted diplomacy grounded in power dynamics and Syria’s national interests. Regionally, the Syrian President aimed to assert Arab national interests, but above all, Syrian interests. Lacking significant natural resources and geographically exposed to the Israeli threat, Syria needed its neighbors to assert control over the region and position itself as a leader. Al-Assad thus initiated an outreach policy toward other Arab countries, balancing pragmatic alliances and calculated rivalries to maintain his regional influence despite growing international isolation. Bashar al-Assad's accession to power in 2000 did not mark a major break with his father's foreign policy. The guiding principles of Syrian diplomacy remained unchanged, resting as ever on three fundamental pillars: the defense of national sovereignty, the preservation of Arab nationalism - the central ideology of the Baath Party - and the securing of the economic resources needed to ensure the regime's long-term survival. A central objective of Syrian foreign policy was also the return of the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967. This crucial geopolitical issue influenced Syria's stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and guided its regional alliances.

Building on this strategic approach, Syria’s foreign policy has been particularly marked by its complex relationships with neighboring countries, where its regional influence has been both reinforced and challenged through a series of key alliances and rivalries.

One of the most striking aspects of Syrian Realpolitik has been its relationship with Lebanon, shaped by Damascus' military occupation of the country between 1976 and 2005. Lebanon was seen as a strategic and security extension of Syria, and Bashar al-Assad's regime exercised tight control by influencing local politics and appointments to the Lebanese government. The signing of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in 1991 formalized this military presence, but this domination was brutally challenged after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. Under international pressure, notably via United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559 (S/RES/1559), Syria was forced to withdraw its troops, marking a major strategic setback. However, Damascus continued to exert its influence through Hezbollah, a key military and political player, consolidating its presence in Lebanese affairs.

At the same time, the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Jordan illustrated Damascus' ability to navigate shifting alliances. While common interests existed, particularly in economic and security matters, political differences, notably on the Palestinian question and relations with Israel, often led to tensions. Nevertheless, cooperation between the two countries continued when their respective interests required it.

Furthermore, the alliance between Syria and Iran, sealed during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, has been a fundamental pillar of Syrian foreign policy. Founded on a common opposition to Israel and Western influence, this cooperation has enabled Damascus to offset its growing diplomatic isolation. Thanks to this relationship, Syria has played a key role in the “axis of resistance”, supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, this alignment with Shiite Iran has also exacerbated tensions with the dominant Sunni countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt, complicating Syria's position within the Arab League.

Historically, Syria had maintained close ties with Riyadh and Cairo, notably as part of the “Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus axis” in the 1970s. This cooperation came to the fore during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which, although a military defeat, enabled Syria to temporarily strengthen its regional influence. However, the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, perceived by Syria and Saudi Arabia as a betrayal by Egypt, put an end to this agreement. Following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, relations with Riyadh and Cairo deteriorated further, isolating Syria even further on major regional issues.

At the heart of Syrian foreign policy was also its persistent conflict with Israel, a structuring element that shaped both its regional posture and its domestic politics. By positioning itself as the leader of the “refusal front”, Syria reinforced its legitimacy among certain Arab factions, while using this conflict to justify its authoritarian security policies. While indirect negotiations have taken place over the years - notably under American mediation in the 1990s and via Turkey in the 2000s over the Golan Heights - no peace agreement has ever been reached. This diplomatic impasse has enabled Damascus to maintain a posture of resistance, while maintaining influence on the Palestinian question through its support for Hezbollah and factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Faced with the military superiority of its neighbors, Syria has relied on asymmetrical strategies to support non-state actors, an approach that has enabled it to compensate for its conventional inferiority. This policy has led to involvement on several fronts: Lebanese and Palestinian against Israel, as well as Turkish and Iraqi after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. By maintaining contacts with various Iraqi, Arab and Kurdish political groups, Damascus sought to maintain its regional influence and prevent the emergence of an Iraq hostile to its interests. On the Palestinian question, Syria tried to mediate between Hamas and Fatah, exploiting internal divisions to consolidate its diplomatic weight. This approach was in keeping with the logic of asymmetrical warfare waged by proxy, while requiring an effective military deterrent capability.

From 2004 onwards, Syrian diplomacy was also accompanied by a desire to build economic alliances as part of the establishment of a “social market economy” (Seifan, 2011). Syria's military withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 prompted the regime to accelerate the liberalization of its economy and banking sector. Trade diversification became a priority, with a strengthening of economic partnerships with Turkey and Arab countries, particularly Iraq. Bashar al-Assad has also sought to capitalize on Syria's geographical position as a transit country for oil and gas pipelines, in cooperation with Iraq, Iran and Turkey. At the same time, investment from the Gulf monarchies - notably Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Kuwait - increased, supporting the regime's goal of strengthening the private sector and offsetting declining oil revenues.

Ultimately, Syrian foreign policy has been characterised by a delicate balance between alliances, confrontations and strategic manoeuvres, enabling Damascus to maintain a central role in the region despite growing diplomatic isolation. Indeed, despite the temporary successes of this approach, the regime failed to ensure lasting stability, illustrating the limits of its diplomacy and the fragility of its political model. A few weeks before the start of the Syrian uprising, Bashar al-Assad was still declaring that Syria would be spared the revolts of the Arab Spring, believing that his foreign policy corresponded better to popular aspirations than those of the pro-American regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet the demonstrations of March 2011 highlighted the widening gap between the stability sought internally and the regime's diplomatic ambitions. Contrary to official government rhetoric, the demonstrators' slogans made no reference to pan-Arab ideology. The absence of notions such as the “Arab nation” in the demands of the opponents reflected a new approach: for these Syrians in search of change, Arab identity could not fully exist without the prior recognition of a genuine Syrian citizenship.

International Relations

Syria's relations with the international community were complex and ambiguous, characterised by both dialogues with certain Western powers and increasing international isolation.

Under the regime of Hafez al-Assad, Syria maintained a complex strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. After the 1973 war, Moscow supported Syria by helping it develop its deterrent capability against Israel, but in return Syria refused any Soviet interference in its internal affairs. Hafez al-Assad established a partnership with the USSR, in exchange for military assistance, with Damascus guaranteeing Moscow a presence in the Middle East to counter United States (US) influence. However, the alliance was marked by disagreements, notably over Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Soviet support, though diplomatic, remained limited and did not materialize militarily unless Syria was attacked. Indeed, the USSR did not want to enter into direct confrontation with the United States and its allies in the region, principally Israel, which benefited from massive American military support. Moscow was aware that any direct confrontation risked escalating into a full-scale confrontation. Aware that the key to the conflict lay in Washington, Assad avoided getting too deeply involved with Moscow, also seeking to keep relations open with the United States and the West. Eventually, after failed negotiations and Israeli aggression in 1982, Assad signed a treaty with Moscow in 1980 to strengthen Syria's military capacity. This Soviet support, combined with regional alliances (notably with Iran and tacitly with Saudi Arabia), enabled Assad to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy from Israel and ensure the country's security. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1990, relations between Moscow and Damascus soured, pushing Assad to look after the United States. Bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria continued under President Bill Clinton, but they never led to a formal peace agreement. While it showed its openness to a peace effort in the Middle East, the Madrid Conference (1991) and Oslo Accords (1993) were not a (complete) success for Syria. During the Madrid Conference, negotiations between Syria and Israel hit a deadlock over the Golan Heights, which Syria demanded to recover in full, while Israel refused to relinquish it. Then, witnessing an improvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations, Syria reopened negotiations with Israel with the Oslo Accords. But once again, the Syrian peace process failed due to the unresolved issue of the Golan.

Despite being close to the USSR, Syria remained somewhat isolated on the international scene, particularly after the failure of peace negotiations with Israel during the Camp David conference and its support for resistance movements. Under Hafez al-Assad's regime, Syria became isolated due to its support for various militant groups, including Hezbollah and Palestinian factions, which were accused of terrorism. Syria's involvement in regional conflicts, its alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and its hostile stance toward Israel further isolated it from the West. These actions, coupled with Syria's role in destabilizing neighboring countries, contributed to its reputation as a state sponsor of terrorism. For instance, Syria was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in December 1979 by the US Secretary of State. The violence of the Assad regime was also a source of discontent for the international community. In 1982, for example, the Assad regime suppressed a Muslim Brotherhood revolt in the city of Hama, an event known as the Hama Massacre. Estimates of the death toll vary, but range from 10,000 to 40,000 civilians killed. This brutal act reinforced Syria's image as an authoritarian regime willing to use violence to maintain power.

On the international stage, Bashar al-Assad has tried to continue in the same direction as his father, namely towards international openness. The Syrian regime again attempted to relaunch bilateral dialogues. In particular, some high-ranking Syrian officials felt that the pressure exerted on their country since 2001 was partly due to poor management of its international image. Right from the start of his mandate, Bashar al-Assad held numerous interviews with the Arab and Western press, visited several European capitals and declared his willingness to resume negotiations with Israel. As part of this communication strategy, the prominence given to his wife, Asma al-Assad, also helped shape the image of a young, progressive and secular Syria. In 2008, the regional situation restored Syria's central role on the diplomatic stage. The fragility of its neighbors and the negative impact of Western policies in the Middle East led a number of states to once again recognize its strategic role. Concrete signs of this diplomatic warming have emerged, notably Bashar al-Assad's participation in the July 14th parade in Paris in 2008. But the Syrian president never truly departed from its role as a geopolitical adversary to Western powers. Indeed, despite attempts to modernize and open up, Bashar al-Assad continued his father's foreign policy, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, considered terrorist organizations by Western powers, and remained firm on his position regarding Israel.

In 2003, in response to its support for terrorist groups, its actions in Lebanon, and its ties with Iran, the United States sanctioned Syria through the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, based on previous sanctions already imposed. As a matter of fact, under Bashar al-Assad, Syria continued to maintain a strong military and political presence in Lebanon, especially through its allies, such as Hezbollah. Syria’s close alliance with Iran strengthened under Bashar al-Assad. This partnership was based on mutual opposition to the U.S. and Israel, as well as shared support for groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Iran provided Syria with economic aid, military support, and political backing, reinforcing Assad’s regime. More specifically, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, imposed sanctions on Syria for backing Hezbollah and Palestinian militant groups labeled as terrorist organizations, interfering in Lebanese politics and maintaining a military presence in Lebanon until 2005, and strengthening ties with Iran, which the U.S. saw as a growing regional threat. These sanctions aimed to pressure Syria to change its policies, but instead, Assad’s regime deepened its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, setting the stage for future conflicts, including Syria’s role in the Lebanese-Israeli war of 2006 and its later reliance on Iran during the Syrian Civil War.

The UNSC Resolutions S/RES/1559 of 2004 and S/RES/1680 of 2006, relating to the situation in Lebanon, reflected the Western stance towards Syria at the time, demanding the withdrawal of its troops, as well as an end to the political influence, and the support of militias and armed groups in Lebanon. Consequently, Syria once again faced isolation on the international stage.

On August 21, 2013, chemical attacks struck the suburbs of Damascus, killing hundreds and marking a key point in the Syrian conflict. Syrian rebels immediately accused Bashar al-Assad's regime of being responsible for the attack, while the Syrian authorities rejected these accusations, suggesting that rebel forces had used chemical weapons to manipulate international opinion. The event provoked a strong international reaction, with the USA, the UK and France denouncing the use of chemical weapons and calling for military strikes against the Syrian regime. However, Russia, China and Iran firmly opposed any military intervention, supporting the Damascus regime. However, there was growing opposition to the idea of military strikes in Western countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. The majority of public opinion in these countries rejected military intervention in Syria. On August 29, 2013, a motion in the British Parliament authorizing strikes failed, and on September 10, a similar vote in the US Congress was postponed, marking a turning point in the management of the crisis. This internal opposition to intervention allowed diplomacy to regain the upper hand. On September 14, 2013, an agreement was reached between Russia, the United States and Syria to place all Syrian chemical weapons under international control. This agreement, facilitated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), resulted in the withdrawal of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles by the June 30, 2014 deadline. This diplomatic process avoided military escalation while achieving concrete results in chemical disarmament. The 2013 agreement was seen as a victory for diplomacy, particularly for Russia, which played a key role in negotiating the deal. However, while the agreement reduced Syria's stockpiles of chemical weapons, it did not put an end to the Syrian civil war or to accusations of the regime's use of chemical weapons. The conflict continued to ravage the country, but this diplomatic agreement remains an example of crisis management through diplomacy, avoiding major military intervention while providing a partial solution to the problem of chemical weapons in Syria.

To conclude, Syria managed to develop a diplomacy that allowed it to build and maintain its power and role in the region, despite international pressure. However, this foreign policy also came at a cost, increasing Syria’s diplomatic isolation on the international stage and limiting its room for maneuver. It forced the country to confine itself to narrow alliances, while also weakening its internal situation—ultimately paving the way for the instability that would erupt with the 2011 uprising.

The Arab Spring and the Syrian Revolution

The numerous revolutions in several Arab countries, particularly after 2010, exerted pressure on the authoritarian and repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, which eventually led to the uprising of the Syrian population and the Syrian civil war.

The Arab Spring is a series of popular uprisings that shook several countries in the Arab world (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, etc) starting in late 2010 and throughout 2011. These movements of protest, driven by political, economic, and social demands, aimed at overthrowing authoritarian regimes, gaining more individual freedoms, and ending corruption. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor whose dignity had been violated by a local police officer. This act sparked large-scale protests against the authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was eventually overthrown in January 2011. The success of the Tunisian protests paved the way for other movements across the Arab world, including in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain.

The Arab Spring played out differently across countries. It highlighted the intense desire for change but also revealed the complex challenges in transitioning from authoritarian rule to more democratic or stable systems. In some cases, there were transitions towards more democratic systems, while in others, civil wars or prolonged conflicts ensued. The revolutions profoundly transformed the political landscape of the Middle East. These changes presented both opportunities and challenges for peace and security initiatives. Each country's experience was shaped by its unique political context, history, and external influences. Countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya experienced the overthrow of their governments, leading to major political transitions. Others, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, embarked on internal reforms to address popular demands while maintaining the existing power structures. Finally, nations like Yemen and Syria faced unstable situations with unresolved conflicts, threatening their national cohesion.

In Syria, the people, long subjected to an authoritarian and repressive regime, finally expressed democratic demands after decades of dictatorship under Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad. Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, many Syrians took to the streets peacefully to demand an end to the state of emergency, which had been in place since 1963, greater political freedoms, and an end to corruption and repression. However, if the Arab Spring was the 'detonator', inspiring the people to revolt, we cannot understand the Syrian crisis without taking into account the endogenous causes of the revolt.

More specifically, the economic reforms initiated by Bashar al-Assad when he came to power can help us to understand the discontent of the Syrian population. Since coming to power in 2001, Bashar al-Assad has implemented economic reforms inspired by the Chinese and Tunisian models, seeking to open up the economy while maintaining authoritarian political structures. However, the application of IMF recommendations has led to a deviant economic liberalism, favoring the appropriation of economic resources by a small group, what Caroline Donati calls “crony capitalism”.

Under Hafez al-Assad, power in Syria was based on rigorous control of the economy and a balance between the various political and military factions. The economic reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, known as “infitaḥ”, were implemented gradually, without upsetting state structures. Rather than opening up to the recommendations of international organizations like the IMF, the regime maintained strict economic autonomy. Economic decision-making involved several players, including the President, ministers, government committees and the Baath Party. The 1991 investment law illustrates this, as does the attempt to open a stock exchange in 1987. Although supported by the Minister of the Economy, this project was postponed for fear of a loss of state control, and did not see the light of day until 2008 under Bashar al-Assad. Hafez al-Assad's regime was based on the centralization of power and a game of strategic appointments that prevented the emergence of overly influential figures. The 1984 crisis, marked by rivalry with his brother Rifaat and tensions within the army, illustrates this authoritarian management: several high-ranking officials were removed to prevent any weakening of the regime. This control also extended to the economy, particularly informal channels. In 1993, the decision to put an end to illegal tobacco trafficking, which benefited officers stationed in Lebanon, demonstrated the regime's determination to preserve its financial resources and reassert its authority over all spheres of power.

Under Bashar al-Assad, power in Syria was a continuation of the system inherited from his father, marked by corruption and unemployment. His accession to power in 2000 was facilitated by a constitutional change, and he put forward a policy of “reform with continuity”. Rejecting any democratization based on foreign models, he favored an approach inspired by the Chinese model, where economic development took precedence over political openness. The 2000-2011 period can be divided into two phases. Between 2000 and 2007, there were two opposing currents within the regime: one reformist and the other liberal. The latter gained the upper hand, leading to an intensification of liberal policies from 2007 onwards. This economic orientation accentuated the already existing predatory dynamic and favors a “crony capitalism”, where the economy is monopolized by an elite close to power. Economic development focused on the tertiary sector and foreign investment, with no accompanying social reforms. Despite these warnings, the regime persisted with its liberal policies. In 2005, a reform project entitled “Syria 2025”, which proposed more balanced development, was rejected by the Baath party. At the party congress, the notion of a “social market economy” was introduced, but it remained a declaration of intent with no real impact on the regime's economic orientations.

In 2007, Bashar al-Assad's re-election and the renewal of his entourage strengthened his grip on power. He encouraged the rise of new businessmen close to the regime. This strategy led to the creation of major holding companies, notably Cham Holding, headed by his cousin Rami Makhlouf, and Souria Holding, controlled by a long-standing family ally. A wave of privatizations accompanied this economic restructuring, consolidating the influence of these conglomerates in numerous sectors. Cham Holding, led by Rami Makhlouf, became a dominant economic force in Syria, controlling key sectors such as communications, trade, construction, and tourism. Makhlouf also held a monopoly on cigarette sales and one of Syria's two mobile phone operators, Syriatel. Through state-backed manipulations, he ousted an Egyptian businessman from the telecom market, leading to public financial concerns and the arrest of MP Riad Seif. Makhlouf's business expansion caused conflicts with other entrepreneurs, including the Sanqar family, who relocated to Lebanon and later supported the Syrian opposition, funding the creation of the National Council in 2011. The concentration of economic power in Cham Holding made Syriatel a target during the uprising. Additionally, strategic alliances between Syrian companies and foreign investors, often solidified through marriages, further reinforced this economic structure .

The economic policy of liberalization has led to a neopatrimonialism system, where the alliance between the economic elite and the bureaucracy has given rise to high levels of corruption and networks of clientelism. Privatizations have fostered a cash economy and a “cash culture”, with some young people aspiring to quick profits by dishonest means. The weakening of the State, symbolized by the reduction in the number of civil servants, allowed the private sector to become the main employer, creating major economic inequalities. Wage differentials have widened and families' basic needs have risen considerably. Public spending, particularly in the education and health sectors, has been cut, worsening the social situation. In addition, the abolition of subsidies on basic necessities, particularly petroleum products, has harmed agriculture and seriously affected the rural population. In addition, a decree on border areas has created tensions, particularly among the Kurds, and enabled the state to reclaim land for commercial projects. This policy has also accentuated inequalities between different social classes and between urban and peripheral regions, profoundly altering relations between power and society.

Under Bashar al-Assad's regime, the regions most affected by economic policies have been hotbeds of armed rebellion. These outlying areas, often excluded from economic and social development, have experienced growing tensions that have fuelled conflict. A key example is Tell Kalakh, where repressive measures against smuggling led to violent uprisings. The city of Homs illustrates the correlation between social exclusion and violence, as it was economically and socially marginalized, despite a large-scale project to attract foreign capital, which has only benefited the elite. The urban peripheries, often made up of informal settlements, have also been the cradle of protests. These populations, often the result of rural exodus and hit by unemployment and marginalization, have seen their frustrations manifested in armed uprisings. Towns such as Mu'damiyé and Daraya, where residents have lost land to expropriation projects, have joined the rebels. In addition, economic measures such as the free-trade agreement with Turkey have exacerbated the situation, leading to business closures and rising unemployment in sectors such as textiles, hitting small family businesses hard. Finally, the disappointment of these populations, who were once the Baath Party's base, is a possible explanation for their switch to rebellion, their discontent being proportional to the expectations they had of the regime

To sum up, the "crony capitalism," i.e. this alliance between the business elite and the bureaucratic elite, primarily benefited Assad’s inner circle, leading to the accumulation of significant wealth for those close to the regime while much of the population fell deeper into poverty. Bashar al-Assad’s strategy of liberalizing the Syrian economy by opening the market to investors and foreign competition further deepened inequalities and exacerbated social tensions. This policy favored a small elite connected to the regime, while the basic needs of the broader population—access to housing, clean water, and employment—were neglected. This difficult economic situation, combined with decades of political repression and human rights violations, created fertile ground for revolt. In addition to Bashar al-Assad's economic reforms, his authoritarian regime prevented the rise of any opposition. The repression of political opponents and journalists became increasingly pronounced, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and dissatisfaction. As early as 2007, a Human Rights Watch report highlighted the systemic repression of the Syrian regime through restricted freedom of expression and a muzzled opposition. The report focuses on the severe repression of human rights defenders, who are often arrested, tortured, and subjected to unfair trials. These actions aimed to eliminate any form of dissent and silence civil society in the face of the regime's brutality. It also points out the constant surveillance of journalists, lawyers, activists, and civil society organizations. Activists live under a regime of fear, forced to work under increasingly difficult conditions, facing risks of torture, imprisonment, and reprisals against their families.

Weary of poverty and inequality and inspired by the Tunisian Arab Spring, the uprising erupted in February 2011, in the southern city of Deraa. A group of around twenty teenagers, aged 10 to 15, wrote graffiti on the walls of their school, inspired by the slogans of the Arab Spring: “Jay alek el ddor ya doctor” (“Your turn is coming, doctor”), a reference to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a former ophthalmologist. This act was perceived as an unacceptable provocation by the local authorities. The teenagers were arrested by security forces, transferred to the headquarters of the Political Security Directorate, and subjected to acts of torture. In response to the growing indignation among Deraa’s residents, a delegation of local dignitaries approached Atef Najib, Bashar al-Assad’s cousin and head of the local branch of Political Security, to request the release of the children. Najib allegedly replied: “Forget your children and go to your wives. They will give you more. And if you are not capable, send us your wives. We will make children for you”. Very quickly, demonstrations broke out in the city to protest against the abuse suffered by the teenagers, as well as to denounce corruption, abuses of power, and the regime’s oppression. While the first protests were peaceful, the response from the Syrian security forces was violent: protesters were brutally suppressed, arbitrary arrests multiplied, and the first deaths were recorded, further fueling popular anger. The protest movement soon spread to other regions of the country and eventually reached the capital, Damascus. Social media, particularly Facebook, played a major role in mobilizing Syrians: the page “The Syrian Revolution Against Bashar Al-Assad 2011” notably called for mass demonstrations in favor of “a Syria without tyranny, without emergency laws, and without exceptional courts”.

Initially being a popular uprising demanding greater freedom and an end to corruption, the movement gradually shifted toward an armed insurrection due to the regime's intransigence and military repression. Armed groups emerged, notably composed of defectors from the regular army, leading to the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The country soon fragmented into zones of conflict controlled by various actors: rebel groups, Islamist factions, Kurdish forces, while the regime maintained control over its strongholds. The militarization of the uprising, combined with sectarian divisions and foreign interventions, plunged Syria into a devastating civil war, the humanitarian and political consequences of which would be catastrophic.

The Syrian Conflict (2011-2024)

The Syrian civil war is an armed conflict that has been ongoing since 2011. It officially began with the repression of demonstrations in 2011, then rapidly evolved into a complex community and international civil war, with the involvement of numerous regional and global players.

From a Revolution to a Sectarian Civil War

After months of demonstrations, the Syrian army began to intervene to quell the uprisings. Violent repression escalated into civil conflict between the Syrian regime and various rebel groups. The Syrian civil war turned into a “communal” conflict exacerbating divisions between groups around confessional lines. Different groups, divided by sect or ethnicity, were involved in the Syrian conflict.

Bashar al-Assad belongs to the Alawite minority, a branch of Shia Islam, while the Syrian population is predominantly Sunni. To sum up, Shia Islam believes that leadership should remain within Prophet Muhammad’s family, specifically through his cousin and son-in-law, Ali. Shia Muslims emphasize the importance of the Imams, a line of leaders believed to be divinely appointed. Alawites are a sect within Shia Islam, but their beliefs include elements that set them apart from mainstream Shia doctrine, such as a belief in the divinity of certain figures and the importance of esoteric knowledge. They are primarily found in Syria and are often seen as a minority despite their political power. Sunnis believe that leadership should be determined by consensus among the community and that the first four caliphs were rightful successors to Prophet Muhammad. They represent the majority of Muslims globally.

So in Syria, Sunnis form the majority of the population, while the Alawites, though a minority, have controlled the government since the Assad family came to power due to their control of security and military institutions. The regime has used security forces, notably the Political Security and the Republican Guard, to suppress any opposition. This has created tension, especially as the Alawite-dominated regime, with support from Iran, a predominantly Shia country, and Hezbollah, a Shia militia, has been opposed by Sunni groups demanding more political representation and equality. The protest movement that led to the civil war actually started among the Sunnis, who demanded more freedoms and a better distribution of resources.

When war broke out, Sunnis divided into different rebel groups based on the different ideologies and historical backgrounds. These groups are often not unified because of differences in ideology, goals, and external support. While some seek a democratic, secular Syria, others, like al-Nusra and ISIS, want an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. Regional powers have supported different factions, further dividing the opposition and leading to internal conflicts. For example, Turkey supports more moderate groups, while Gulf states have backed Islamist factions, complicating unity within the opposition. Some of the main groups include:

The FSA was established in July 2011 by defectors from the Syrian military who opposed Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Initially, it was envisioned as the main military force of the opposition, seeking to unify various rebel factions under a single command. The FSA was composed mainly of Sunni soldiers and officers who abandoned the government forces to fight against state repression. The FSA operated as a loose coalition rather than a centralized army, which led to coordination issues. Despite being backed by Western and regional allies, including Turkey, the U.S., and Gulf states, it struggled to maintain unity due to internal divisions, lack of a clear political vision, and limited heavy weaponry. Over time, as the conflict became more complex, the FSA faced increasing pressure from Islamist factions, including groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, which had better organization and funding. By the mid-2010s, the FSA had fractured into various factions, with some groups integrating into Turkish-backed coalitions like the Syrian National Army (SNA), while others aligned with more moderate Islamist groups. Though it lost much of its early influence, remnants of the FSA continued to operate in northern Syria, especially in areas under Turkish control.

Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as the Al-Nusra Front, was founded in 2012 as an official branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria. It was composed of experienced jihadists, many of whom had fought in Iraq. Initially, it operated under the umbrella of the Syrian opposition, presenting itself as a group fighting against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. However, its strict Islamist ideology and Al-Qaeda ties made it controversial among other rebel factions. In 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra rebranded itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and claimed to have severed ties with Al-Qaeda in an attempt to integrate more with other Syrian opposition groups and avoid being targeted as a terrorist organization. Despite this, many observers believed that it still maintained ideological and operational connections with Al-Qaeda. JFS later merged with other Islamist factions to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017, becoming the dominant force in Idlib province. Although HTS presented itself as a more pragmatic Islamist group rather than a direct Al-Qaeda affiliate, its rule in Idlib has remained authoritarian, marked by crackdowns on rival factions and civilian dissent.

Ahrar al-Sham was a separate Islamist group that emerged in the early years of the Syrian conflict. Unlike Jabhat al-Nusra, it was not officially linked to Al-Qaeda, but it shared similar Salafist-jihadist ideologies. Ahrar al-Sham was part of broader opposition coalitions and sought to create an Islamic state in Syria while maintaining relations with Turkey and other regional backers. While Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham cooperated at times against Assad’s forces, they had significant ideological and strategic differences. Ahrar al-Sham sought to balance its Islamist agenda with alliances, while Jabhat al-Nusra/JFS remained committed to jihadist principles. Eventually, tensions between HTS (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) and Ahrar al-Sham escalated into open conflict, with HTS emerging as the stronger faction and consolidating its control over Idlib. ​​In 2021, Ahrar al-Sham joined forces with HTS to take part in the rebel offensive leading to the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, emerged as a radical Sunni jihadist group aiming to establish a global caliphate. The group initially began as Al-Qaeda in Iraq before rebranding itself as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and later declaring itself the "Islamic State" in 2014. The Islamic State, became one of the most notorious groups in the Syrian conflict. It formed in the early days of the Syrian civil war as the "Islamic State in Iraq," quickly distinguishing itself through its brutality and territorial gains. By 2013, ISIS established a proto-state in Syria and Iraq, declaring the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (Daesh). Their main objective was the establishment of a strict Islamic caliphate, and they sought the elimination of all forms of religious belief that did not align with their ideology. This included targeting other Sunni rebel factions as well as the Assad regime, further exacerbating the sectarian nature of the conflict. ISIS's rise transformed the dynamics of the Syrian conflict, shifting it from a popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad into a brutal insurrection marked by radical Islamist violence. As the group expanded, it drew in foreign fighters and became a central focus of international attention. The presence of ISIS, alongside other terrorist groups, further fragmented the opposition, creating a complex battlefield where different rebel factions, Kurdish groups, and the Syrian government struggled to find common ground. This fragmentation prolonged the war, deepened the humanitarian crisis, and exacerbated the destruction in Syria.

Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam) is an influential Islamist rebel group primarily based in the Eastern Ghouta region of Syria. It has been a significant player in the opposition to Bashar al-Assad's regime, especially in the suburbs surrounding Damascus. Jaish al-Islam is known for its commitment to an Islamist agenda but has been a more moderate force compared to extremist groups like ISIS and al-Nusra. While fiercely opposing Assad’s rule, it has also clashed with other jihadist factions such as ISIS. Over the years, Jaish al-Islam has been involved in negotiations both with other rebel groups and, at times, with the Assad regime, though it has not pursued significant peace deals. The group has often been portrayed as more pragmatic, focusing on establishing territorial control while attempting to maintain its legitimacy within the broader Sunni Islamist rebel movement. However, as the war has evolved, the group has faced internal challenges, such as competition with other armed groups and its eventual loss of control over parts of Eastern Ghouta to government forces in 2018.

In addition to Sunni rebel groups, many other players were involved in the Syrian conflict.

The Kurds, through the PYD/YPG, have also emerged as a key regional force in northern Syria. The Kurds are an ethnic group native to the Middle East, primarily found in regions spanning across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They have their own distinct language, culture, and history. The Kurds have long faced oppression and marginalization, particularly in Turkey and Syria. They represent a small part of the Syrian population and are located in the northern part of the country. Marginalized by the Assad regime, they seek greater autonomy from the Syrian regime and more political rights. The main Kurdish group involved in the conflict is the YPG (People's Defense Units), and the Democratic Union Party (PYD). They are part of a broader Kurdish nationalist movement, which also has links to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey. Turkey views the YPG as a terrorist organization, which has led to tensions and military confrontations. Despite these challenges, the Kurds in northern Syria have gained significant territorial control, particularly in the region of Rojava, and have become a key player in the Syrian Civil War, particularly in the fight against ISIS. The YPG led the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), incorporating other militias. The SDF became the main U.S. partner against ISIS but remains in conflict with Turkey, which backed groups like to counter Kurdish expansion. As a matter of fact, their alliance with the U.S. in this fight has strained relations with Turkey, which fears that Kurdish autonomy in Syria could embolden Kurdish separatists within Turkey. Turkey, considering the PYD, the YPG and then the SDF, especially due to their PKK links, as terrorists, has launched multiple military operations against them in Syria to prevent the spread of Kurdish independence movements across its borders.

The Druze, another minority branch of Shia Islam, primarily located in the south of the country, do not take a clear stance in the Syrian conflict. They are an ethnoreligious group originating from the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam, with unique religious beliefs blending elements of Islam, Christianity, and other philosophies. Primarily based in the southern parts of Syria (like the Jabal al-Druze region), the Druze have been wary of the rise of radical Islamism. They seek protection from both Sunni extremists and the Assad regime's forces. Their loyalty is divided, some supporting Assad for stability, while others resist the regime.

The Christians in Syria, including groups like Greek Orthodox and Maronites, represent a small but significant minority. Most Christians, particularly in areas like Aleppo and Damascus, support the Assad regime, fearing the rise of Sunni extremist groups. However, Christian opinion is divided—some factions have supported the opposition, especially where they felt the regime could not protect their rights. Their primary concern remains maintaining their religious freedoms and securing a place in Syria's future.

The complexity of finding an arrangement between Syria's various groups is rooted in a mix of historical, ideological, and political factors. Many of these groups carry deep-seated grievances from historical marginalization, such as the Sunni majority feeling excluded by the Alawite-dominated government. These divisions are further amplified by religious and ideological differences, with radical groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda heightening sectarian tensions, which makes reconciliation difficult. Political and survival interests also play a significant role, as different groups, such as the minorities (Alawites, Druze, Christians) or the Sunni-majority opposition, are motivated by self-preservation. Additionally, the Kurds seek autonomy but face opposition from both the regime and neighboring Turkey. External involvement from regional and international actors like Iran, Russia, the US, and Gulf states further complicates negotiations, as each actor has its own strategic interests and supports different factions. Finally, the militarization of the conflict, with the rise of various military alliances based on tactical goals rather than shared political objectives, has made it increasingly difficult to find a unified solution or a peaceful negotiation.

In short, Syria's fragmented political landscape, marked by a combination of sectarian divides, survival instincts, and external interference, has made it nearly impossible to achieve a comprehensive arrangement among the diverse groups involved in the conflict.

Escalation: the International Dimensions

The conflict, at first a community and regional affair, soon became international. The Syrian conflict, which broke out in 2011, has continued to grow in complexity due to the increasing intervention of foreign powers and regional diplomacy. The Syrian civil war has become a battleground not only between Bashar al-Assad's regime and its opponents, but also between external players with divergent interests. The involvement of these actors, both regional and international, has profoundly influenced the evolution of the conflict, the Syrian regime's strategy, and the geopolitical dynamics of the region.

On one side, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah have actively supported Bashar al-Assad's regime. Russia has provided air strikes and military aid, as well as diplomatic support through its veto power in the UN Security Council; Iran, through its military aid and support for Shiite militias such as Hezbollah. Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian Shiite Lebanese militia, supported the Assad regime by sending fighters to support Al-Assad's army. On the other side, the opposition was supported by various countries such as Turkey, the Gulf monarchies and the USA. Turkey supported various rebel groups such as the SNA, and was also involved in the conflict on Kurdish territory in Syria. The Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Emirates) were supporting rebel groups against Assad through military aid, particularly Saudi Arabia. Finally, the USA was involved in the Syrian conflict through military and financial support for certain rebel groups such as the FSA. They were also continuing their fight against terrorism through airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State.

Iran has been one of the Syrian regime's main supporters since the beginning of the conflict. This support has taken the form of direct and indirect military aid. As early as 2011, Iran sent military advisors to assist the Syrian army in its fight against the rebels. This support soon expanded to include foreign Shiite fighters and militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, financed and trained by Tehran. These forces have played a key role in consolidating Bashar al-Assad's power, enabling the Syrian army to maintain control over strategic areas, particularly in the south and west of the country. Iran has also used Shiite militias from Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These groups, often linked to paramilitary structures financed by Iran, not only fought alongside the Syrian army, but also enabled Iran to strengthen its influence in Syria and the Levant region. This intervention reinforced the regional aspect of the conflict, transforming Syria into an arena for indirect confrontation between rival powers.

Russia, meanwhile, has also played a crucial role in supporting the Syrian regime, but with broader geopolitical objectives. Since 2015, Moscow has stepped up its military intervention in Syria, sending aircraft and troops to support Syrian operations. Russia's interests in Syria are not limited to defending Bashar al-Assad's regime. Indeed, Russia sees Syria as an essential strategic partner, not least to preserve its Tartous naval base in the Mediterranean and maintain a military presence in the region. Russian military support enabled a turning point in the Syrian civil war, allowing the regime to regain several key territories from rebel hands. At the same time, Russia played a major diplomatic role, using its veto in the UN Security Council to block several resolutions that could have led to increased pressure on the Syrian regime. This military and diplomatic support has consolidated Russia's position as a key player in the region.

Lebanon, through Hezbollah, was a key player in supporting the regime, sending its fighters to defend strategic areas against the opposition. Shiite militias also played an important role in the confrontation against Sunni groups, reinforcing the sectarian dimension of the conflict.

The Daesh (ISIS) terrorist group has also had an indirect impact on the Syrian conflict. Although Daesh has been a bitter enemy of Bashar al-Assad's regime, the Syrian regime has sometimes used the threat posed by the organization to justify its continued rule and demands for international support. The regime has even been accused of enabling Daesh's rise to power by not systematically attacking it at first, allowing the organization to grow in certain regions. Furthermore, some reports have suggested that the Syrian regime may have exchanged resources, such as oil, with Daesh through intermediaries, contributing to the sustainability of both actors in specific areas.

The Syrian conflict has also been marked by interventions from regional powers that have exacerbated the complexity of the war. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and other Gulf states supported the Syrian opposition, providing arms, funding and logistical support. Turkey, for example, has played an active role in supporting Syrian rebels, particularly Islamist groups and the Kurds. On the other hand, other countries, such as Iraq and Lebanon, supported the Damascus regime, partly because of their political and religious affiliation with Iran, but also for strategic reasons linked to the stability of the region.

The international community, while concerned about Syria's plight and human rights violations, has been largely divided in its response. The US, the EU and some Arab countries have supported an armed opposition to the regime, but without effectively coordinating unified action. This division has enabled the Syrian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, to maintain its position. In addition, powers such as China supported the Syrian regime at the UN Security Council, vetoing any resolution aimed at isolating Bashar al-Assad.

The lack of a unified response has also allowed extremist groups like Daesh to flourish, creating a climate of instability that has extended beyond Syria's borders and had a major impact on neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. In addition, powers such as Russia have used the situation to deepen their geopolitical presence in the region, taking advantage of the weakness of Western diplomacy.

The internationalization of the Syrian conflict can be explained by multiple geopolitical interests within the international community. The conflict became a battleground between different regional powers. Indeed, as explained earlier, Syria is an important player in the Middle East and holds a key geostrategic position. The Syrian civil war was thus a proxy conflict between the various powers involved. On the one hand, the conflict has intensified regional rivalries by revealing the Sunni/Shiite divide, with Shiite Iran backing Assad (an Alawite) and Sunni states supporting the predominantly Sunni rebels. On the other hand, Russia using Syria to assert its power and counter Western influence, American in particular, as well as the international community's weak and hesitant response to the conflict, has shown the rivalries within the UN. The Syrian civil war actually constituted a diplomatic failure on the part of the international community, which, held back by divisions in the Security Council (veto power of Russia and China) has been unable to find a political solution to the conflict.

In short, one one hand, regional diplomacy and foreign intervention have played a decisive role in the survival of Bashar al-Assad's regime and the prolongation of the Syrian conflict. On the other hand, the Syrian civil crisis was a factor of regional destabilization and has highlighted the impotence of the international community and the blockage of collective governance mechanisms, making the search for peaceful and sustainable solutions even more complex. In addition to causing the suffering of thousands of Syrians (7 out of 10 Syrians requiring humanitarian assistance i.e.16.5 million people), the Syrian civil crisis has had considerable regional and global impacts. It has provoked an unprecedented humanitarian and security crisis, affecting Jordan and Iraq, and provoking a massive influx of refugees at the borders of neighboring countries and Europe (more than 6 million Syrian had left the country since 2011). Confessional divisions have been rekindled, particularly in Lebanon, with the massive influx of Syrian refugees. In Turkey and Jordan, the arrival of Syrians has posed a major challenge. Finally, instability and violence in certain Syrian regions have enabled the rise of Daech in the region.

The Humanitarian Situation

"Syria is the greatest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time. It remains a cause of suffering for millions of people and should generate a wave of global support," former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi.

Since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically, with devastating consequences for the civilian population. The conflict is now considered by the United Nations to be the worst catastrophe of modern times.

Hundreds of thousands of people have died as a result of the conflict. The United Nations Human Rights Office estimates that over 306,000 civilians were killed between 2011 and 2021, averaging 83 civilian deaths daily over the decade. Around 70% of the Syrian population is in need of humanitarian aid. Needs include access to food, drinking water, medical care and safe shelter. The economic crisis has pushed 80% of Syrians below the poverty line.

Since the start of the crisis, over 14 millions of Syrians have had to flee their home because of the violence and catastrophic living conditions. Among them, more than 7.4 million are still displaced within Syria. Others have found refuge in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while Europe has faced an unprecedented migration crisis since 2015. More than 6 million Syrian refugees live in countries neighboring Syria including Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

Civil infrastructures, notably hospitals and schools, have suffered massive destruction. This situation limits access to healthcare and education for a large part of the population. Access to basic necessities is also restricted, increasing the risk of disease and exacerbating already difficult living conditions.

The war has had a devastating impact on children, with millions deprived of education due to the destruction of schools and persistent insecurity. Many also suffer psychological trauma from prolonged exposure to violence. Around 2.5 million children have been forced to flee their homes, while millions of others have lost access to education and health services. 7.5 million children are in need of humanitarian aid, 6.4 million are in urgent need of protection, 2.45 million are out of school and almost 14,700 children have been killed or injured since the start of the conflict.

Despite the reduction in fighting in some areas, the humanitarian situation remains critical. The civil war has caused enormous destruction to Syria's infrastructure and immense suffering among the population, with thousands killed and injured. Reconstruction efforts are hampered by political instability, international sanctions and lack of financial resources. Humanitarian organizations continue to provide vital assistance, but access to certain areas remains limited due to the security situation.

Human Rights Watch's World Report 2023 on Syria highlighted several key points regarding the human rights situation in the country. On the side of the Syrian regime, Syrian security forces and affiliated militias continued to practice arbitrary imprisonment, enforced disappearance and ill-treatment of various populations, including children, people with disabilities, the elderly, returning refugees and residents of reconquered areas who had signed reconciliation agreements. On March 30, 2022, the Syrian government passed a law criminalizing torture, providing for penalties ranging from three years' imprisonment to the death penalty for acts of torture resulting in death or serious injury. On the opposition side, non-state armed groups such as the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS) have also been accused of human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions and ill-treatment of detainees. For example, in January 2022, an Islamic State attack on the al-Sinaa prison in Hassaké triggered ten days of clashes, killing more than 500 people and displacing at least 45,000.

Human Rights Watch and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have highlighted the obstruction of humanitarian aid by access restrictions and political obstacles, limiting the ability of humanitarian organizations to respond effectively to growing needs. The criminalization of humanitarian aid in certain areas has also complicated relief efforts, endangering the lives of civilians and humanitarian workers. Medical facilities have been systematically targeted and bombed throughout the conflict, considerably reducing the capacity of the health system to respond to the growing needs of the population. This destruction of medical infrastructures has forced humanitarian organizations to provide care in precarious conditions, often under constant threat. Displaced persons camps, such as Deir Hassan, are home to hundreds of thousands of people living in deplorable conditions. Limited access to drinking water, food and health services, combined with the constant threat of violence, creates an environment of despair and vulnerability for residents.The Al-Hol camp in north-eastern Syria, for example, is home to around 50,000 people, the majority of them children. Living conditions there are extremely difficult, with a lack of access to basic services and exposure to violence.

In short, Syria is facing a complex humanitarian crisis, requiring a sustained international response to meet immediate needs and support the country's long-term reconstruction. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, the EU and its member states have mobilized more than 35 billion euros to support the Syrian population, both inside the country and in neighboring countries. This financial commitment testifies to the importance of the EU as the main humanitarian donor in Syria. As we shall now see, this substantial investment by the EU is part of a complex relationship with Syria, marked by periods of cooperation and political tension.

To understand the relevance of EU and Syria relations, we are going to divide their cooperation into two phases. First, in the period prior to the Syrian crisis, the EU attempted to forge closer ties with Syria through economic and cooperation agreements, although they failed to conclude concrete agreements with real impacts. Second, after 2011, the outbreak of the Syrian civil crisis halted all attempts at cooperation, with the EU suspending development aid and focusing instead on humanitarian aid and sanctions.

Before 2011

Relations between Syria and the European Union have been marked by periods of limited cooperation, followed by gradual isolation of the Syrian regime after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011.

Historically, EU-Syria relations have been marked by periods of rapprochement, even despite European concerns about human rights and terrorism in Syria, with a strategy based on political dialogue and economic development. The first contacts between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Syria date back to 1964, when Syria expressed its desire to establish a diplomatic mission to the EEC. In 1970, Syria applied for European food aid, which was conditionally granted in 1972. This aid was conditional on specific development projects, with the constant aim of supporting economic, social and political development in Syria. These relations evolved to include conditions of financing and support, strengthening cooperation between Syria and the EEC/EU. In the 1970s, Syria strengthened its trade relations with the EEC, becoming its main trading partner. Economic and political reforms in Syria during this period also helped to warm relations with the West, marked by the signing of agreements with France and other European countries.

In 1974, Syria marked a turning point in its relations with the EEC by expressing an interest in diplomatic and commercial cooperation. In 1977, Syria signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the EEC to promote trade (oil exports and agricultural products) and encourage economic and technical cooperation. This agreement remains limited, however, as EU-Syria relations are complicated (different policies, human rights, etc.). But this agreement, even if it has no diplomatic significance, marks a first step in the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership that will see further developments. Indeed, it was not until 1995, with the Barcelona Declaration, that political discussions were incorporated into EU-Syria relations.

In 1986, relations were frozen following the “Hindawi” bombing (on April 17, 1986, Syrian security forces carried out an attempted attack on a plane belonging to the Israeli airline El Al departing from London's Heathrow airport). On this occasion, the EU imposed economic sanctions against the Syrian regime. Despite this, in 1991 the European Commission stressed the importance of maintaining dialogue with Syria, in view of its role in the Middle East and to avoid its isolation, despite concerns about human rights and democracy. Subsequently, relations between Syria and the EU warmed up in the 90s, with financial aid protocols (two protocols in 1992 and 1993 of 146 and 158 million ECU between the periods 1987-1991 and 1992-1996) and the holding of cooperation councils in 1994. The economic sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime since the “Hindawi” affair were lifted on this occasion.

In 1995, Syria signed up to the Barcelona Declaration, aimed at creating a Mediterranean partnership. The Barcelona Declaration’s objectives were (and still are) to bring together the EU and twelve Southern Mediterranean non-members countries (MNCs) to create a common space, where peace, stability and prosperity would be promoted through dialogue as well as political, security, economic, cultural and social cooperation between these countries. These MNCs were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The political and security partnership involved the promotion of regional security, the common fight against terrorism and organised crime, the commitment to respect fundamental human rights, as well as the principles of rule of law and the sovereignty of States. Through the economic partnership with the twelve Mediterranean countries, the EU aimed at establishing Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in which customs barriers would be gradually removed to trade in manufactured goods. This partnership also involved, among other things, the modernisation of economic and social structures, as well as agriculture, the promotion of free trade and regional cooperation and the development of the market economy. Finally, the social and cultural partnership aimed to create a space of intercultural dialogue and exchange through social media, educational and cultural programmes. Through the Barcelona Declaration, Syria aimed to draw closer to the EU, to benefit from the economic opportunities that a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade zone could bring, and to acquire international legitimacy and reduce the pressure of the US sanctions still in place. However, tensions still existed, because of the Syrian regime's involvement in Lebanon, a cause of regional unrest, as well as Syria's reluctance to sign an association agreement with the EU, due to differences over Brussels' demands. In 1998, negotiations began on an association agreement between the EU and Syria, but progress was slow.

In 2004, a provisional agreement was reached, but a month later, under French influence, the European Council suspended negotiations due to political considerations, particularly in relation to Syria's involvement in Lebanon. Despite the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, the disarmament of militias and the organization of Lebanese presidential elections free from any interference, the Syrian regime did not change its attitude and remained present in Lebanon. Some negotiations between the EU and Syria also took place within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), launched by the EU in 2004, in the same vein as the Barcelona Declaration and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, was aiming at strengthening ties with its eastern and southern neighbors by helping these countries to develop, ensure stability and encourage democratic reform. The main goal was to create a space of economic, security and political cooperation to ensure stability and prosperity. The ENP is financed primarily through the European Union's budget, utilizing various financial instruments designed to support the EU's external action. From 2007 to 2013, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) financed the ENP. Then, from 2014 to 2020, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) allocated EUR 15.4 billion to the ENP. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the successor of the ENI, aims to allocate EUR 19.3 billion to the ENP over the 2021-2027 period. Syria took part in the ENP in 2004 until 2011, but refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, because, as we already said, the Syrian government was reluctant to meet the criteria demanded by the EU, especially regarding its stay in Lebanon.

Within the framework of a Country Strategy Paper (CSP), a strategic plan signed over several years defining cooperation priorities between the European Union and a partner country (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, etc.) in areas such as human rights, education, the economy, etc., the EU was to support Syria between 2007 and 2013 in areas such as economic modernization, education, governance and social development. More specifically, the EU aimed at modernising the Syrian administration, pursuing the decentralisation process, strengthening the rule of law and increasing respect for human rights. The National Indicative Program (NIP) provided for up to 130 million euros of aid to support these projects through funding for economic and social projects, assistance with administrative reforms and encouragement of trade relations with the EU.

In 2008, Syria was a founding member of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The UfM, an intergovernmental organization that brings together 43 countries, including all European Union member states and 16 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, was established following the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It aims at promoting and strengthening cooperation and dialogue between the members still to ensure stability and development in the region. After a resumption of EU-Syria negotiations in 2008 under President Sarkozy, an agreement was almost signed again in 2009 within the framework of the UfM, but Syria postponed its signature, and eventually never signed it. Indeed, the association agreement proposed to Syria included unprecedented economic clauses and difficult reforms, raising concerns about the potential impact on the Syrian economy. At the same time, Syria was moving eastwards to strengthen its ties with countries such as Russia and China, gaining access to new economic opportunities.

To conclude, even though Syria was considered an important player in the region, cooperation between the EU and Syria before 2011 was limited and complex. Diplomatic relations between the two actors have been marked by tensions, notably due to Syria's positions on sensitive regional issues and its alleged involvement in controversial activities. The air strike launched by the Israeli air force in the Syrian desert, near Deir ez-Zor, on the Al-Kibar site, as part of Operation Orchard in September 2007, revealed Syria's secret attempt to build a nuclear reactor, further contributing to EU’s mistrust in Syria. Bachar al-Assad denied any nuclear activity and claimed that the site was a conventional military installation. However, an IAEA inspection in 2008 revealed the presence of man-made uranium particles, suggesting that this was indeed a nuclear site. However, above all, Syrian support for groups such as Hezbollah, its troubled role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its authoritarianism and human rights violations, as we have seen in the first part of this article, were the main concerns of the EU regarding its cooperation with Syria.

Eventually, when war broke out in 2011, EU sanctions against the Syrian regime halted ongoing development programs in the country: Syria’s membership in the UfM was suspended, as well as in most ENP programs, and the CSP strategic plan was put on hold. EU action in Syria then focused on diplomatic support, security issues and humanitarian aid.

After 2011

Diplomatic Support

After 2011, diplomatic relations between Syria and the EU broke down. The EU strongly condemned the repression and suspended all political cooperation with the Syrian government as it did not recognize Bashar al-Assad's regime as a legitimate partner. It was committed to humanitarian aid, but not to direct diplomatic cooperation with the Syrian regime. The organisation has consistently advocated for a political transition in Syria, emphasizing the need for a negotiated and sustainable political solution.

The EU supported the UN's efforts to organize peace negotiations, particularly the Geneva process, which aimed to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table for a ceasefire and political transition. Its position has evolved over time to include increased pressure on the Syrian regime, especially due to the escalation of violence and the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government. The Geneva negotiation process was established under the auspices of the United Nations in an attempt to resolve the Syrian civil war. This process was launched in 2012 with the goal of finding a political solution to the conflict, particularly a political transition involving a ceasefire and the formation of a transitional government. The first round, known as "Geneva I," took place in June 2012, with the main objective of establishing a transitional government, halting violence, and initiating constitutional reforms. A second round, "Geneva II," took place in January 2014, in hopes of reviving the negotiation process. However, in both cases, the discussions failed due to the difficulty of finding common ground between the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Geneva process continued afterward but was repeatedly unsuccessful.

Through the 2013 Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis, the EU set out priorities regarding the Syrian conflict. On the diplomatic front, it focused on supporting a political settlement of the conflict in Syria, leading to a democratic transition, while addressing the urgent humanitarian situation. It supported the efforts of the United States and Russia to revive political negotiations in Geneva, as well as the Joint Special Representative of the UN and the League of Arab States, and the UN itself. In the context of the Geneva II conference, the goal was to find a common approach with the USA and Russia regarding the representatives of both parties (the Syrian regime and the opposition). The EU maintained its commitment to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) while remaining open to cooperation with other moderate groups to help them establish themselves as credible interlocutors. It also promoted inclusivity and ensured that human rights were respected.

The EU also has developed a specific strategy for Syria, within the framework of the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq, addressing the threat of Daesh in particular. In addition to imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime, providing humanitarian aid to Syrians and refugees, and combating terrorist groups, the EU demanded a genuine political transition, based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. It refused to intervene militarily in the conflict, as only a credible political solution could guarantee Syria's stability. It therefore fully supported the efforts of the UN Special Envoy and the Geneva negotiations. In particular, it called for a ceasefire and the resumption of the Geneva talks, and offered its support to the Syrian opposition, as well as to a meaningful and inclusive transition in Syria, focusing on human rights and democracy.

“In diplomatic terms, the EU's main enemy is itself!’

While some remained positive about the EU's involvement in the Syrian conflict, others were concerned about its lack of influence over Bashar al-Assad. While the humanitarian aid provided by the EU to Syrians has been essential, many point to the EU's diplomatic failure in Syria.

In his report published in September 2017, Julien Barnes-Dacey analyzed the role Europe could play in bringing peace to Syria, focusing on a de-escalation strategy supported by a national political initiative. De-escalation efforts in Syria, such as local ceasefire agreements, have often failed due to the absence of a coherent national political strategy. Without a comprehensive political vision, these ceasefires remain fragile and risk leading to new phases of civil war. Barnes-Dacey proposed that Europe adopt a proactive approach by supporting a de-escalation process accompanied by active political engagement. Although Bashar al-Assad's continued rule was contrary to European principles of justice, the author suggested that Europe had no other choice if it wishes to end the conflict and bring peace to Syria. Barnes-Dacey concluded that, despite the challenges and compromises involved, the EU had to play a central role.

For others, the EU's failure to manage the Syrian crisis diplomatically, highlights the absence of a coherent strategy within the EU, its inability to play a major role in peace negotiations, and the ineffectiveness of its actions. Although the EU has imposed sanctions and provided humanitarian aid, these measures are deemed insufficient to resolve the conflict. Indeed, the economic sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime have had little effect on al-Assad, who continues to receive aid from Iran and Russia. Effective pressure against the Assad regime was essentially military, calling into question the impact of economic sanctions on a political transition. Federica Mogherini's appeal to the United Nations illustrated the EU's failure to adopt coercive security and diplomatic measures, which it seeks to delegate.

Furthermore, the EU was limited in its diplomatic approach to Syria, unable to significantly influence the situation on the ground. Indeed, while it has been a key player in terms of humanitarian aid, it lacked a coherent political strategy. The EU's internal divisions, with differences of opinion between its members on how to deal with the Syrian crisis, made effective joint action difficult. In 2013, the lifting of the embargo on arms deliveries to Syrian rebels demonstrated the difficulty member states had in reaching agreement. While some countries, such as France and the UK, wanted to lift the embargo to support the Syrian opposition, others, such as Germany and Austria, were opposed for fear of escalating the conflict. The lack of consensus among the 27 member states, leading to a deadlock, illustrates the EU's limitations in adopting a common position on foreign and security policy issues, and highlights the EU's lack of influence in managing the Syrian conflict.

Still others criticized the EU's response to the Syrian crisis, arguing that its discourse remained simply too indulgent towards certain actors, while being ineffective. At the start of the civil war, the European Union took a firm stance against Bashar al-Assad, demanding his departure from power. Over time, however, it adopted a more lenient stance. On the one hand, it has failed to take concrete measures to sanction the Syrian regime's human rights violations and war crimes. On the other, it has failed to bring about a democratic transition in Syria, not least because of the ineffectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Bashar al-Assad's government.

With the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011, the European Union had a strategic opportunity to reorient and revitalise its foreign and neighborhood policy. Rather than continuing an approach based on the stability of authoritarian regimes, the EU could engage in stronger support for democratic processes and economic reforms in the countries of the southern Mediterranean. To achieve this, it should have increased its economic and technical support to countries in transition, in order to strengthen their democratic and economic development. The concept of “more for more” was proposed: the more a country engages in democratic reforms, the more support it receives from the EU. However, despite the EU's announcement of a new approach to the ENP, in practice the EU has continued to apply traditional logics and practices. What appeared to be an overhaul of the Neighborhood Policy was in fact a continuation: the EU has maintained its strategic and security interests as priorities, rather than genuine support conditional on democratic reforms in its neighboring countries. EU development aid was used as a foreign policy instrument to encourage political and economic reform in neighboring countries. However, this approach had its limits, due to local political realities and the EU's inability to apply strict conditionality criteria. Despite official rhetoric, funding has often been distributed according to pre-existing logics, including to authoritarian regimes without significant reforms. In conclusion, the “more for more” strategy has proved largely ineffective, with strategic and economic priorities often taking precedence over the promotion of democratic reforms.

‘The Syrian case is a reminder of another aspect of the EU's foreign policy: the absence of hard power.’

To conclude, the EU has adopted divergent and inconsistent positions on the Syrian crisis, oscillating between firmness and indulgence towards Bashar al-Assad's regime. Although it has imposed sanctions and provided humanitarian aid, these actions have proved ineffective in influencing the situation. Divisions within the EU have hampered any coherent response, while economic pressure on Damascus has failed to produce concrete results. The “more for more” policy also revealed its limits, as strategic and security priorities often took precedence over democratic reforms. Despite its efforts, the EU struggled to exert a decisive influence, illustrating the absence of its hard power (use of coercive means such as military force or economic sanctions to influence the behavior of other international players) on the one hand, and the declination of its soft power (ability to influence others through persuasion by diplomacy, culture, development and humanitarian aid, etc.) in the management of the Syrian conflict.

The Syrian crisis has highlighted the structural and strategic limits of the European Union's foreign policy. While the EU was able to position itself as a major humanitarian player and expressed a clear desire to support a political transition in Syria, it proved incapable of transforming its principles into decisive action on the ground. The absence of a coherent strategy, internal divisions between member states, dependence on external partners such as the United States and Russia, and the inability to wield real coercive power (hard power) have greatly reduced its influence. At the same time, its soft power - essential to its diplomatic identity - has been undermined by contradictory choices and a less-than-rigorous application of its own principles, as demonstrated by the failure of the “more for more” policy. The Syrian example illustrates the tensions between the EU's stated ambitions and its actual ability to act effectively in international conflicts.

Security

Following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the EU cut virtually all security ties with Syria. The EU sanctions against the Syrian regime can be divided into five categories.

Firstly, the EU imposed sanctions targeting the Syrian government including for example the cessation of loans and technical assistance from the European Investment Bank (EIB). Before the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the EIB played a key role in supporting Syria's development through different financial and technical assistance programs, as part of the broader EU efforts to strengthen cooperation with countries in the Mediterranean region. The EIB's support spanned multiple sectors, including transport, municipal infrastructure, energy, and healthcare, aiming to modernize essential public services and boost economic growth. For instance, one of the major projects was the modernization of the Port of Tartous. In May 2003, the EIB signed a €50 million loan agreement with the Syrian Ministry of Transport to enhance port management and infrastructure, improving Syria's maritime logistics capabilities over the period of 2003–2006. In 2009, the EIB continued its investment with a €50 million loan for municipal infrastructure upgrades, directed at improving urban development, traffic systems, and environmental sustainability across Syrian cities. This initiative, granted to the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration, aimed to raise living standards and support local governance reforms. In the healthcare sector, the EIB also extended a €130 million loan in 2010 to finance the construction and equipping of eight hospitals in six governorates. The project also included the completion of the National Centre for Drugs and Public Health in Damascus, with the broader goal of increasing access to medical care and strengthening public health infrastructure. Following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and escalating human rights violations by the Assad regime, in line with the EU sanctions, the EIB suspended all loan disbursements and technical assistance to Syria in November 2011.

Secondly, the EU imposed sanctions against individuals involved in the repression of the Syrian population. Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and Council Regulation No. 36/2012 imposed targeted restrictions on individuals linked to the Syrian regime, including restrictions on asset freezes and travel bans. These measures specifically targeted individuals involved in the violent repression of the Syrian people, in particular those who directly support the Assad regime. These sanctions included the freezing of the financial assets of individuals and entities associated with the Syrian regime. This means that their property, bank accounts and other financial resources were blocked in the EU, preventing them from being used to finance repressive activities or operations linked to the Syrian regime. The freezing of assets aimed to limit the regime's access to financial resources that could be used to maintain or intensify repression against the Syrian population. The sanctions also imposed a ban on entry into the European Union for the individuals concerned. These travel restrictions were designed to cut these people off from international relations and make it difficult for them to access economic and political resources in Europe. The travel ban mainly affected political, military and economic leaders linked to the repression, but also their relatives and members of Syrian state-owned companies supporting the regime. The aim of these measures was to punish those responsible for the violent repression and limit their ability to act internationally, while signalling to the international community the Syrian regime's responsibility for the repression of the Syrian people. By freezing their assets and prohibiting their entry into Europe, the EU seeked to discourage any form of financial or diplomatic support for the Assad regime. Initially, Assad was not included on the list of people concerned by these sanctions, to provide a chance for diplomatic reforms. However, by 2013, after the EU acknowledged that regime change was unlikely, Assad and his family were added to the list.

Thirdly, there were also sanctions imposed on the repressive apparatus specifically, that included an arms embargo, as well as restrictions on the export of telecommunication equipment, oil, and gas from Syria. The EU first imposed sanctions on Syria in May 2011 including restrictions on the export of arms, telecommunications equipment, as well as oil and gas from Syria. An embargo was then declared, halting all financial relations with Syrian institutions and support for the Syrian regime. Between May 2011 and May 2013, the EU imposed an arms embargo on Syria, banning the supply of military equipment, arms, and items potentially used for internal repression. The embargo was extended until February 2013, but internal disagreements among EU member states led to its suspension in May 2013. These measures were set out through Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP and Council Regulation No. 442/2011. Together, these instruments formed the basis of the EU's political and legal approach to address the crisis in Syria. Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP established the political framework for sanctions against the Syrian regime. As part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the decision outlined broad sanctions, including an arms embargo and restrictions on various goods and services. These restrictions specifically targeted items that could be used for internal repression or to support the regime, such as military equipment, telecommunications gear, and oil and gas. This decision was primarily designed to pressure the Syrian government to cease its violent actions against civilians and move toward political reform. To ensure the effective implementation of these political measures, the Council Regulation No. 442/2011 was introduced. This legal instrument translated the decisions of the Council into binding measures for all EU member states. The regulation specifically included provisions to enforce sanctions such as the embargo on arms and restrictions on the export of goods like telecommunications equipment and oil. It also extended to financial measures, including a freeze on assets held by Syrian institutions, in an effort to cut off resources supporting the regime. In short, while Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP set out the political sanctions framework, Council Regulation No. 442/2011 provided the legal backbone to ensure that these measures were enforced across all EU member states. The two instruments worked together to apply pressure on Syria, targeting its military capacity and financial resources, while aiming to curb the regime's ability to maintain its oppressive actions.

Fourthly, the EU enforced sanctions targeting specifically at the energy sector. It imposed an energy embargo, specifically banning oil imports from Syria. This was a significant step, as such an action is uncommon for the EU to take without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The aim was to weaken repression by cutting off the Assad regime's sources of revenue. These sanctions focused on banning the import of oil and oil products from Syria, prohibiting the provision of insurance to the oil sector, the supply of technology for the oil and gas industry, and the granting of loans to companies engaged in the oil industry. It was forbidden to buy Syrian companies active in the oil sector. Sanctions in the electricity sector were also issued. It is forbidden, for example, to participate in the construction of new power plants, or to provide technical or financial assistance and the creation of joint ventures for this purpose. Regulation No. 36/2012, adopted on January 18, 2012, imposed a total embargo on the import of crude oil and petroleum products from Syria. The aim of this measure was to deprive the Syrian government of revenue from these exports, which account for over 89% of Syria's exports to the European Union. This ban was one of the most powerful of the economic sanctions imposed, as it affects a key sector of the Syrian economy, oil, which is used in large part to finance the regime's repressive activities. In addition to banning the import of these products, the regulation also prohibits the provision of insurance services to companies linked to this sector. This made it more difficult for the regime to continue exporting its oil, as cargoes must be insured by entities in the receiving countries, imposing an additional cost and complicating trade. Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 also imposed a ban on investment in Syrian companies operating in the energy sector. This measure prevented European companies from participating financially in Syria's oil and gas industry, thus limiting access to new financing for these sectors. The objective was to reduce the regime's ability to develop and maintain energy infrastructures, which were essential to its economic and military operations. In parallel, Decision 2013/255/CFSP, adopted on May 31, 2013, reinforced these measures by extending sanctions to the entire energy sector. It included a ban on participating in the construction of new power plants in Syria and also prohibits the export of technologies that could be used in the Syrian energy sector. This was intended to prevent any expansion of the energy sector, further depriving the regime of the ability to maintain its infrastructure and limiting the resources available for its repressive activities.

Finally, sanctions based on trade restrictions were set out, particularly by prohibiting cargo-only flights and banning the export of materials like gold and precious metals to Syria. The aim of these sanctions was to prevent significant improvements in the limited trade that remains after the ban on oil imports. By banning trade in luxury goods, the EU wanted to avoid participating in the repression by limiting their use to finance the Syrian regime and its allies. They also included prohibiting EU members from financially supporting Syrian nationals or entities in the long term, and discouraging them from doing so in the short term. Thus, through these sanctions, the EU was attempting to reduce the profits of the Syrian regime and its allies, without harming those not involved in the repression. However trade and import sanctions brought little result as they were not the EU's main target. Indeed, trade was not the regime's main source of revenue, unlike oil exportation. Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012, adopted on January 18, 2012, imposes restrictions on trade with Syria, banning the export of certain luxury goods, such as diamonds, gold and precious metals, and limiting trade in certain products considered non-essential for the population but likely to benefit the regime. The products concerned include luxury goods, accessories and products that could support the country's ruling elites. In addition, Decision 2011/782/CFSP of December 1, 2011, which complements the above-mentioned regulation, extends these trade restrictions by prohibiting the provision of financial services for commercial transactions with Syria. It also imposes stricter measures to prevent European companies or individuals from directly or indirectly supporting the regime through their investments or commercial partnerships with Syrian entities. This decision aims to restrict the regime's ability to resort to external financing to maintain its operations and repressive activities.

For the EU, the economic sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime were a tool for exerting pressure on Bashar al-Assad's regime. The aim was to weaken the Syrian president and pressure him to carry out political reforms and accelerate regime change. However, through the diversification of its international relations, strengthening its ties with Russia and Iran, these sanctions have failed to destabilize the Syrian regime, and by exploiting the war economy, Bashar al-Assad has been able to keep control of the situation and develop a survival strategy in response to the European sanctions. The EU, although determined to isolate the Syrian regime, ultimately failed to significantly influence Syria's domestic politics up to the point of the regime's collapse, in contrary to its expectations.

Another key point in the EU's security strategy regarding Syria was the fight against Daesh in the country and the region. In 2014, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) significantly impacted the European Union's response to the Syrian crisis. With IS taking control of major cities in Iraq and Syria and carrying out terrorist attacks in European capitals, security concerns emerged as a priority for EU member states. As a result, the focus shifted from advocating for the removal of Bashar al-Assad and a democratic transition in Syria to prioritizing the fight against IS. The EU's rhetoric, which previously emphasized democratic change, peaceful protests, and regime change between 2011 and 2014, gradually evolved to focus more on combating terrorism, ensuring the safety of European citizens, and addressing the migration crisis as a security threat. Essentially, the EU transitioned from a norm-driven approach to one centered on security concerns.

Through Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the ISIL / Da'esh crisis in Syria and Iraq of October 2014 and the Document on the elements of an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq and the Daesh threat in February 2015, the EU developed a regional strategy to combat the Islamic State. Through political diplomatic engagement, communication work, and practical support measures, the Document on the Elements of an EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq and the Daesh Threat aimed to combat the terrorist threat posed by Daesh and ISIL in Syria and Iraq in order to restore regional and international stability, and to promote a political transition in Syria to establish lasting peace. To achieve this, the EU strategy consisted of: (a) promoting regional engagement and dialogue in support of security and long-term peace; (b) defeating Daesh as a military force and terrorist organization by supporting anti-Daesh forces, and limiting resources such as the influx of foreign terrorist fighters, funds, and arms to Daesh; (c) preventing regional spill-overs and enhancing border security; (d) providing humanitarian aid and international protection to the Syrian population; and (e) strengthening local resilience capacities in Syria and other neighboring countries to prevent Daesh from recruiting more fighters and spreading more violence. On March 16, 2015, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on the EU's regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat. The EU strongly condemned Daesh's actions, including acts of violence, terrorism, and war crimes committed in Syria and Iraq. The EU emphasized its firm stance against Daesh destructive ideology and its attacks on civilians, religious minorities, and cultural heritage. The EU reaffirmed its commitment to fighting the threat posed by ISIL/Da'esh in these two countries and in neighboring countries, through the same objectives previously outlined in the Document on the elements of an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq and the Daesh threat of February 2015. Through the Council conclusions on the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat, the EU updated its approach to countering ISIL/Daesh, reinforcing political solutions, security, and humanitarian support. It built on previous strategies from 2015 but emphasized further coordination with regional partners and stronger local capacities to address the evolving security situation. The EU believed that peace in Syria depended on eliminating the terrorist threat alongside diplomatic efforts, political reforms, and socio-economic development.

The European Union's strategy towards Syria focused on two main areas: on the one hand, the imposition of tough economic sanctions against Bashar al-Assad's regime, and on the other, the fight against the terrorist threat posed by Daech. The EU sanctions, organized around five main categories - financial sanctions, targeting of individuals and entities linked to the regime, embargo on arms and dual-use goods, restrictions in the energy sector, and trade limitations - were aimed at weakening the Syrian regime and fostering a political transition. However, despite their symbolic scope and rigor, these measures had a limited impact on the internal dynamics of the regime, which was able to adapt its alliances and take advantage of the war economy to survive. From 2014 onwards, the emergence of Daech transformed the EU's security priorities. The initial objective of regime change gave way to a pragmatic approach focused on security, counter-terrorism, and regional stabilization. The regional strategy drawn up in 2015 illustrated this inflection, combining humanitarian aid, support for local forces, cooperation with regional partners, and resilience-building. This evolution reflects a shift from a normative policy to a more realistic security approach, revealing the limits of the EU's influence in a conflict where geopolitical and military logics outweigh economic and diplomatic pressures.

Humanitarian Aid

With the outbreak of civil war in 2011, the humanitarian situation became catastrophic: millions of people were displaced within the country or became refugees abroad (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan), entire towns were destroyed, and populations were deprived of food, water and healthcare. As we already stated, since the start of the crisis, over 14 millions of Syrians have had to flee their home, among them, more than 7.4 million are still displaced within Syria.

However, the Syrian crisis has not only impacted neighboring countries, but also Europe directly. In 2015, Europe faced a massive migration crisis. Before the Syrian conflict, the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 had triggered political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa, leading to wars and violent repression, particularly in Libya and Iraq. At the same time, thousands of African migrants, fleeing authoritarian regimes, internal conflicts, and extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, embarked on the journey to Europe. The Syrian conflict, added to this dual crisis resulted in a mass influx of refugees, putting immense pressure on European countries' reception capacities. Between 2015 and 2016, more than a million people arrived in the European Union, most of them fleeing the war and terrorism affecting Syria and other countries. Facing the mass arrival of refugees at the EU's borders, European governments encountered major challenges, having to manage borders, ensure decent reception conditions, and address security concerns while integrating populations from vastly different cultural and economic backgrounds. The EU also had to navigate internal divisions over the distribution of migrants, further escalating political tensions among Member States. In this context, Europe found itself balancing its humanitarian obligations with the need to address domestic concerns related to the economy, security, and social cohesion. To combat this crisis, the EU has adopted various measures, firstly humanitarian, to help people directly in the affected countries.

The EU has been heavily involved in providing humanitarian aid to the country. It has become one of the main humanitarian donors to Syria and its neighbors. Since the beginning of the conflict, it has constantly stressed the importance of supporting the Syrian population and neighboring countries hosting Syrian refugees. The EU has been promoting intensive humanitarian diplomacy and has been calling on the parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law, particularly regarding the inviolability of medical facilities and personnel, as well as to allow full access for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syrians in need. The Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis, adopted in June 2013, stands as one of the European Union’s most significant strategic documents outlining its policy and response to the Syrian conflict. In addition to supporting the search for a political solution and preventing the conflict from destabilizing the region, the EU, through this communication, expressed its commitment to addressing the humanitarian crisis by providing aid and assistance to the population.

More than 37 billion euros have been mobilized since 2011 for humanitarian aid, health, education, and assistance to refugees, including over 4.4 billion euros in humanitarian aid specifically for Syrians. The EU's humanitarian aid focuses on providing essential services to vulnerable populations. Aid is always channeled through international organizations, as no direct cooperation with the Syrian regime is possible. It is delivered through humanitarian partners, including NGOs, United Nations agencies, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Key areas of intervention include healthcare, food assistance, access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene, protection, shelter, and education services.

Despite these efforts, the humanitarian situation in Syria remains critical. Approximately 16.7 million people require assistance, highlighting the need for continued international mobilization. The EU emphasizes the importance of guaranteed, predictable, and sustainable humanitarian access to ensure effective aid delivery to Syrians. In 2024, the European Commission announced a budget of 163 million euros to provide humanitarian assistance to Syrians still in the country.

Since 2017, annual Brussels Conferences on the Future of Syria have been organized to mobilize humanitarian funds and support reconstruction. With over 4.6 million registered Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, including more than 2.8 million in Turkey, over 755,000 in Lebanon, and more than 564,000 in Jordan, the EU also provides humanitarian aid to these countries.

In Turkey, refugees face deteriorating living conditions due to the country's inflation crisis, making access to essential rights such as education and healthcare more difficult. Many refugees live in substandard housing and struggle to access sufficient food, sometimes resorting to child labor or begging to survive. The 2023 earthquakes worsened the situation, affecting approximately 50% of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In response, the EU mobilized 78.2 million euros in aid. Additionally, humanitarian projects have been implemented to support refugees and provide them with essential resources. Between 2012 and 2024, the EU's humanitarian aid for refugees in Turkey totaled 3.48 billion dollars.

In Lebanon, refugees have not only been facing poverty and food insecurity but also an economic and political crisis, as well as ongoing violence between Israel and Hezbollah. Following the October 7, 2023 attacks, an increase in internally displaced persons was observed. While estimating the number of refugees in Lebanon is challenging, UNHCR reports that around 40,000 Lebanese and 7,000 Syrians have returned to Lebanon. Syrian refugees live in dire conditions, with limited access to basic healthcare, education, or the labor market. In 2024, the EU allocated 92 million euros in humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in Lebanon, which was later increased following the escalation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Since 2011, 959 million euros in humanitarian aid have been allocated to Lebanon to assist both Lebanese citizens and refugees.

In Jordan, while refugees did not face violence as in Turkey or Lebanon, the COVID-19 pandemic and inflation have significantly impacted their lives, leaving them reliant on EU humanitarian aid. Refugees continued to live in difficult conditions, lacking access to basic rights. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the EU has provided 431 million euros in humanitarian aid to Jordan. In 2024, 14 million euros were allocated to health, education, and protection programs. Various initiatives have also been launched to support women and children—who represent more than half of the refugee population—by improving access to education and sexual and reproductive healthcare.

In addition to the humanitarian aid delivered directly to Syrians still on the ground by NGOs or UN agencies, and the aid provided to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, or Madad Fund ('sustaining' or 'reinforcing' in English), was created by the EU to respond to the regional consequences of the crisis. It does not finance projects in Syria itself, but in neighbouring countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees: mainly Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. The fund supports not only Syrian refugees, but also the local communities in these countries that welcome them in need. The Madad Fund was set up to complement traditional emergency humanitarian aid mechanisms, which were insufficient to respond to the Syrian crisis, with a more structured, long-term approach aimed at strengthening the resilience of refugees and local communities. Established in December 2014, the Madad Fund has mobilised 2.38 billion euros to finance over a hundred projects in various sectors such as basic and higher education, livelihoods, health, water and sanitation, protection and social cohesion.

Migration and Humanitarian Diplomacy

Beyond the direct humanitarian aid provided to both the Syrian population and the neighboring countries, the EU has had to adopt measures within its own territory to manage the influx of migrants. In this context, migration diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy have emerged as central tools in both the EU’s external relations and its internal governance of migration.

Migration diplomacy refers to the use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures by states to manage cross-border population mobility. While migration diplomacy focuses on the international management of migration flows, states can pursue two main strategies: coercive migration diplomacy and cooperative migration diplomacy. Cooperative migration diplomacy involves a state or coalition of states offering rewards, such as political or economic incentives, to a target state in exchange for their cooperation on migration issues. The goal is to establish mutually beneficial agreements without resorting to violence or threats. On the other hand, coercive migration diplomacy relies on threats or the actual use of force to influence migration flows. States adopt this strategy to pressure other countries into complying with political or economic demands. Unlike brute force, coercive migration diplomacy leverages the threat of harm or disruption to compel compliance.

Humanitarian diplomacy, by contrast, could be defined as all the negotiation, communication and advocacy activities carried out in emergency situations by humanitarian actors (international organizations, NGOs, States, etc.), in order to protect the rights and lives of vulnerable populations, facilitate humanitarian access, and promote respect for international humanitarian law, while adapting to the political and security realities on the ground. This type of diplomacy is different from traditional diplomacy in terms of its objectives (saving lives rather than defending state interests), its actors (humanitarians rather than professional diplomats), and its context of intervention (humanitarian crises and conflicts). It is based on international humanitarian law and on the humanitarian imperative.

Humanitarian and migration diplomacy have become central and strategic components of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey's approach provides a compelling illustration of how humanitarian concerns can be instrumentalized as tools of diplomatic and political leverage. Initially, Turkey engaged in humanitarian diplomacy by advocating for peace in Syria and offering direct humanitarian assistance—welcoming refugees and supporting affected populations. However, as the conflict dragged on and the number of Syrian refugees increased dramatically, this approach gradually evolved into a broader migration diplomacy, marked by a dynamic interplay of cooperation and coercion in Turkey’s dealings with the EU.

To better understand how Turkey's migration diplomacy unfolded and shifted over time, it is essential to examine the evolution of its response to the Syrian refugee crisis. This response can be traced through four distinct phases, each reflecting changing political priorities, domestic pressures, and strategic recalibrations in Turkey’s engagement with both the refugee population and the European Union. In the first phase (2011), Turkey adopted an open-door policy, expecting the conflict to be temporary. 248.660 refugees were placed in 22 shelters and none of the Syrian refugees have been returned to their homeland. However, in the second phase (2012–2015), as the refugee crisis persisted, Turkey began pushing for the redistribution of refugees to other states or international organizations, driven by the economic burden of hosting such a large population. From the third phase (2015 onwards), Turkey shifted towards using migration diplomacy more opportunistically. By 2015, over one million refugees had arrived in the EU via Turkey, prompting a shift in Turkey's strategy to exert leverage on the EU through coercive means. The fourth phase saw Turkey encouraging refugees to return to Syria, often under the guise of creating a "safe zone" in Northern Syria, though such proposals are met with skepticism due to the region's instability.

The turning point actually came in 2015, when the refugee crisis intensified. In response, Turkey began to use migration as a tool for coercive diplomacy, especially after the EU started to tighten its borders. In 2016, the EU and Turkey signed the EU-Turkey Deal, which included three main points: Turkey would take necessary measures to stop migrants from traveling irregularly to Greek islands; any migrants who arrived irregularly on the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey; and for every Syrian returned from the Greek islands, an EU member state would accept one Syrian refugee from Turkey. In exchange, Turkey received financial assistance, including €6 billion to improve the humanitarian conditions of refugees within Turkey. This agreement marked a significant use of coercive migration diplomacy, as Turkey capitalized on its control over migration flows to extract political and financial concessions from the EU. As of July 21, 2017, 7,807 Syrian refugees had been resettled to the EU from Turkey under this provision.

Despite the apparent success of this deal in reducing migration flows, the situation remained volatile. In 2019, Turkey once again used migration diplomacy to further its political objectives, including military operations in Syria. Turkey's actions demonstrated the power of coercive migration diplomacy as a tool for both political and economic leverage. In February 2020, Turkey escalated its coercive diplomacy, responding to European criticism of its military intervention in Syria by encouraging migrants to move toward the Greek border. Turkish President Erdoğan made clear that Turkey could use its control over migration to put pressure on Europe: "Hey EU, wake up! I say it again; if you try to frame our operation there as an invasion, our task is simple: we will open the doors and send 3.6 million migrants to you". In conclusion, Turkey's use of migration diplomacy in managing the Syrian refugee crisis has been a strategic tool, leveraging both coercion and cooperation to influence European policies.

But the EU’s migration diplomacy has also taken place within its own borders, notably through migrant relocation, border control, and humanitarian diplomacy, in an effort to manage the influx—particularly of irregular migrants.

In September 2015 Decision 2015/1601 was adopted by the Council of the EU in response to the 2015 migration crisis, which particularly affected Greece and Italy. Faced with a massive influx of migrants, this decision established provisional measures aimed at relieving the pressure on these two countries by setting up a program to relocate asylum seekers to other EU member states. The main aim of this decision was to redistribute migrants to other EU member states in order to offer them international protection. These measures were also intended to strengthen solidarity and cooperation between EU countries for more effective management of asylum applications and migratory flows. Relocation specifically concerned asylum seekers arriving in Greece and Italy, and each EU country undertook to receive a certain number of these people, according to criteria defined by the decision. The measures provided for in the decision are temporary, with a period of application scheduled until the end of 2017. However, the aim was to redistribute migrants within a reasonable timeframe while continuously assessing the migration situation. In addition, the European Commission and the national authorities of the Member States were working together to coordinate the implementation of these measures, in order to better manage incoming flows and ensure a dignified reception of migrants. This decision was an important part of the European effort to tackle the migratory crisis, and to reorganize the distribution of migrants more fairly across the EU. As of July 21, 2017, more than 24,000 people had been relocated in 24 participating countries countries, including 16,774 from Greece and 2,675 from from Italy.

Furthermore, to combat illegal crossings and migrant smuggling, reinforcing borders has become a priority for Europe. Regulation No 2007/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council established the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, commonly known as Frontex. Frontext's original mission was to coordinate and support member states' efforts to manage and secure the EU's external borders. Its aim is to facilitate operational cooperation between member states in border control, surveillance and the prevention of illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Its missions include coordinating joint operations at external borders, providing expertise, supporting the training of member states' border guards, and facilitating the exchange of information between border authorities. Frontext supports member states unable to secure their borders by providing assistance and resources. The organization is also responsible for carrying out border management risk analyses, and ensuring that information is shared between member states to enhance the effectiveness of border security efforts.

Through the Return Action Plan of 2015, the EU decided to involve Frontex more closely in managing migrants at borders. It was decided that Frontex would play a crucial role in the process. Specifically, the EU planned to make more systematic use of joint return operations coordinated by Frontex, and to provide specialized training for escort officers. It was also decided that Frontex's mandate could be extended to better support return operations.

Subsequently, Directive 2016/251 of the European Parliament and of the Council, adopted on February 16, 2016, strengthened the security of the EU's external borders. The main objective of this directive was to ensure effective and consistent management of the EU's external borders. To this end, it established minimum standards for border controls and surveillance, aimed at preventing illegal entry and countering transnational criminal activity, as well as terrorism. Member States were thus encouraged to improve cooperation not only between themselves, but also with European agencies such as Frontex, the agency responsible for managing external borders. This cooperation was aimed at strengthening the operational capacities of member states, notably through logistical support for Frontex in the most vulnerable areas, and the coordination of national strategies. In general, Frontext's capacities were being strengthened. In addition, the directive encouraged Member States to use shared information systems, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), to improve monitoring of the entry and exit of people. This system, along with other tools, made controls more effective and facilitated cooperation between Member States in managing external borders. Finally, the directive provided for specific measures such as training programs for border guards, to improve their responsiveness to crises such as waves of migrants or terrorist threats.

Eventually, Regulation 2016/1624 established the European Border and Coast Guard Corps, officially launched in October 2016, to best respond to the migration crisis. The corps was created with the aim of strengthening the security of the European Union's external borders in response to the growing challenges linked to migration, security and border management. It was designed to strengthen cooperation between EU member states and provide enhanced assistance in the management of common external borders. The main mission of the European Corps of Border and Coast Guards is to support Member States in their surveillance and control of borders, and in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. It provides operational capabilities, including border guard teams, equipment and training, to help manage migratory flows and secure borders. More than 1,550 agents were deployed to support member states at their external borders, in addition to the 100,000 border guards in member states.

The Syrian crisis has profoundly shaken not only the Middle East, but also Europe, provoking one of the most serious migratory crises of recent decades. Faced with the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe, the European Union has put in place a range of responses articulated around direct humanitarian aid, the relocation of asylum seekers, the strengthening of its borders, the return of irregular migrants, as well as migration diplomacy. These measures reflect the complexity of striking a balance between humanitarian obligations, security imperatives and internal political realities. While the EU has been able to mobilize significant financial, logistical and diplomatic resources to respond to this crisis, it has also been confronted with its own limitations, particularly in the face of divergences between member states and growing pressure from third countries such as Turkey. The management of the Syrian crisis has not only put the European Union's operational capacities to the test, it has also revealed the profound geopolitical stakes involved in migration, redefining the balance of power and the logic of cooperation on a regional scale.

December 8, 2024, marked a historic rupture in Syrian history with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, bringing an end to over five decades of authoritarian rule initiated by his father, Hafez al-Assad, in 1970. The swift collapse, triggered by the seizure of key cities by the armed group HTS, was met with scenes of jubilation across the country. For many Syrians, it signified the end of an era defined by repression, centralized power, and international isolation, and the beginning of a long-awaited political transition. In the wake of Assad’s downfall, Syria entered a deeply fragile and uncertain phase. By April 2025, an interim government led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa had taken shape, seeking to stabilize the country and chart a new political course. Key measures included the ratification of a five-year interim constitution and the establishment of a diverse transitional cabinet aimed at reflecting Syria’s pluralistic society. Yet, despite these early efforts, the challenges facing the country remain significant.

One of the most immediate consequences of the regime’s collapse has been a surge in sectarian violence, particularly targeting the Alawite minority—associated with the Assad family. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, in March 2025, more than 1,700 Alawite civilians were killed in coordinated attacks by Sunni militias and factions linked to the new ruling coalition in areas such as Latakia, Tartus, and Homs. The violence was indiscriminate, affecting even Alawites who had opposed the regime. The perpetrators include a mix of Sunni militias, some integrated into the SNA, and extremist groups like HTS. Although President al-Sharaa’s government has pledged to investigate these atrocities and safeguard minority communities, the scale and persistence of the violence have cast doubt on its ability to effectively do so. Over 30,000 Alawites have fled to neighboring Lebanon, seeking refuge from the intensifying sectarian threat.

In this turbulent context, the international community, particularly the EU, has recognized the unique opportunity presented by this moment in Syria's history. Having previously struggled to foster a political resolution to the conflict, the EU now finds itself in a position to play a critical role in Syria’s reconstruction, national reconciliation, and democratic transition. This evolving role represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU—one that is informed by past diplomatic failures but driven by the necessity of supporting Syria in rebuilding institutions, fostering social stability, and redefining its international posture. The EU’s engagement will be crucial, especially as Syria seeks to move beyond sectarian violence and develop a more inclusive political framework.

To this end, the EU has already taken significant steps. In February 2025, the EU Council decided to lift certain restrictive measures that had previously been imposed on Syrian institutions, recognizing that some sanctions no longer suited the changed circumstances on the ground. While sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the Assad regime, chemical weapons production, and drug trafficking remain in place, steps were taken to facilitate the reconstruction process. The Industrial Bank, the Popular Credit Bank, and several other institutions previously sanctioned were removed from the EU sanctions list, enabling their participation in the rebuilding efforts.

At the same time, the EU has committed substantial financial resources to Syria’s recovery. In March 2025, at the ninth Brussels conference, the EU pledged 2.5 billion euros for 2025 and 2026, raising the total aid provided to 5.8 billion euros. This aid will support Syria’s political transition, reconstruction efforts, and humanitarian needs, as well as address the challenges faced by neighboring countries hosting Syrian refugees. Additionally, in December 2024, Ursula von der Leyen announced the reinforcement of EU humanitarian funding, bringing total humanitarian aid for the year to 163 million euros. A dedicated humanitarian airlift operation has been set up to deliver supplies to those still suffering in Syria, with almost 100 tons of medical, educational, and shelter materials being sent via Turkey.

While the fall of the Assad regime marks a transformative moment in Syria's history, the road ahead remains fraught with challenges. The ongoing sectarian violence and the need for national reconciliation pose significant obstacles to stability. However, this period also presents an opportunity for the EU to recalibrate its role in supporting Syria’s democratic transition, reconstruction, and peacebuilding efforts. With the right commitment to human rights, inclusive governance, and international cooperation, the EU can play a key role in shaping a stable and prosperous future for Syria.