Article - Ursula von der Leyen's dual mandate: Delivering on Previous Promises (2024-2029)

In this second part of our analysis, each of the seven priorities set out in “Europe's choice”, vdL's 2024-2029 political guidelines, will be discussed, examining the relevance of the many promises made and looking for continuities, but also contradictions and inconsistencies with her previous 2019-2024 political program, “A Union that Strives for More”. The aim is to assess the coherence of the objectives of Von der Leyen's successive mandates, and whether her plan will be likely to save Europe from an uncertain future.

The first priority, “A prosperous, competitive and sustainable Europe”, is aimed at promoting investment for the spread of digital technologies and innovation, strengthening SMEs and industrial competitiveness, deepening the Single Market and harmonizing EU laws. The second priority, “A tailor-made European defense and security”, focuses on both the development of the European defense industry and the improvement of NATO cooperation as well as on migration flows and internal border management. The third priority, “A better European way of life for people”, promotes citizens' rights, such as social fairness, equality, youth engagement, social cohesion and affordable housing. The fourth priority, “A better quality of life for the people of Europe”, addresses nature, food safety and water issues, such as water resilience, oceans, the competitiveness of sustainable agriculture or the safety and sustainability of the food supply chain. The fifth priority, “Protecting democracy and European values”, aims to strengthen the rule of law by supporting independent media and involving citizens in decision-making, but also by combating disinformation operations by malicious actors. The sixth priority, “Europe's global leadership: power through partnership”, underlines the greater role the EU should play on the global stage by supporting the reforms of multilateral organizations, deepening trade relations and securing access to key raw materials, as well as promoting stability in the Middle East, Latin America or ASEAN. The seventh and final, “A new budget and reforms for a better future”, argues for a simplified and effective EU budget, focusing on common priorities that are also in line with national and private investment objectives, and supports treaty changes and decision-making reforms for a better Union.

Six months ago, on July 18, 2024, von der Leyen was re-elected by the MEPs for a second term as President of the European Commission, putting her at the helm of the EU for another five years. While this gives her the opportunity to defend the work she has accomplished over the past five years, it also comes with new challenges compared to when she first took office in 2019. New global challenges have arisen, particularly in the Middle East, such as the wars in Gaza and Yemen, and tensions between Lebanon, Iran and Israel. China is another major global player that the EU sees as a systemic rival. Tensions with Russia persist, with the war in Ukraine still ongoing and Russian interference operations not only fuelling disagreements and divisions between EU countries, but also altering the trajectory of post-Soviet states towards EU membership (e.g. Moldova and Georgia). The recent election of Donald Trump as President of the United States also brings challenges for the Union and the strategic autonomy of the “old continent”. The EU also faces internal challenges, such as inflation, energy security, the housing crisis, migration and global competitiveness (i.e. against the US and China). The 27 Member States will need to work together to resolve these challenging crises. The European elections in June 2024 and the right-wing victory in the European Parliament were a blow to the EU, fuelling populist and eurosceptic movements across Europe. What's more, democratic backsliding is threatening the rule of law in Member States such as Poland and Hungary. Therefore, Ursula von der Leyen will have her work cut out to lead the EU into better times, as many challenges await her and others are yet to come. Her second term will give her the opportunity to improve in areas where she has been criticized, notably by focusing on policy creation rather than policy implementation, particularly in areas such as climate, migration and digital transformation. Von der Leyen will have to deliver tangible results in line with the ambitious targets set out earlier. Accordingly, she will have to defend the seven priorities she has proposed.

Make Business Easier and Deepen the Single Market

As one of the Union's greatest achievements, the Single Market is crucial to the economic, social and geopolitical functioning of the EU, all the more so considering the ambitious goals set in response to unprecedented global challenges (e.g. achieving the fair, green and digital transitions, pursuing EU enlargement to promote a larger, more resilient Europe and enhancing defense capabilities to ensure peace and stability both within European borders and internationally, as well as supporting Ukraine). Although these objectives are of strategic importance to the Union, they require huge financing. For example, more than €200 billion is needed to achieve the goals of the Digital Decade, while between €342 billion and €620 billion should be invested annually by 2030 to achieve the goals of the European Green Deal 1, 2, 3. However, this is quite problematic as unlocking the full potential of the Single Market (i.e. the free movement of goods, services, capital and people) in its current configuration is hampered by persisting obstacles such as different national legal frameworks, non-harmonized licensing requirements, lack of harmonized tax systems, fragmented digital integration, non-recognition of professional qualifications or administrative burdens. Ursula von der Leyen therefore emphasized the need to strengthen the Single Market and tasked Enrico Letta with producing a report on how to achieve this. The report, published in April 2024, outlines concrete steps to remove the key barriers that are essential to ensure the Single Market can fully support the EU's strategic objectives. Enrico Letta focuses strongly on the promotion of knowledge diffusion (i.e. bridging innovation gaps, increasing competitiveness, supporting skills development), the enhancement of productivity (i.e. improving labour mobility, promoting high-value industries) and the completion of the Capital Markets Union (i.e. reducing dependence on banks, facilitating cross-border investment, mobilizing investment), which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

One key recommendation in Letta’s report is the “Single Market for Consumers”, which focuses on empowering consumers by improving access, information and protection of European consumers. Firstly, there is unequal access for consumers in some Member States who are prevented from accessing goods and services available in other Member States or who face barriers when purchasing products and services from other Member States. One example is Apple, which was warned by the European Commission in November 2024 because its services, including the App Store and iTunes Store, restricted payment options and prevented certain consumers from downloading apps offered in other EU/EEA countries, depending on the country in which they had registered their account 4. Such restrictive practices also exist in other sectors (e.g. manufacturing, transport, digital services, agri-food). To address this, the EU adopted different legislation, such as the Geo-Blocking Regulation in 2018, the Directive on unfair trading practices in agri-food business-to-business relationships in 2019, and the DMA in 2022. However, their effectiveness remains questionable as, with the exception of the DMA, there is no formal procedure for dealing with cross-border cases, which prevents national authorities from taking action. Nevertheless, the scope of the DMA is sector-specific and only applies to the largest digital platforms that meet certain thresholds for turnover, market capitalization and user base. This means that smaller companies offering digital services or other companies outside the digital platform economy that engage in anti-competitive practices do not fall within the scope of the DMA. To solve this problem, the EU should develop a formal procedure for cross-border cases that is standardized for all Member States. Secondly, there is an information asymmetry in product descriptions between the seller, who generally knows exactly the product, and the consumer, who has to take the commercial information provided by the seller for granted. In addition, there is often a lack of clear and accurate information about the origin, quality and environmental impact of products, whilst companies often exaggerate their sustainability claims. The current Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) and the Green Transition Empowerment Directive, both adopted in 2024, are a good step towards providing consumers with reliable and clear information about the durability, reparability and recyclability of goods at the point of sale. However, more information should be provided on sustainable mobility, food waste prevention and sustainable waste management. It is therefore crucial to impose EU-wide information obligations on sellers, e.g. through harmonized labelling and standardized information (e.g. geographical indicators, ecological footprint, allergens), so that labels are reliable, comparable and verifiable across the EU and consumers can make an informed choice before buying products. To this end, vdL should push for the Green Claims Directive proposed for 2023 to be adopted as soon as possible. And to prevent the already overloaded product packaging from being overloaded with additional information, one solution could be to use the Digital Product Passport (DPP), which provides access to extensive information by simply scanning a data tag. Thirdly, consumers are often exposed to unfair practices (e.g. hidden fees, price discrimination based on information collected on the internet, fake countdown timers, unfair contract terms, pre-setting of options, misleading advertising) and are vulnerable to harmful products (e.g. counterfeit or malfunctioning products). To address these problems, national consumer protection authorities and/or the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) could enter into a dialog with the companies using these techniques to put an end to such unfair practices. As regards the proliferation of harmful products, it is essential to complete the current legal framework (e.g. EU General Product Safety Regulation, Toys Directive, Low Voltage Directive, Pressure Equipment Directive). Letta proposes that the Commission takes the lead and coordinates Member States in the development of common artificial intelligence tools for inspections to detect and flag dangerous non-food products in the EU rapid alert system “Safety Gate”.

Ursula von der Leyen also announced the EU's Better Regulation Agenda, which aims to simplify legislation to support SMEs, strengthen accountability through better enforcement and implementation, and streamline legislative procedures between the EU institutions. Firstly, the Union urgently needs to make it easier for European SMEs to operate on the continent and prevent many of them from relocating to the US, where the reason for this move is a more favorable regulatory environment. In fact, the EU's risk-averse regulatory approach has led to an excessive amount of overlapping regulations that hinder the dynamism and efficiency of the Single Market. In fact, 55% of SMEs in the EU cited regulatory barriers and the administrative burden caused by regulation as the biggest obstacle to investment 5. To unlock the full potential of the Single Market, it is therefore crucial to improve the implementation of existing rules for goods and services. By overcoming obstacles such as red tape, significant additional compliance costs or legal uncertainty, several hundred billion euros can be freed up by 2030, a considerable amount that is urgently needed for the European Union. Several objectives were put forward by von der Leyen in this respect, based on Enrico Letta’s recommendations. For example, she has promised to present proposals to simplify, consolidate and codify legislation, and to eliminate overlaps and contradictions. For this to be effective, Letta proposes a “two-tier” approach to simplification programs. On the one side, technical simplification, which should address obsolete, overlapping and unnecessary legislation (e.g. provisions superseded by newer regulations, divergent national technical standards, duplicative reporting requirements), could be implemented through omnibus legislation, a single legal act that consolidates several amendments or repeals. On the other side, political simplification, which should address fundamental and controversial reforms (e.g. VAT rates, labor law, climate policies), could be achieved through in-depth dialogue with governments, business, civil society and EU institutions, balancing their divergent interests. As envisioned by Letta, all these simplifications and harmonizations of business regulation could be consolidated in a European Code of Business Law, a comprehensive and unified legal framework covering company law, contract law, consumer protection, insolvency law and labor law. In a broader perspective, such initiatives would be part of the ambition to introduce a new legal status, the 28th regime, one of vdL's objectives. Under the 28th regime, an optional EU-wide framework, SMEs and innovative companies would be able to choose whether to comply with the different national laws of the 27 Member States, as they currently do, or to operate under this single set of rules. For businesses, the 28th regime would simplify the administrative burden and compliance costs (e.g. different licenses, multiple tax requirements), allow them to scale up across the Single Market and ensure that they compete on a level playing field in all Member States. At EU level, the 28th regime would play a key role in completing the Single Market by removing many of the existing barriers to cross-border trade and business activity and leading to a single regulatory environment. Ultimately, this would make the EU more attractive to businesses, which would boost innovation, investment, job creation and competitiveness. Speaking of the competitiveness of SMEs, Ursula von der Leyen promises to introduce a new approach to competition policy that would better align with EU priorities (e.g. green and digital transitions), ensuring that SMEs can compete in emerging markets, and providing exemptions or simplifying procedures for mergers, acquisitions or applications for state aid. At the same time, she intends to propose a new SME and competitiveness check, which would assess the potential effects of proposed regulations on SME activities, costs and performance. This assessment would serve as a starting point for proposing simplifications or exemptions for SMEs where possible, in order to reduce compliance costs and administrative burdens. She also envisages creating a separate category for small and medium-sized enterprises, which is currently set at over 250 employees or €50 million in sales, in order to help them become larger companies. At the moment, neither the specific details of this new category nor the possible simplification measures have been defined. WSecondly, better enforcement and implementation (i.e. fewer differences in the application of laws across Member States) would ensure that laws deliver the intended benefits, e.g. consumer protection, economic growth, digital transformation or environmental protection. Ultimately, this would advance the objectives of wider priorities, ensure effective allocation of resources and encourage accountability and reform among Member States. Thus, Ursula von der Leyen promised to call on the Commission to produce annual reports for the EP and the Council on the enforcement and implementation of EU legislation. Such annual assessments would make it possible to better track progress and hold the responsible actors accountable for delays or failures in the implementation of legislation. Letta goes further in his analysis, acknowledging that remedial mechanisms such as SOLVIT, the national administration service responsible for resolving disputes relating to the misapplication of EU rules, need to be strengthened. For example, SOLVIT's effectiveness is hampered by inadequate staffing levels, lack of control and different procedural standards (e.g. delays in decisions, loss of the possibility of appealing administrative decisions). He recommends establishing a legal framework for SOLVIT, replacing the Commission's Recommendation on the principles governing SOLVIT with a legally binding European Regulation. Such a transition would facilitate greater consistency in the interpretation of EU law and uniform application of procedures across all SOLVIT centers. To further consolidate such enforcement instruments, he also stresses that they should be complemented by the creation of “National Single Market Offices” (NSMOs) in each Member State and a “EU Single Market Office” (EUSMO) at the EU level. NSMOs would monitor the application of EU Single Market legislation, identify systemic issues, and act as a single point of contact for SMEs needing to navigate cross-border regulatory issues. Though some countries have already taken steps to create NSMOs, such as the Danish Business Authority, not all Member States have done so. There are also wide variations in the tasks, capacities and effectiveness of these national offices. The EUSMO, which would be a new entity as it does not currently exist, would identify cross-border trends and systemic barriers in the Single Market by aggregating and analyzing data from the National Coordination Points, advise the European Commission on improving regulation based on systemic issues identified by the National Coordination Points and SOLVIT, and provide an additional escalation level for unresolved SOLVIT cases. Thirdly, vdL promised to renew the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on Better Lawmaking. The agreement, which was first adopted in 2003 and updated in 2016, regulates cooperation between the EP, EC and Council in the legislative process. Its renewal would and should strengthen cooperation between the EU institutions in order to reduce delays and improve coherence in the legislative process and make legislative procedures more accessible to stakeholders, businesses and citizens.

Build a Clean Industrial Deal to Decarbonise and Bring Down Energy Prices

After launching the European Green Deal in 2019, von der Leyen will focus on implementing the existing legal framework of the European Green Deal over the next five years. During her previous term of office, a list of regulations and directives aimed at combating climate change, promoting sustainability and ensuring the transition to a green economy was produced. Central to this is the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which aligns EU policies with the 2030 climate target set out in the European Climate Act. Now the time has come to translate these ambitious targets and plans into tangible action and to ensure that Member States meet their obligations under the agreement. If the EU fails to meet the interim targets for 2030, which is likely, there is a good chance that this will derail the long-term ambitions of the Green Deal 6, 7.

To turn things around, the President of the Commission is committed to focusing her efforts on strong enforcement mechanisms, financial support and a shared commitment from all Member States. She is looking to introduce an interim target for 2040 of a 90% reduction in emissions and enshrine this in EU law to ensure the long-term continuity of the policy regardless of political changes. This is important because without this interim target, there is a risk of losing momentum if the 2030 targets are met, or motivation if they are not. This is complemented by maintaining the EU's leadership role in climate diplomacy. Ursula von der Leyen wants to ensure that the EU is able to shape international agreements by bringing ambitious climate action, with a particular focus on the upcoming COP30 (in 2025) in Brazil. It will be key for the EU to advocate for alignment with the 1.5 degree target of the Paris Agreement while strengthening partnerships with climate vulnerable regions outside the EU, such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Another important part of her vision concerns the decarbonisation of European industry, an important pillar to drive the net-zero industrial pace and at the same time position itself as a world leader in clean technologies. In her first 100 days in office, she will present a New Clean Industrial Deal and later a new Clean Technology Trade and Investment Partnership. Together they aim to secure access to raw materials (e.g. lithium, cobalt, nickel) and expand trade in clean energy and technologies (e.g. solar cells, battery systems, wind turbines). Indeed, it is important for the Union to secure access to raw materials that power clean technologies such as wind turbines, batteries, solar cells and electrical wiring. As the EU is highly dependent on importing them, any disruption to supply chains could jeopardize the EU's energy transition, as in the case of the semiconductor shortage during COVID-19. The New Clean Industrial Deal will also aim to streamline approval procedures for clean energy and industrial projects and use existing EU programmes such as InvestEU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to financially support such projects. The two upcoming laws will be accompanied by the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, which is intended to help energy-intensive industries to introduce clean technologies more quickly. The most important measure of this Act will be to create financial incentives (e.g. grants, low-interest loans, tax relief) and to channel investment into infrastructure and industry 8. To this end, an Industrial Decarbonisation Fund could be established, which may also support research, development and deployment and promote clean industrial clusters and innovation hubs.

In response to the significant rise in energy prices in the EU due to COVID-19 and the Russian war in Ukraine, von der Leyen made it clear that reducing energy costs for companies and households is at the heart of her agenda. This is all the more true as the EU has a significant competitive disadvantage in the energy sector compared to major global players such as the United States and China. Around 60% of companies in the EU say that energy costs are a barrier to investment, compared to 38% in the US 9. In terms of traditional energy resources, the EU is highly dependent on oil, gas and coal imports, which makes it very vulnerable to global price fluctuations and geopolitical disruptions. This is mainly due to the fact that Europe's domestic reserves of fossil fuels are limited. In terms of green energy technologies, the EU is experiencing delays in the construction of renewable energy infrastructure (e.g. wind and solar farms), mainly due to resistance from local communities and complex approval procedures. To address that, she proposes activating and expanding the aggregate demand mechanism, leveraging the principle of “economies of scale”. Put simply, the idea is to use collective buyer power by pooling the energy demand of several stakeholders (e.g. Member States, companies) in order to negotiate better prices, terms and conditions for energy procurement from suppliers. This would leverage the collective purchasing power of the EU to secure lower energy prices and more stable supply contracts. Mario Draghi, who has been tasked with drafting a report on improving European competitiveness, supports this idea. In his report, he proposes using the EU Energy Platform, which currently acts as an intermediary tool that matches aggregated demand with available supply on the market, to go a step further and enable the joint procurement of gas as well as other energy commodities such as electricity or hydrogen.

To support sustainable transport, vdL will propose a Single Booking and Ticketing Regulation to improve the accessibility and attractiveness of rail travel in the EU. This is urgently needed as the rail sector is currently facing fragmentation in terms of booking systems, fare structures and poor train connections. For example, the new Regulation will introduce a single ticketing system that will allow passengers to purchase a single ticket for cross-border train journeys, including journeys with multiple operators 10. In parallel, interoperable platforms for booking such tickets must be developed and access to reliable information on fares, timetables, delays and train cancellations must be improved. European high-speed rail networks that better connect European capitals will also be supported, requiring increased investment in rail infrastructure and network maintenance by the EU-27 11. This will not only benefit passengers (e.g. cost savings, improved travel experience or convenience) and rail operators (e.g. more passengers and increased revenue, improved efficiency), but also the EU's sustainability objectives. Given the EU's objective to reduce transport emissions and the fact that rail is one of the most environmentally friendly modes of transport (i.e. less than 1% of total transport emissions), the Regulation could encourage a modal shift from car and air to rail and thus contribute to the EU's Green Deal objectives by reducing emissions and congestion. However, as the BEUC (“Bureau Européen Des Unions De Consommateurs”) emphasizes in its recommendations, the Commission should not only focus on the technical aspects of making it easier to issue and book tickets for rail travel. It is equally important to strengthen rail passengers' rights, as they are currently hampered by shortcomings in the implementation and enforcement of passenger rights legislation. This is because the 2021 Rail Passengers' Rights Regulation provides for the possibility for Member States to be exempted from certain provisions. As a result, around 64% of train services in the EU are covered by such exemptions, which means that only a small proportion of rail passengers actually benefit from the protections and rights provided for in the Rail Passengers' Rights Regulation. In Sweden, for example, passengers on rail services travelling less than 150 km are not entitled to the usual compensation or assistance for delays or cancellations (Chapter IV). In Ireland, passengers with disabilities or reduced mobility may face accessibility and assistance restrictions on domestic rail services (Chapter V). Such national exceptions should be completely abolished. It is also important to establish common legal definitions for the liability of railroad undertakings, infrastructure managers and third party platforms, agreeing compensation mechanisms and automatic reimbursements between the parties involved, providing national authorities with investigative and sanctioning powers and imposing severe penalties for non-compliance with the Regulation.

A More Circular and Resilient Economy

As explained in the previous part, the EU has already adopted several measures to promote the circular economy as part of the EU Circular Economy Action Plan, which is part of the EU Green Deal. However, the action plan itself is not clearly linked to the slight increase in circular economy activities and the targets set out in the CEAP will be difficult to achieve. This is mainly because much of the effort is focused on improving waste management and setting recycling targets rather than addressing the market gap in demand for secondary materials. Accordingly, vdL promised to put forward a New Circular Economy Act that would create market demand for recycled and reused materials (e.g. through bans or restrictions on non-recyclable materials, carbon pricing, subsidies for recycled materials) and establish a Single Market for waste. This is in line with Letta's recommendation to embed circular economy principles into the single brand by creating a Single Market for circular economy that not only supports environmental sustainability but also boosts economic growth by promoting innovative business models and consumer behavior. The new Circular Economy Act would initially aim to stimulate demand for high-quality recycled materials. In order for the EU to improve access to circular materials, it is important to set mandatory requirements for the minimum content of recycled materials in products in particularly sensitive sectors, as demonstrated by the new Battery Regulation or the revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive. It will therefore be crucial for the Commission to focus on the careful implementation of the ESPR in order to establish sustainable products throughout the European market. The new Act would then gradually create a Single Market for waste, as recommended by Letta, to harmonize waste standards (e.g. definitions, classifications and quality requirements for recycled materials), simplify cross-border waste trade and introduce EU-wide digital systems to track waste streams in order to reduce illegal waste shipments.

Promoting the security, sustainability and resilience of the EU healthcare system is another of von der Leyen's priorities. Firstly, she promised to present a new Chemicals Industry Package to simplify REACH and provide clarity on “forever chemicals” (PFAS), since these are highly correlated with environmental sustainability as they contaminate soils, water and ecosystems and dangerously affect public health. REACH is the EU chemicals regulation that ensures the safe use of chemicals and at the same time promotes innovation in the chemical industry 12. For example, it registers and assesses the safety of chemicals that companies manufacture or import and restricts or gradually bans the use of substances with unacceptable risks. The simplification of REACH is very important as the regulation leads to a high administrative burden for SMEs as multiple levels of compliance and overlapping regulations create inefficiencies 13. In terms of reporting and transparency requirements, both the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) require companies to disclose sustainability-related risks, which leads to duplication in reporting. The ESPR, with its product-specific transparency requirements, overlap with the CSRD and the European Sustainability Reporting Standards Regulation (ESRS), which provide for disclosures at company level. In terms of product sustainability standards, both the ESPR and the Regulation on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP) emphasize transparency in the environmental and safety labeling of products. As the CLP Regulation focuses on the labeling of hazardous substances and the ESPR requires product labels to disclose environmental impacts (e.g. energy consumption, recyclability), this again leads to duplication of effort. A significant part of the new chemicals package addresses PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances), man-made chemicals that are used in products such as cookware, textiles, firefighting foams and packaging due to their water and grease repellent properties. The problem is that they are highly persistent, which has earned them the nickname ''forever chemicals'', and cause health problems associated with cancer, hormonal disruption, immune system damage and developmental disorders. It is therefore crucial that the new legislation defines and establishes clear guidelines for the identification of PFAS, bans their non-essential use when safer alternatives are available, sets deadlines for the elimination of these substances in highly affected sectors (e.g. textiles, packaging), improves monitoring of contamination of water, soil and food, and establishes remediation programs for contaminated sites and products. This objective of lowering exposure to PFAS aligns with the broader strategies on preventive health. von der Leyen intends to address health challenges, including the side effects of remote working, cardiovascular diseases, degenerative illnesses, and autism, building on the success of the Beating Cancer Plan as it successfully demonstrated the impact of prevention-focused strategies. Therefore, her preventive health approach should promote early detection, healthier lifestyles, and access to innovative treatments. Secondly, similar to the EU Chips Act, vdL plans to present a Critical Medicines Act, which would reduce the EU's dependence on non-EU countries for ingredients for critical medicines, particularly China 14. It is crucial to secure active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) to ensure the self-sufficiency of the chemical industry, which is central to the EU's strategic autonomy. The Act is expected to boost EU manufacturing capacity by providing incentives and funding from the next MFF, diversify supply chains by building partnerships with reliable global suppliers while reducing over-reliance on single regions, and build up safety stocks to ensure availability even in times of crisis 15. Thirdly, in her first 100 days, she will propose a European Cybersecurity Action Plan for Healthcare to better protect hospitals and healthcare providers from cyber-attacks that threaten patient safety, data integrity and business continuity. Key actions under the Cybersecurity Action Plan could include the acceleration of the modernization of hospitals' and healthcare providers' IT systems and support them in implementing modern cybersecurity solutions, the creation of a central EU framework for cyber-attack detection, response and recovery, and the introduction of EU-wide standards for cybersecurity in healthcare (e.g. data encryption, secure communication protocols, network security) 16. As von der Leyen has focused on creating standards for cyber regulation in her first term, such as with the updated Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2), the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), the requirements under the Medical Device Regulation (MDR), the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR), the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and the AI Act, it is now time to focus on their effective implementation. For example, guidelines for the implementation of the NIS2 Directive in the healthcare sector could be developed and disseminated via ENISA's toolkits 17. The European Cybersecurity Action Plan for Healthcare should also promote best practices for digital resilience, such as ICT risk management measures (i.e. strategies to identify, assess and mitigate risks in all IT systems), regular resilience testing and third-party risk management to address vulnerabilities throughout the supply chain 18.

Boost Productivity With Digital Tech Diffusion

As von der Leyen argues, productivity can be boosted and the diffusion of digital technologies promoted by focusing first on the implementation of the digital laws passed during her first term in office. More specifically, she wants to focus on the implementation and enforcement of the DSA and the DMA, laws promoting a fair, transparent and innovative digital ecosystem. For example, the DMA tackles anti-competitive practices by “gatekeepers”, and the DSA mandates greater transparency in algorithmic processes and advertising practices. Together, these provisions reduce barriers to entry, allowing more SMEs to access markets, and promote the integration and diffusion of cutting-edge technologies, increasing productivity and tech diffusion across all industries. However, driving innovation and increasing productivity remains difficult in the current complex legal landscape of data protection and data security. The fragmentation of data laws makes it difficult for companies to manage multiple types of data. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) sets high data protection standards for personal data, the Data Act clarifies the handling of non-personal data and the Data Governance Act (DGA) promotes data altruism (i.e. trustful data sharing between companies and the public sector in strategic sectors such as health, energy or transport). The recent AI Act creates even more regulatory burden as AI companies must adhere to ethical standards and the safe use of data. To mitigate this, vdL intends to propose a European Data Union Strategy that focuses on simplifying and harmonizing the framework for data sharing while maintaining high data protection and security standards. Therefore, the strategy would aim to unlock the potential of data sharing by aligning the requirements of the GDPR, the Data Act and the DGA, and to support SMEs by providing financial incentives and technical guidance for the use of data spaces and standardized data sharing protocols.

Building on the implementation of existing laws to enable technological innovation and diffusion, the next step is to strengthen technological capabilities and increase investment in transformative technologies, with a particular focus on AI. In her first 100 days, the Commission President promised to launch an “AI Factory Initiative” to create centers of excellence to develop, test and scale AI applications (e.g. predictive maintenance, automation, supply chain optimization) for different sectors such as health, manufacturing, climate or finance. Such hubs, which bring together universities, companies and governments to jointly develop AI solutions, make use of the supercomputing capacity of European supercomputers. After the EuroHPC selected seven consortia to set up the first AI factories across Europe in December 2024 (Barcelona, Spain; Bissen, Luxembourg; Bologna, Italy; Stuttgart, Germany; Mimer, Sweden; Kajaani, Finland; and Athens, Greece), the AI factories are expected to be operational by April 2025 19. In parallel to the establishment of the AI factories, the Commission will develop an “ Apply AI strategy” in cooperation with Member States and civil society to promote the industrial use of AI and improve the delivery of public services. The focus will be on the ethical use of AI at scale to better support the integration of AI in industry and public services (e.g. smart city management, personalized education, healthcare). Although the EU has strong research capacities, Ursula von der Leyen proposed the establishment of a European AI Research Council to further advance AI innovation. This would make it possible to pool resources and coordinate AI research efforts in the Member States. As AI requires huge investments that no European company or country can afford on its own (i.e. between €30 billion and €35 billion over three years), pooling resources through the European AI Research Council is a good alternative to position the EU as a global leader in the research and development of advanced, general-purpose AI 20. It would follow the example of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) as a means of avoiding duplication, promoting knowledge sharing and awarding uniform grants and funding 21. In fact, the association of 23 European Member States, 11 non-European Associated Member States and 4 Observers allowed countries to pool their resources to support investments in high-energy physics research that a single European country could not have supported over such a long period of time. This led to fundamental innovative research such as the World Wide Web (WWW), superconductivity, magnets, electronics, vacuum, AI, radio frequency, software or precision mechanics. Her objectives, which aim to improve the EU's global leadership position and close the gap with other global competitors, are not limited to AI, however, but also to other disruptive technologies, as she plans to increase investment in supercomputing, semiconductors, IoT, genomics, quantum computing and space technology. There is still a lot to be done in this area to close the EU's competitiveness gap. In space, a Single Market should be created, as proposed by Draghi and Letta, while efforts should be made to improve access to finance to support innovation and the scaling up of European companies. In the area of semiconductors, the European Chips Act should be revised to establish an EU budget for semiconductors and allow Member States to jointly invest in the procurement of chips to be defined in a New Semiconductor Strategy. For quantum technologies, quantum labs connected to all HPC centers in the EU should be established and an EU Quantum Chips Plan should be developed to coordinate the European approach and avoid duplication of investment. Finally, it is crucial to intensify cooperation between the EU and the US to ensure access to the “digital transatlantic marketplace” with low barriers, promote common standards for procurement and guarantee supply chain security.

Putting Research and Innovation at the Heart of the Economy

As explained by Draghi in his report, despite the EU producing almost one-fifth of the world’s scientific publications (18%), ranking ahead of the US (13%) and second only to China (27%), its innovation capacity and presence in innovative markets lags behind that of the US due to a slower pace of technology adoption and issues for new European tech start-ups to scale up 22. There are different root causes to this problem. One of them concerns private R&D spending, i.e. private companies’ investments, where the EU spent 2.24% of its GDP on R&D in 2022, compared to 3.5% for the US, 3.3% for Japan, and 2.4% for China 23. In addition, public R&D spending, which comes from national budgets and is complemented by a smaller amount of EU funding (i.e. mainly Horizon Europe, but also the Structural and Cohesion Funds and the European Defense Fund), is highly fragmented and not always aligned with EU-wide priorities. This lack of coordination between national public spending and EU objectives directly hampers EU excellence, negatively impacts cooperation between public and private entities on innovative projects and weakens the bargaining power of Member States when negotiating procurement contracts. In fact, cooperation networks rarely extend across national/regional borders, with only 13% of shared partnerships submitted each year involving organizations based in two different European countries (compared to almost 30% in the US). Moreover, innovation clusters in the EU are still underdeveloped and focus mainly on traditional industries, such as the Paris cluster, which specializes in the automotive (PSA Automobiles), aviation (Safran Aircraft Engines) and chemical (L'Oréal) industries. In contrast, the largest international clusters (e.g. Tokyo-Yokohama, Seoul, San Francisco, Beijing or Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou) specialize in digital communication, computer and audiovisual technology and are built around universities or research and technology organizations (RTOs) with strong research programs. In this area too, i.e. academic excellence, the Union is struggling. Although the EU has an excellent university system on average, there is a significant gap in world-leading research universities, particularly in the natural and health sciences. This can be explained by the fact that the management of such institutions is burdened by heavy bureaucratic constraints and that it is difficult to create sufficiently attractive conditions to retain and attract the most talented researchers in Europe and around the world (e.g. less attractive remuneration packages, no guarantee of promotion for top researchers, lower salaries). Yet, universities play a central role in innovation ecosystems by producing a highly skilled workforce, conducting pioneering research and supporting the conversion of research into practical innovation.

Ursula von der Leyen has promised several measures to boost Research and Innovation (R&I). At the top of her agenda is the strengthening of European University Alliances (EUAs). The 60 EAUs, which are cross-border partnerships between European universities supporting excellence in education and R&I, while promoting cross-border mobility and inclusion, aim to create a European education area that is connected, innovative and globally competitive. Strengthening this network of European universities is essential to enhancing the EU's global reputation as a leader in education and innovation. Draghi, for example, stresses the importance of increasing the funding of 10 million euros a year for each alliance (i.e. 600 million euros a year in total), provided by Erasmus+, to unlock their potential. Some experts even call for the internationalization of the EUAs, and in particular for greater collaboration with African universities, which would increase student and staff mobility and improve cultural understanding and language skills 24. Mario Draghi also supports the idea of a European Degree, which is gradually becoming a reality after the Commission presented a proposal for a European Degree in March 2024. Such a degree could be provided for Bachelor's, Master's or doctoral programs which are jointly designed and delivered by universities from different EU countries. It would be based on the criteria agreed at EU level to ensure recognition in the 27 EU Member States, participation of higher education institutions, and the uniform standards and excellence of the participating universities. The League of European Research Universities has highlighted some prerequisites for the success of the initiative, such as using the existing tools of the Bologna Process to avoid duplication and/or contradictory processes, reducing bureaucracy in the introduction of joint degrees and joint programs with the aim of reducing the administrative burden on universities, and aligning it with regional and national qualifications frameworks 25.

A European Biotech Act will be developed as part of a broader Strategy for European Life Sciences with the aim of positioning the EU as a world leader in biotechnology and life sciences. Simplifying and clarifying the rules for the evaluation of clinical trials for biotech-derived medicines (1), establishing an EU Biotech Hub to provide advice, support and coordination on regulatory issues (2), promoting the use of generative AI in personalized medicine, drug development and protein pioneering (3), increasing bio-manufacturing capacities, including addressing the shortage of qualified workers in biotechnology (4), revising the Bioeconomy Strategy by the end of 2025 to include biotechnology in the work program of the European Innovation Council with a particular focus on the protection of intellectual property and the promotion of the benefits of biotech innovation (5), and increasing funding and investment building on successful public-private partnerships such as the Circular Bio-Based Europe Joint Undertaking (6) will be the six main pillars of the Act 26, 27. Points 5 and 6 reflect her commitment to expand the European Research Council (ERC) and European Innovation Council (EIC), as well as to support public-private partnerships (PPPs) to provide more resources (e.g. larger budgets, innovative laboratories) 28. But the President of the Commission plans to do more with regard to these objectives, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report. With a budget of over €16 billion under Horizon Europe, the ERC focuses on scientific excellence, awarding grants primarily to support early-stage research. Draghi has called for ERC funding to be doubled to support a greater number of projects, as well as the introduction of a competitive program to develop leading research institutions. The EIC focuses on disruptive innovation, supporting high-risk, high-return projects through grants and equity investments, with a budget of €10.1 billion until 2027. Draghi calls for its transformation into an ARPA-type agency, as it currently lacks the scale and skill set to make strategic decisions in highly specialized fields, as well as a reinforced budget. Increased funding for the ERC and EIC seems realistic, as von der Leyen has promised to increase research spending. There are also calls to double the Horizon Europe budget to €200 billion in the next MFF and to better align the next EU Framework Program for Research and Innovation with EU competitiveness priorities 29, 30. The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) should also be expanded to increase the mobility of researchers, promote knowledge exchange and prevent brain drain 30. According to Draghi, this should be one of the most urgent priorities. However, the MSCA seems to have been ignored as vdL's focus is on strengthening the ERC and the EIC.

While the proposed initiatives are comprehensive, they are not enough to tackle the scale and complexity of the challenges facing the EU. Ursula von der Leyen needs to be even more ambitious and should take up Enrico Letta's recommendation to create a fifth dimension of the Single Market, namely the free movement of knowledge. By extending the four Single Market principles (i.e. goods, services, capital and people) to the unrestricted flow of knowledge, ideas and innovation between Member States, this would allow the EU to radically reshape its research and innovation ecosystem and create a truly integrated European Research Area (ERA). By harmonizing the Intellectual Property framework, allowing researchers to move freely across the EU and benefit from the same qualifications, tax rules and employment regulations, and developing EU-wide standards for data sharing and open science, all researchers, institutions and companies across the Union will be able to access each other's knowledge, infrastructure and know-how. The creation of a central digital platform providing access to publicly funded research, datasets and educational resources, or a European Knowledge Commons, would be central to this strategy 31. Publicly funded research would then become freely accessible to all researchers in the EU, including universities and their students, as well as research institutions. The Commission should also support the development of European data spaces while working towards the harmonization of mechanisms for cross-border data flows, in particular with regard to data protection, transfer and interoperability. However, the main problem is that the current data sharing policy is too restrictive. For example, the Data Act, which gives device manufacturers exclusive control over the data generated by their devices, restricts users' and third parties' access to this data due to restrictive licensing and pricing 32. The other major piece of legislation is the EU Data Governance Act, which focuses on improving access to public and sensitive data, but excludes private platforms that generate significant innovation from data, leading to missed opportunities to create value from data pools 32. Overcoming this would better integrate data sharing platforms, fostering closer collaboration between universities, research institutions and private companies. In such an ecosystem, knowledge diffusion would drive economic vitality as well as societal progress and cultural enlightenment.

Turbo Charging Environment

In order to advance the EU's ambitious goals, a “turbo charging environment” must be created in which sufficient financial resources are available to support targeted initiatives and SMEs. The first transformative element promised by von der Leyen concerns investment and capital mobilization. De-risking private investments, one of vdL’s promises, is a key prerequisite for commercial banks, investors and venture capitalists to be able to finance fast-growing companies with confidence. Indeed, private investors often see green projects as risky, as they have to deal with complex regulations, long payback periods and uncertain returns. To address that, the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) was adopted in June 2024, which aims at enhancing European manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies and their key components (e.g. grid, nuclear fission energy, hydropower, solar thermal, carbon capture, or wind propulsion technologies) 33. While this is a positive step, the Commission needs to focus on its proper implementation. She also promised to develop further initiatives in cooperation with the European Investment Bank. For example, Mario Draghi proposes the introduction of a dedicated European Green Guarantee (EGG) as part of an EU-wide guarantee scheme to support bank loans for green investment projects and companies.

Maximizing public investment and mobilizing private capital are also key to meet the massive financing needs, especially for green technologies. In order to maximize public investment, the combination of public funds with private capital offers considerable advantages including better project profitability and the absorption of initial risks. To make this a reality, as recommended by Draghi, the Commission should encourage the development of strong public-private partnerships that strike a balance between affordability for taxpayers and profitability for investors. Such PPPs should also encourage the introduction of risk-absorbing instruments such as concessions (i.e. an agreement between the government and a private company to build, operate or manage a public service or infrastructure for a certain period of time) and licenses (i.e. an official authorization granted by the government that allows a company to use public resources or provide certain services), which ultimately promote stable and predictable revenue streams for investors while ensuring that the projects serve public interest objectives. Going one step further, the creation of a public-private fund would prove valuable in supporting SMEs going public through IPOs, as it would lower the barriers by sharing the costs and risks. A public-private fund for IPOs would also strengthen the Capital Markets Union by increasing activity on European stock exchanges and attracting investors.

In order to mobilize more private capital, the completion of the Capital Markets Union is essential. Currently, the CMU, which aims to facilitate access to finance for SMEs from investors across the EU regardless of national borders, is still highly fragmented. The differences between Member States in terms of regulations, welfare systems, tax regimes and regulatory frameworks restrict the free flow of capital, and there is a high dependency on bank loans, which makes the EU economy very vulnerable to banking crises 34. While the measures taken in 2015 have not led to the expected results, von der Leyen's previous Commission work (e.g. new CMU action plan, ELTIF, ESAP) will not take effect until several years from now. Recognizing these shortcomings, she promised to take action by proposing a European Savings and Investment Union (SIU), building on the Letta report and rebranding the Capital Markets Union. The SIU would focus on combining the EU's huge pool of private savings (among the highest in the world) with strategic investment, with the issue of national pension reforms at its heart. For example, Letta proposes to simplify the Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) by creating a new long-term EU Savings Product that makes saving easier and more automatic for individuals. Also, in contrast to the pay-as-you-go pension systems prevalent in other EU countries, funded pension systems would be favored, as they not only strengthen capital markets but also improve fiscal sustainability, as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 35.

All in all, these should provide the necessary financial leverage to achieve her second transformative measure of supporting strategic projects, or Important Projects of Common Interest (IPCEIs), which are large-scale projects involving several EU Member States to address common challenges. As with batteries (e.g. EuBatIn in 2021), hydrogen (e.g. Hy2Tech and Hy2Use in 2022, Hy2Infra and Hy2Move in 2024) and microelectronics (e.g. ME/CT in 2023), a first set of new IPCEIs is planned for early 2025, which will likely continue to focus on microelectronics, hydrogen technologies and health and pharmaceuticals 36, 37. However, the current procedures for accessing EU funds or state aid for such projects can take up to several months due to complex bureaucratic and financial obstacles. Therefore, the Commission President promised to simplify funding mechanisms (e.g. by introducing a central EU approval process for the assessment and approval of IPCEIs and/or combining public funding from EU programs with national and private sector contributions) and speed up implementation (e.g. by developing pre-approved frameworks and clear performance indicators for the planning, approval and implementation of IPCEIs). To further support IPCEIs financially, vdL intends to set up a dedicated European Competitiveness Fund, which would increase the budget in the next MFF with the aim of ensuring that funds are allocated to meet the EU's strategic objectives in order to remain competitive. She also plans to revise the Public Procurement Directive, which regulates how public authorities purchase goods, works and services. The revision is urgently needed as the 2014 reforms have proved insufficient to simplify processes, encourage SME participation and align procurement more closely with strategic objectives 38. Figuratively speaking, competition for public contracts in the EU internal market has decreased over the last ten years (2011-2021), with the duration of procurement increasing over the last ten years (i.e. from an average of 62.5 days in 2011 to 96.4 days in 2021). One of the main problems is that most public contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder, often disregarding qualitative evaluation. This is a major problem as it often leads to social fraud, non-compliance, very low quality works/services and unfair competition, ultimately driving up costs significantly both during the execution of the contract and after its completion 39. In his report, Letta emphasizes the importance of implementing the recommendations from the European Court of Auditors' report, such as improving the quality and accessibility of procurement data by merging European and national procurement datasets, aligning clearer and measurable public procurement targets with EU priorities (e.g. twin transitions, promoting social value, improving social capital) and updating the Commission's tools for monitoring competition in public procurement (e.g. incorporating data analytics and AI) while promoting a more competitive, transparent and fairer procurement environment by evaluating tenders based on non-price criteria (e.g. environmental and social performance). Although the Commission has just launched a call for evidence and a public consultation to assess the Public Procurement Directives in December 2024 40, a proper reform proposal is not expected before 2026, with the reform unlikely to enter into force before the end of the decade due to negotiations in the European Parliament and Council and the subsequent two-year transposition into national law.

Tackle the Skills and Labour Gap

To support the EU's ambitious targets, it is crucial to address the insufficient supply of skilled labor in the Union. The digital transformation (i.e. the introduction of AI, big data, robotics and IoT) has increased the demand for specialists such as software developers, cyber experts or data analysts in all sectors. However, the population in Europe is aging and there are not enough skilled workers in STEM fields, mainly due to a mismatch between the skills of the workforce and the needs of the market, which is shrinking the labor pool. In addition, cutting-edge sectors such as machine learning, semiconductors or quantum computing are advancing rapidly and require niche experts. This gap is affecting the EU's competitiveness as competitors such as the US and China have more robust talent pipelines. It also slows technological innovation and adoption, delaying the transition to the twins. To counteract this, von der Leyen has proposed taking measures that align with Draghi's recommendations. One of her promises is to propose a STEM Education Strategic Plan to encourage students, from primary school to university and vocational training, to pursue STEM education. As highlighted in the Draghi report, the plan must drive a curriculum review that involves as many stakeholders as possible (e.g. teachers, education providers, social partners, businesses) and targets the skills most needed in the EU labor market (e.g. green technologies, data science). However, it is currently difficult to meet the new skills requirements in a targeted manner. On the one side, the formal education system lacks precise information on the qualifications required by companies, and on the other, companies may not have the incentive to offer employees further training opportunities. To remedy this, vdL wants to propose a European Strategy for Vocational Education and Training (VET) that promotes lifelong learning (e.g. learning formats with online and hybrid options tailored to students, workers and people from disadvantaged backgrounds). In addition, Draghi emphasizes the need to incentivize participation in vocational training, whether through tax breaks for employers when they offer vocational training to their employees or by providing scholarships and grants for students and low-income families. It is equally important to promote worker mobility and labor market flexibility within the Single Market by enabling workers to transfer their qualifications seamlessly across borders. To this end, she wants to propose an Skills Portability Initiative to ensure that a qualification acquired in one country is recognized in another. Specifically, Draghi advocates the introduction of a common system for the certification of skills in all EU Member States that deviates from the current formal and rigid educational degrees. This could be achieved by standardizing vocational qualifications within the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) or by promoting the recognition of micro-certificates and digital badges as qualifications. Such credentials could, for example, be accessed online by employers and other employees thanks to an EU-wide Digital Skills Passport, since it would record an individual's qualifications, certifications and skills in a standardized format. As she also pledged to increase funding for skills and focus on sectors critical to the twin transitions, it could be expected that the STEM Plan would leverage existing funding mechanisms such as Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and the ESF+ to support STEM education programs as well as opportunities for students to gain practical experience in STEM fields (e.g. internships, apprenticeships). The several promises made by Ursula von der Leyen and the various recommendations made by Mario Draghi would fall under a comprehensive and unifying framework that she wants to create: a Union of Skills. This umbrella initiative would serve as a basis for the development, retention and recognition of skills across the EU, coordinating the various efforts to address skills and labor shortages, promote lifelong learning and ensure a resilient workforce.

Bringing the European Defence Union Into Life

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a shock for the EU, exposing its weaknesses in the defense sector, such as highly fragmented defense procurement, insufficient stockpiles, slow decision-making and heavy reliance on external supply chains 41, 42. In the air sector, for example, there is currently strong industrial consolidation in the production of military transport aircraft (e.g. Airbus, A400M) and modern fighter jets (e.g. Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon), with European manufacturers such as Airbus and Leonardo being major players in the global market 42. This process of pooling the expertise and resources of several national manufacturers into fewer, larger entities was a deliberate decision mainly driven by France, Germany, and the UK, but also Spain and Italy, which began in the 1960s and reached important milestones in the 1990s. However, there is also a significant gap in integrated air and defense missile systems, as there is no EU equivalent to the US Patriot or THAAD systems. In the naval sector, France, Italy, Germany and Spain form the leading bloc in the development of frigates, submarines and aircraft carriers 43. However, they all have their own procurement policies and independent shipbuilding industries, which leads to duplication in production. In contrast, South Korean shipbuilders such as Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries can offer more attractive deals as their domestic industry benefits from a coordinated procurement policy, lower labor costs, technological leadership (e.g. modular design), government subsidies and greater production volume. Going back to the EU, the fragmentation is the highest in the land sector 43 due to low entry barriers (e.g. no need for highly sophisticated equipment or expertise, lower initial investment), which leads to smaller Member States developing niche solutions. Examples include light tactical vehicles tailored for high-mobility operations in rough terrain, with the Spanish URO VAMTAC and the Italian IVECO LMV having different design philosophies, anti-tank systems, with the Polish Spike and the French MILAN having different launchers and targeting systems, or small arms with the same operational purpose, with the Czech CZ BREN 2 and the German HK416 having different calibers. In addition, most of this equipment and vehicles need to be modernized to counter new threats such as drones that can provide real-time intelligence, deliver precision strikes and penetrate conventional defenses, as well as electronic warfare that can disrupt or even disable communications systems and GPS. This obsolete equipment stems mainly from systems developed decades ago, when today's threats were not as present and evolving so rapidly. Finally, although the EU has significant space capabilities (e.g. Copernicus, Galileo, EGNOS), Member States are pursuing their own space initiatives (e.g. Italy's COSMO-SkyMed, Luxembourg's GovSat-1 or Germany's Heinrich Hertz), which dilutes the collective resources. Consequently, the EU-27 is losing its competitive edge to other players such as the US, China and even private companies such as SpaceX due to a lack of innovation and cost-efficiency in space launch systems.

The EU has taken several steps to respond to some of these challenges, such as the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement Act (EDIRPA), which aims to promote joint procurement to improve defence industry capabilities, or the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which aims to ensure the timely delivery of munitions and missiles 44. However, more needs to be done by the Union to address the EU's critical capability gaps. Aware of this, Ursula von der Leyen has moved the European Defence Union up the political agenda. At the heart of this priority is institutional leadership, with the appointment of the first ever Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilus, who will present a White Paper on the future of European defence in the coming weeks. At the operational level, it will be important to ensure the correct implementation of EDIS and the adoption of EDIP. The Commission must ensure that capacity building focuses on key investments such as strengthening the European Defence Fund to match the EDIP, so that it adequately targets the EU's most critical shortcomings (i.e. maritime, land and air combat capabilities, space systems, early warning technologies, integrated air and missile defence). With these initiatives in mind, vdL intends to prioritize the creation of a Single Market for defence equipment and services, which would remove current barriers and allow Member States and industry to align defence procurement, production and trade. As Letta and Draghi advocate in their reports, such a move would lead to a better integration between industrial capabilities and defense policy. By better matching supply and demand, European defense manufacturers will benefit from a better insight into current and future market needs, which will improve access to finance and promote cross-border cooperation. This would also help Member States to align their national policies and ultimately maximize public spending through better coordination, support SMEs and innovation thanks to the harmonization of regulatory frameworks and promote “Made in EU” defence procurement. Although aiming to increase the EU's strategic autonomy (EU-SA) in the defence sector, Ursula von der Leyen made it clear that these steps are not aimed at replacing NATO, but at strengthening cooperation with the organization, as she wants to extend the EU-NATO partnership to emerging threats in the cyber, hybrid and space domains. For example, NATO forces would benefit from the standardization of equipment and systems, which would optimize joint operations in the air, land, sea, space and cyber domains (i.e. efficiency, interoperability and capabilities).

A Preparedness Union

In addition to facing critical gaps in the land, aid, naval and Spanish domains, the EU's approach to cybersecurity challenges is also fragmented and under-resourced. For example, national cyber efforts to counter hybrid threats are still too weak to effectively counter large-scale cyber operations targeting them. In general, the EU lacks cutting-edge capabilities, such as insufficient AI integration into threat detection systems, preventing it from processing large amounts of data in real time. Furthermore, the nature and response time of cyber threats is not uniform across the EU, as Member States have developed their own solutions due to varying levels of capacity and cooperation. For example, national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) often do not align on threat-sharing speed or protocols. There are also differences in the development of tools (for example, Germany focused on its Digital Defense Cloud to protect critical infrastructure, which is not compatible with other EU systems) or threat perception (for example, the Netherlands focuses on fighting ransomware attacks, while Italy and Spain focus on phishing schemes to counter financial cybercrime). Hence, von der Leyen is committed to ensuring that the EU can respond effectively to new challenges, especially by promising to coordinate national cyber efforts. Building on Sauli Niinistö's report, the Commission will present an EU strategy on preparedness, which will serve as a roadmap for coordinated action. Following the report published on October 30, few priorities and themes can be expected in the strategy. One key aim is to address the design of the current sectoral framework, which overlooks interconnected risks and cross-border dimensions, leading to limitations in the speed of decision-making and effectiveness of crisis management. To address this, Niinistö recommends creating EU-wide early warning systems that integrate real-time data from Member States, establishing a centralized operational crisis center based on the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, and developing a risk assessment of all risks. Another recommendation is to improve the framework and strengthen the dual-use infrastructure (i.e. civil-military cooperation) to ensure that responses to hybrid threats and armed aggression can serve both civilian and military needs. Ursula von der Leyen also announced that cyber resilience and deterrence tools will be essential to secure critical infrastructures and improve sanctions against cyber and hybrid attacks, and that a new strategy to improve chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security will be presented. Despite previous efforts to improve resilience to public security threats, such as the EU CBRN Action Plan, the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) or the EU Security Union Strategy, there are still gaps in preparedness, cross-border coordination, advanced technological integration and a heavy bureaucracy for crisis management actors.

A Safer and More Secure Europe

While the Commission has taken positive steps over the last five years, challenges remain. Examples include Europol's limited operational capacity and dependence on Member States for enforcement (e.g. dependence on the US FBI to carry out arrests during Operation Trojan Shield in 2021, reliance on national authorities to seize servers and arrest suspects during the dismantling of the Emotet malware network in 2021), European Arrest Warrant’s procedural shortcomings and legal inconsistencies directly affecting its effectiveness (e.g. arrests for minor offenses such as theft of property, possible human rights violations in the event of extradition, delays in judicial proceedings), or the exploitation of vulnerabilities in European ports by drug trafficking networks (e.g. personnel bribery and coercion, infiltration of IT systems). As a result, vdL wants to build on the progress made so far while tackling these limitations by proposing a new European Internal Security Strategy to provide a comprehensive framework for tackling emerging threats. Von der Leyen also promised to make Europol a truly operational police force by doubling its staff and improving its ability to support national law enforcement agencies, as well as modernizing the European Arrest Warrant to ensure faster and more consistent cross-border prosecutions. In the fight against cross-border crime, she wants to extend the mandate of EPPO and introduce a new European Action Plan against drug trafficking as part of a broader EU ports strategy, building on the European Ports Alliance and aiming at security, competitiveness and economic independence. The President will also push the Commission to develop a new counter-terrorism agenda and establish a European Critical Communication System that will enable authorities to better coordinate responses to terrorism and organized crime in real time.

Stronger Common Borders

Despite the EU's ambitious goals and efforts to improve border capacities, the previous target of reaching 10,000 permanent corps by 2024 was not achieved as only 2,500 were operational, resulting in a postponement to 2027. Given von der Leyen's next goal of tripling the number of European border and coast guards to 30,000 by 2029, it seems very difficult to increase Frontex's capacity by 20,000 in the space of just two years. While she stresses the importance of equipping Frontex with state-of-the-art surveillance and situational awareness technology to improve seamless border management through enhanced screening procedures and the Eurodac database, she has not provided detailed plans on how to address the challenges associated with rapidly increasing the agency's capacity (e.g. recruitment challenges, budgetary constraints and coordination with Member States) 45. Complementing these efforts, a new EU visa policy strategy will be developed to strike a balance between secure borders and accessible entry routes, while preserving the EU's internal cohesion under external pressure and the fundamental principle of free movement within the Schengen area. Based on a document of the Hungarian Presidency, the main changes concern the improvement of the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) through digital tools to abolish physical entry/exit stamps, to track the entry, exit and overstay of both visa-free travelers and Schengen visa holders using biometric data, and to screen applicants against EU security databases to detect potential threats (e.g. criminal links, overstaying). (e.g. criminal links, overstaying). The role of eu-LISA, the EU agency for large-scale IT systems, will be strengthened to compile comprehensive statistics on the use and misuse of visas and the possibility of applying personal visa sanctions (e.g. temporary entry bans, higher visa fees, shorter visa validity periods) will be examined.

Standing Fair and Firm on Migration

With the adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024, the objective for the next five years is to focus on the implementation of all parts of the Pact, complemented by efforts to address unresolved issues. For example, the Commission will develop a European Migration and Asylum Strategy to create a long-term vision. In addition, legal migration pathways will be aligned with the skills needs of European economies and regions to address both demographic challenges and labor shortages. A new common approach to return is also proposed to address fragmentation and inefficiencies in refugee resettlement and return procedures. In addition, the EU will strengthen partnerships with the Global Alliance to fight migrant smuggling and take decisive action against shadow economies that exploit vulnerable migrants, such as labor exploitation (e.g. lack of proper contracts and legal protection or unfair wages) or illegal activities (e.g. counterfeit goods, human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking). To support these future efforts and strengthen the objectives of the previous mandate, which focused on readmission agreements, the prevention of irregular departures and the fight against smuggling networks, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of maintaining and developing strategic relationships with non-EU countries in the area of migration and security. A new Pact for the Mediterranean will also be introduced, based on two pillars: the promotion of regional cooperation between European companies and regional players and the creation of humanitarian corridors through strategic partnership agreements with countries in North Africa, but also in countries across the Mediterranean 46.

Social Fairness in the Modern Economy

Although the Commission does not have direct competence to adopt on social issues, a number of initiatives to strengthen social rights, social protection and the fight against poverty and social exclusion have been adopted, such as the Adequate Minimum Wage Directive, the European Guarantee for Children and the Work-Life Balance Directive, which came into force during the first mandate of von der Leyen, and other initiatives such as the Skills Pact or the Platform Work Directive that have been adopted. The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) Action Plan and its 20 principles also played a key role in von der Leyen's social policy, although it met limited success as it depends on Member States' commitments. That is why vdL has promised to present a new action plan for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, which is likely to intensify cooperation with the social partners and civil society organisations such as the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), BusinessEurope, Caritas Europa or the European Women's Lobby (EWL). In order to better coordinate policies to promote fair wages, good working conditions, training and a fair transition to employment, vdL plans to present a roadmap for quality jobs for both workers and freelancers. In line with this idea, she will propose a new Pact for European Social Dialogue in early 2025, in cooperation with European trade unions and employers. It will aim to promote cooperation in policy-making between trade unions (e.g. ETUC, UNI Europa, EPSU), workers (e.g. Fair Wear Foundation, EWL, FEANTSA) , and employers (e.g. SMEunited, BusinessEurope), through social dialogue. A process called “tripartite dialogue”. This serves a variety of purposes, such as fostering trust between stakeholders, promoting more inclusive labour markets, strengthening the institutional framework and better adapting to new labour market challenges (e.g. digitalisation, green transition, automation, skills development). Such a pact could pave the way for the creation of formalised platforms for tripartite sectoral discussions, as well as introduce regular progress reviews and reports on the implementation of decisions taken, in order to improve transparency and accountability in the social dialogue process 47. To have a greater impact, she proposed to increase funding to support a fair transition in the next MFF and to ensure that regional disparities do not remain while transitioning to a sustainable economy.

Particular attention will be paid to combating poverty and social exclusion, as 21% of the EU population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, most of whom are children, single-parent families, migrants and people with disabilities 48. It is also recognized that there is an urgent need to tackle demographic change (e.g. migration and ageing) and regional disparities (e.g. public services, private sector activity, skills development, transport, job opportunities, digital connectivity). She is therefore committed to developing the first EU Anti-Poverty Strategy aimed at tackling the root causes of poverty and social exclusion in all Member States. This is in response to criticism voiced against the Commission, which viewed poverty as a socio-economic and individual problem, disregarding its multidimensional aspects 49. The new strategy, which aims to reduce poverty by 50% by 2030, will strengthen the European Child Guarantee, an initiative that provides free healthcare, early childhood education, adequate housing and adequate nutrition to every child in Europe at risk of poverty or social exclusion 50. It will be crucial to complement this with a strategy that addresses the systemic and structural causes of poverty, promotes the participation of those affected by poverty in the policy development process and connects the dots with other key EU policies (e.g. digital rights, migration and asylum, climate policy, tax rules, housing plans) 49. Such a strategy could advocate for a greater allocation of funding (e.g. through ESF+) to ensure the smooth implementation of the Child Guarantee in all Member States, call on Member States to develop national action plans against poverty aligned with the EU strategy, or encourage Member States to prioritise poverty reduction in their recovery and resilience plans 47.

Ursula von der Leyen also wants to specifically target the housing sector to reduce homelessness and ensure decent living conditions, particularly given the housing crisis across the Union. Between 2015 and 2023, house prices in the EU increased by an average of 48%, with Hungary registering the largest increase (+173%), followed by Czechia (+111%), Lithuania (+114%), and Portugal (+104%), while between 2010 and 2022, rents in the EU increased by an average of 18%. Resulting from this housing affordability problem, 20% of adults aged between 30 and 34 in the EU still live with their parents, a figure that rises to 42% for those aged between 25 and 29 51. Compared to ten years ago, the average age of young people leaving their parental home has increased in 14 countries, such as in Croatia (+1.8 years), Greece (+1.7) and Spain (+1.6) 52. To address that, vdL made housing a priority in Dan Jørgensen's agenda to address housing issues (e.g. affordability, urban development and climate resilience) and to integrate housing into broader EU strategies. For example, the inclusion of housing projects in the RRF, which allocates €723.8 billion in grants and loans to support Member States' reconstruction efforts, would provide more funding for affordable housing construction, renovation and infrastructure improvements. Regarding the integration of housing with the Green Deal, this would be useful to accelerate the transition to energy efficient housing. As housing is responsible for around 40% of the EU's energy consumption and 36% of its greenhouse gas emissions, it would make a significant contribution to achieving the EU's 2050 climate neutrality targets. Accordingly, the Commission will present the first EU Affordable Housing Strategy, which would set EU-wide benchmarks for housing affordability and quality standards and define clear targets and funding mechanisms to increase the stock of affordable housing. By tackling rising housing costs, which disproportionately affect low-income households, the President of the Commission wants to ensure that access to safe, quality and affordable housing becomes a right for every European To complement the support to low-income households, von der Leyen will launch the Social Climate Fund, which will be used to renovate homes to improve energy efficiency and reduce utility costs. Another of her goals is to extend the New European Bauhaus to housing design that respects the principles of sustainability, inclusivity and affordability. Specifically, she would encourage creativity and innovation in solving housing problems by fostering cross-sectoral collaboration between designers, architects and urban planners, as well as promoting innovative architectural and urban design solutions that integrate green technologies 53. Concretely, this refers to the inclusion of urban greening (e.g. rooftop vegetation, urban gardens), green materials (e.g. recycled, bio-based or carbon-neutral components), passive/zero-energy buildings (e.g. solar panels, heat pumps, rainwater harvesting), community-oriented buildings (e.g. common areas, shared housing), accessibility (e.g. for the elderly, people with disabilities) or mixed-use developments (e.g. residential, commercial and recreational areas). In the shorter term, she plans to simplify funding allocation processes and inject liquidity into the market so that Member States can double their cohesion policy investment in affordable housing to address urgent needs. However, an increase in funding alone could prove useless if Member States and regions do not have sufficient capacity or face administrative obstacles to use EU funds effectively. This was already the case in the past, for example, when Bulgaria and Romania struggled with low absorption rates during the 2007-2013 programming period, leaving billions of euros unspent instead of being used for development. During the same period, Romania also experienced significant mismanagement problems and irregularities in public procurement, which led to payment suspensions and clawbacks, further delaying project implementation. Another example is Calabria in Italy, where local authorities have difficulties in meeting the administrative requirements for EU funds (e.g. required audits, detailed project proposals), which affects the efficiency in the implementation of (large-scale) projects. It is important that this financial package is accompanied by technical assistance to Member States in order to improve the management of funds and the implementation of projects, while ensuring a fair distribution of funds between regions. In addition, the Commission will also need to make adjustments to the existing framework, such as simplifying procedures, revising legislation, strengthening monitoring and improving capacity building. She clearly expresses her intention to revise state aid rules by adapting them to allow public funding of energy-efficient and social housing projects without breaching EU competition law. She also wants to work more closely with the EIB to create a pan-European Investment Platform to leverage sufficient public and private investment to address funding gaps to finance large-scale housing initiatives, including the development and renewal of affordable housing, as EIB-backed projects would provide guarantees or risk-sharing mechanisms to attract private investors. However, there are other adjustments that are necessary to avoid inefficiencies, delays and mismanagement that are not mentioned. For example, it is important to address budgetary constraints, such as national allocation frameworks, which currently allocate funds on the basis of multi-annual frameworks and pre-determined national quotas, and co-financing rules, which place a burden on national budgets. Another important adjustment concerns technical assistance to local and regional authorities, which is currently limited due to weaker administrative capacity in project preparation, management and reporting. This leads to project delays, inefficiencies and even unintentional misuse of funds. To address this problem, standardized project proposal templates and pre-approved project pipelines could be promoted and EU funding programs such as Twinning or the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) could be expanded to address their current shortcomings (i.e. modest funding and project scopes prevent the support of large infrastructure projects or the coverage of urgent liquidity needs, lengthy and administratively burdensome application procedures, designed as external policy instruments to promote institutional cooperation and capacity building between EU Member States and non-EU countries rather than to promote intra-EU cooperation, or lack of integration with other EU instruments such as the TSI).

Reuniting Societies, Supporting Young People

To support youth, von der Leyen aims to strengthen the bond between young Europeans and the EU institutions, while addressing the pressing issues arising from the ubiquitous role of technology in everyday life. This starts with embedding intergenerational fairness as a core principle of EU governance, ensuring a fair distribution of opportunities, resources and responsibilities between younger and older generations. This will be the role of Commissioner Glenn Micallef, who will need to ensure that young people's concerns, such as education, employment and digital rights, are heard and included in decision-making. The President of the Commission has promised to organise the first annual Youth Policy Dialogue with the Commissioners within her first 100 days. This annual forum serves as a platform to directly engage young Europeans and EU Commissioners in the debate on youth-related policies such as education, employment, digital rights and climate action, with the aim of strengthening democratic input and ensuring that EU policies reflect the priorities of the younger generation. However, trust and engagement between youth and the institutions can only work if youth have a formal voice in EU policy-making. vdL has therefore pledged to set up a President's Youth Advisory Board, a standing committee made up of youth representatives from across the EU, which will directly provide feedback and ideas to the President of the European Commission. An effective way to engage young people and encourage their participation in EU policies is through social media promotion. Sharing stories of young people participating in European Youth Events (EYE) via quizzes, challenges, polls and videos on Instagram, TikTok and Twitter, as well as working with youth ambassadors and influencers, could resonate with young audiences who would feel empowered, informed and inspired to get involved in European democracy.

Supporting young people also means giving them more and better opportunities. As Erasmus+ is the most successful and well-known programme supporting education, and training initiatives across Europe, promoting mobility, cultural exchange and lifelong learning, von der Leyen logically wants to strengthen it to make it even more effective. The programme's budget for 2021-2027 was €26.2 billion, almost double the previous budget for 2014-2020 (€14.7 billion). Allocating more resources to enable greater participation and expand mobility and learning opportunities could be achieved either by supporting additional increases in funding to support new initiatives or by improving access. For example, the programme could be extended to secondary school students (e.g. Erasmus High School Initiative) and non-traditional participants such as adult learners and trainees and disadvantaged groups or regions (e.g. Erasmus for All). More opportunities could similarly be made available for apprentices, teachers and youth workers. As recommended by Draghi, the scope of the programme could also be improved and focus on building skills and competences relevant for the EU in the 21st century. Thus, Erasmus+ projects should increasingly, but not exclusively, focus on digital literacy, green technologies or climate resilience. However, in September 2024, concerns were raised about a possible reduction of €295 million in the Erasmus+ budget for the period 2025-2027, part of a broader proposal to cut EUR 1.52 billion from the EU's flagship programs, as more funds for defense and economic recovery need to be allocated and some member states are pushing for a “more prudent budget” to avoid increasing debt financing costs, given their alarming economic situation 54, 55. Yet, these cuts are not in line with the EU's commitment to education, inclusion and skills development, especially at a time when the programme is expected to support major changes that the EU (and the youth!) need more than ever.

Another objective of von der Leyen is to improve the well-being of society addressing the negative impacts of social media. Ursula von der Leyen's plan revolves around three main initiatives. She proposes to launch a Europe-wide investigation to assess how social media affects mental health, privacy and social cohesion in different age groups, by examining issues such as misinformation, concerns about physical appearance and the impact of screen time. These evidence-based findings will ultimately serve as the basis for the development of an Anti-Cyberbullying Action Plan that would hold platforms accountable for removing harmful content, provide more resources for schools, parents and youth organisations to educate young people about digital safety, and address addictive design of online services by promoting transparency and ethical design practices by technology companies to limit the use of addictive design elements (e.g. "clickbait", endless scrolling, dopamine triggering) to protect children and adolescents from harmful digital behaviours and mental health risks.

A Union of Equality

Building on the efforts of the previous mandate, she proposed initiatives to further advance gender equality, anti-discrimination policies and inclusiveness. For example, she wants to address the persistent discrimination and legal protection gaps in the EU by revising and extending the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy. Similarly, the EU Action Plan against Racism, which expires in 2025, needs to be renewed, as racial discrimination remains a significant problem in many Member States (e.g. in policing, housing, employment and education). However, the Commission will face challenges given that anti-feminist movements have gained traction in Europe. There will also be resistance from Member States due to the different cultural and political perspectives of EU countries and resistance from some Member States regarding EU’s advocacy in LGBTIQ rights or anti-racism reforms 56, 57.

The EU Gender Equality Strategy, which also expires in 2025, is also on von der Leyen’s agenda as it needs to be expanded and significantly strengthened. Indeed, persistent challenges (e.g. unequal pay, under-representation in leadership positions and gender-based violence) point to the need to strengthen women's protection from violence, including online harassment and domestic violence, to promote women's representation in decision-making positions and economic participation, as well as to close the gender pay gap. In order to better structure the promotion of women's rights, von der Leyen intends to present a comprehensive plan outlining the EU's priorities and actions, to be presented on International Women's Day on 8 March 2025. However, even this task will not be easy, as some Member States are opposed to the EU getting involved in national criminal laws, especially when it comes to defining violence against women, reflecting online anti-gender movements taking place across Europe 57, 58. Another example of resistance is the challenges faced by Ursula von der Leyen in achieving gender balance in the new College of Commissioners in 2024. Despite her request that each Member State nominate both a man and a woman for the post of Commissioner, most of them did not comply with her request, as the majority of them submitted only one nomination, mostly male candidates 59. As a result, only seven women were nominated. After exerting some pressure, the total number of women was 11, compared to 12 four years earlier, decreasing female representation from 44.4% (2019) to 40.7% (2024) 60, 61.

Food Security, Water, and Nature

European farmers have been at the center of the discussion recently, blaming the EU for making their lives more difficult. Concerned about market saturation and the resulting fall in prices caused by the entry of Ukrainian agricultural products on the EU market, which could be exacerbated by a possible trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur, about the jeopardizing of their productivity by EU environmental policies on pesticide and emission cuts, and about the pressure on their profit margins due to increased production costs, European farmers have taken to the streets in various EU countries demanding action from the Union. These issues highlight the need for the Commission to take a forward-looking posture to balance the protection of EU farmers with the sustainability, competitiveness and resilience of the sector. Accordingly, von der Leyen pledged to present a vision for the agri-food sector in her first 100 days, setting out a long-term strategy aligned with the EU's wider priorities such as the Green Deal and Farm to Fork strategy. The Commission President also promised to support an EU income policy for farmers that would protect farmers across the EU from market volatility and external shocks through stable and fair incomes. This policy, which is likely to build on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as it already provides direct payments and subsidies to farmers, could introduce new mechanisms to address price fluctuations and ensure fair pricing in the supply chain. Given her attention to environmentally friendly practices, such a policy could also provide incentives to compensate for environmental protection (e.g. organic farming, agroforestry or regenerative agriculture). She also intends to simplify administrative processes and reduce red tape for farmers, using digital tools and technologies to simplify reporting and compliance or by streamlining application procedures for CAP payments and environmental programs. Investing in infrastructure along the entire agricultural supply chain to increase productivity, efficiency and market access is another key element of vdL’s program. For example, subsidies could be provided for precision agriculture (i.e. the introduction of digital tools and data-driven farming methods), food processing technologies (i.e. alternative proteins, plant-based foods) or supply chain digitization (i.e. platforms to improve traceability, transparency and efficiency).

With the appointment of Costas Kadis as Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans and her promise to develop a European Oceans Pact, the protection of Europe's marine resources is also on the agenda. Kadis will have to develop a centralized and coherent strategy to tackle the challenges of the maritime sector. He will oversee the implementation of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and ensure sustainable fishing practices, fair quotas and the protection of marine biodiversity. Other key tasks include strengthening the EU's voice at global level, e.g. in negotiations on biodiversity on the high seas (BBNJ agreement) and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as supporting the development of the blue economy (i.e. promoting sustainability in sectors such as aquaculture, offshore renewable energy and shipping). His role will be very important given the many challenges facing the EU, such as marine pollution (e.g. plastic waste, chemical pollution), sustainable fish stocks in the Mediterranean, the ineffectiveness of marine protected areas or fisheries agreements with non-EU countries (e.g. with Senegal), which current regulatory tools are failing to resolve 62, 63.

Climate Adaptation, Preparedness, and Solidarity

Ursula von der Leyen takes note of the growing threat of climate change and natural disasters and is committed to ensuring that EU Member States are able to respond to these new challenges. She wants to develop several proposals such as the European Civil Defense Mechanism, the European Climate Adaptation Plan and the European Water Resilience Strategy, which fit into the broader framework of the Preparedness Union built on the recommendations of the Niinistö report. First, the European Civil Defence Mechanism aims to improve civil protection in the event of disasters. It is a response to the more frequent and severe forest fires, floods and droughts that occur in the EU and which Member States are often unable to deal with on their own. Currently, the EU relies on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), which is complemented by rescEU. In his report, Niinistö recommends transforming the UCPM into a comprehensive European Civil Defence Mechanism that integrates both civilian and military capacities to deal with hybrid and large-scale disasters, where a central crisis center is responsible for the coordination of civil-military forces, supported by public and private actors. In order to improve solidarity and defense mechanisms, the mutual assistance clauses, i.e. Article 42(7) and Article 222 TFEU, must also be strengthened. Second, the objective of the European Climate Adaptation Plan is to improve preparedness and resilience in all key sectors (e.g. energy, food systems, water, land use). Indeed, the EU has taken action in various policy areas, but lacks a unified, cross-sectoral strategy for climate change adaptation. This leads to gaps in climate change preparedness in key areas which directly threatens public safety and economic stability. Therefore, the proposed European Climate Adaptation Plan must address these critical sectoral gaps by, for example, developing a comprehensive risk assessment framework to identify and map risks and provide efficient early warnings. Niinistö also recommends that all critical infrastructure is upgraded to withstand extreme weather conditions and crisis cascades, and public-private partnerships should be encouraged to fund and implement such adaptive infrastructure projects. Third, the European Water Resilience Strategy, which aims to ensure sustainable and equitable access to water resources by addressing the key challenges of water scarcity, quality and management, should be in line with the Critical Entities Resilience Directive. Due to pollution, increasing droughts and excessive water abstraction, the availability of clean water is declining in many parts of Europe, affecting not only citizens but also agriculture, industry, energy production and biodiversity, with negative consequences for the economy and the environment. Combining both would therefore lead, for example, to comprehensive risk assessments, as the Water Strategy requires regular assessments of risks to water resources, covering both natural and man-made threats, as required by the CER Directive. Regarding the use of technology (e.g. satellites, smart meters, automatic controls), the Water Strategy encourages the deployment of digital solutions to monitor water resources, predict disasters and improve water efficiency (e.g. water recycling, desalination), while the CER Directive sets mandatory cybersecurity requirements for critical facilities, including water systems.

Protecting Our Democracy

Given the growing prominence of hybrid threats (e.g. cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns) and their impact on European elections, policy making and public debate, it is crucial for the Union to address them in order to safeguard its democratic processes. As explained in the first part, the EU has already implemented a number of tools such as the FIMI toolkit, FIMI ISAC, RAS or DSA, as well as the European Democratic Action Plan (EDAP) or EUvsDisinfo. Although these mechanisms form a 'democracy shield', there is no such formal designation, so there is no coherent and robust framework to coordinate other EU efforts. Moreover, despite the tools available, problems remain, such as the reactive rather than proactive nature of the EU response, the imbalance in resources within the EU and between the EU and its adversaries, or the failure to address the role of platform design, algorithmic amplification and micro-targeted advertising in disseminating disinformation and integrating it into legislation 64, 65, 66, 67. To address these challenges, Ursula von der Leyen pledged to propose a "new" European Democracy Shield to fight foreign information manipulation and interference online, revolving around six main pillars: increasing digital and media literacy, enhancing prevention through pre-bombing, creating a European network of fact-checkers and making it available in all languages, improving digital enforcement to ensure misinformation is detected, tackling deep fake news, and preserving and promoting freedom of expression. She specifically mentioned that the Democracy Shield builds on the examples of France's Viginum and Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency, both of which represent innovative and tailored approaches to countering information manipulation and psychological warfare. For example, Viginum focuses on educating citizens and public authorities about digital manipulation tactics and uses advanced technology to monitor and analyse disinformation campaigns on digital platforms, while the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency enhances the population's ability to identify and counter manipulative narratives and coordinates countermeasures to disinformation campaigns. This would allow the creation of proactive strategies that offer flexible solutions addressing both technical and psychological vulnerabilities. However, she must be very careful, as excessive disinformation can have the opposite effect 64, 67. A focus on fact-checking and content removal may raise concerns about censorship and the violation of fundamental freedoms (e.g. expression, press, access information). On January 9, 2025, for example, Elon Musk, owner of the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), hosted Alice Weidel, the German AfD candidate for chancellor, for a live interview that sparked controversy and debate across Europe. During the 74-minute conversation, the two discussed migration and energy policy, space exploration and space exploration 68. The problem here is that the AfD is classified by German security authorities as an anti-immigration, anti-Islamic and far-right party because the AfD is associated with neo-Nazi organizations and symbols, and their parliamentary Chairman, Björn Höcke, was convicted twice for using a Nazi slogan at a rally 68, 69, 70, 71. Allowing the AfD to spread its ideas therefore raised concerns about the spread of misinformation on a global digital platform 68. On the one hand, Weidel and Musk argue that freedom of speech should not be selective and that everyone should enjoy this right. On the other hand, current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz responded that he does not support freedom of expression when it is used to promote far-right views 72. In response, the Commission stated that Musk had the right to express his opinion, but that it should never be aimed at spreading hate speech or influencing elections, according to the DSA 69, 70. This underlines the fragile balance between safeguarding the individual right to freedom of expression and preventing the dissemination of harmful and/or false content to protect democratic processes.

Strengthening the Rule of Law

As a fundamental value of the EU, it is essential to defend the rule of law, which is what vdL is committed to. Currently, the Rule of Law report focuses on the four areas mentioned in the first part, and she would like to include an assessment of the impact of rule of law deficiencies on the Single Market. By presenting rule of law issues not only as a matter of principle, but also as an essential element of economic stability and fairness, Member States could be encouraged to remedy these deficiencies, as the economic consequences have greater resonance. Then, to really strengthen the rule of law, von der Leyen would like to allocate European funds specifically to national measures aimed at combating corruption and protecting the EU's financial interests. These funds could, for example, support anti-corruption bodies and law enforcement capabilities, develop digital tools for fraud detection and cross-border investigations, or improve whistleblower protection. She also calls for preserving the independence, transparency and pluralism of the media throughout the Union, by focusing on the implementation of the European Act on Media Freedom, and by providing greater financial and institutional support for journalists and the media. The latter could involve financial support for training programs for journalists in investigative journalism, cybersecurity and legal protection, or strengthening the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for Media Freedom, which provides emergency assistance to journalists under threat. Particular attention should be paid to Hungary, Poland or Italy, where the independent press is struggling due to the increased use of government measures such as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). However, despite ambitious policies, enforcement remains a problem as the EU expects Member States to implement and enforce such rules. Ursula von der Leyen should therefore focus on robust enforcement mechanisms so that the EU can act decisively in the event of non-compliance. One such effort could be the empowerment of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism, a mechanism complementary to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (i.e. the suspension of certain rights of Member States for serious breaches of EU values), in case a breach of the rule of law or a threat directly affecting the EU's financial interests. Yet, it has traditionally been rarely used because its activation may exacerbate intra-EU disagreements, it may be difficult to establish a causal link between a breach of the rule of law and a direct impact on the EU's financial interests, or there is ambiguity because it overlaps with existing budgetary supervision (e.g. OLAF, Court of Auditors). ​​Another challenge relates to media ownership, where a balance must be struck regarding politically appropriate media ownership to avoid excessive restrictions on freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression and freedom of the press). When a few individuals (e.g. billionaires, political actors) or corporations control the media, diversity of viewpoints can be compromised and reporting can become biased, undermining journalistic independence and ultimately disproportionately influencing public opinion.

Putting Citizens at the Heart of Democracy

The initiatives proposed by Ursula von der Leyen, i.e. annual citizen participation (e.g. panels and dialogues), civil society engagement (e.g. consultation mechanisms, partnerships), and empowerment for local governance (e.g. decentralised decision-making, expansion of the network of Local EU Councillors), aim to operationalize the democratic ideals expressed in the CoFoE. She wants to institutionalize citizen participation by incorporating the recommendations of the European Citizens' Panels directly into the EU policy-making process. To further improve citizen engagement and representation at local level, she wants to ensure that EU policies are aligned with the needs of local communities by working more closely with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) and involving Council members to improve governance at local level. She also calls for better cooperation between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the EU, recognizing the crucial role they play in promoting environmental justice, equality and freedom of expression, protecting marginalized groups and monitoring members of government to improve governance at the local level.

Enlargement as a Geopolitical Imperative

Enlargement will be an important aspect of vdL's next mandate, reflecting the strategic goal of increasing the EU's influence as a geopolitical actor in neighboring regions and countering the growing presence of other powers, such as Russia. The expansion or integration of new countries would also allow the EU to narrow its income gap with the US, as enlargement would grow the Single Market, boost trade and investment and ultimately provide significant economic growth for the new members and new opportunities for existing members 73. The integration of several countries of the Western Balkans (e.g. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, North Macedonia) and the Eastern Partnership (e.g. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) by 2030 would be a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity, but would also pose major challenges 74. In addition to concerns and skepticism regarding economic competition (e.g. budgetary and agricultural policy), migration and cultural integration, enlargement could also complicate EU decision-making, as the balance of power in the EU (i.e. between big and small, east and west, rich and poor, state believers and market economists) could change, and bilateral conflicts between the member states could increase 74, 75. Marta Kos, the new Commissioner for Enlargement, will focus on preparing candidate countries for EU membership and ensuring that they meet the required standards in the areas of governance, rule of law, democratic reforms and EU values and policies. Thus, the EU's recognition of enlargement as a geopolitical imperative will require careful consideration by EU actors. With the securitization of enlargement policy that has emerged in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is crucial that speed is not prioritized over substance and security is not prioritized over values, lest the long-term goal of enlargement and the proper functioning of the Union be overshadowed.

A More Strategic Approach to Neighbourhood

In the Mediterranean, economic, energy, migration and security challenges are growing ever more complex. Dubravka Šuica's role will be to tackle these issues. For example, pressure will be put on to manage migratory flows from and through the Mediterranean region in order to ease tensions between regional actors, but also to tackle the root causes of instability that fuel migration (e.g. economic inequality, poor governance, regional conflicts) by promoting trade, investment and development that stimulate economic growth and job creation. Another key aspect of the EU's regionalized approach to diplomacy is the development of an EU-Middle East strategy. The main priority is to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the EU supporting a two-state solution by engaging with influential regional players such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to encourage reform and peace-building efforts. It is imperative to guarantee the security of Israelis and Palestinians, while tackling the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. However, it is challenging to reach an agreement with the regional players (e.g. Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia) due to differing interests. For example, Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah makes peace efforts more difficult. The Palestinian community itself is also fragmented between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which makes meaningful negotiations difficult as they hold different views. Added to this is the disunity among EU member states, which prevents the EU from calling for effective talks, restraint and ceasefires. Beyond conflict resolution, vdL stresses the importance of tackling wider regional challenges such as youth unemployment, economic diversification and climate resilience as part of the EU-Middle East strategy.

A New Economic Foreign Policy

The European Commission will adopt an ambitious economic foreign policy plan, revolving around three pillars: economic prosperity, trade, and investment in partnership. To achieve economic prosperity and security, vdL proposed different actions such as protecting the economy from key technology leakage by strategic competitors and systemic rivals (i.e. China), developing economic standards for key supply chains with like-minded partners, investing innovation as well as developing economic statecraft tools to boost EU's competitiveness, and adopting the principle of "de-risking, not decoupling" to maintain economic engagement with rivals (i.e. China) while reducing vulnerabilities. This balance of de-risking with ongoing economic ties will be a delicate task given EU’s dependency on Chinese critical raw materials and pressure from American President Donald Trump to impose tariffs. von der Leyen also proposed actions to deepen trade, such as developing new partnerships for Clean Trade and Investment and strengthening FTAs to ensure access to essential minerals and raw materials, as well as improving rules-based trade under the WTO and using trade defense instruments if necessary.

Finally, to promote joint investment, she proposed expanding the Global Gateway to provide macroeconomic support targeting sectors such as energy, transport, digital connectivity and clean technologies as a way of countering initiatives such as China's Belt and Road. Launched in 2021, the Global Gateway is the EU's contribution to closing the global investment gap (i.e. up to EUR 300 billion in investments by 2027), aligned with the United Nations 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 76. Examples of projects include Bio2Watt in South Africa, Mozambique and Uganda (i.e. energy plants using animal waste and other waste sources to reduce biogas), dune restoration and sand replenishment projects in Togo or solar energy and hydrogen production in Trinidad and Tobago 77, 78. Given that cooperation between the EU and other important actors (e.g. Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean) is also one of von der Leyen's objectives (e.g. for trade diversification, access to raw materials, social and development programs, and cooperation on climate change), the EU should intensify its collaboration with the AU on common priorities in preparation for a successful EU-AU summit in 2025. For example, the EU should step up logistical support for African-led peacekeeping missions through the African Peace Facility (APF), focus on development projects to create jobs and improve living standards through the European Trust Fund for Africa, or increase financial and technical assistance for climate change adaptation projects.

However, expanding the scope of the Gateway will require stronger and more effective coordination with Member States, private investors and international financial institutions, an area in which the EU is known to struggle. In addition, the Global Gateway builds on existing EU investment commitments, such as the €150 billion package for Africa, for which the EU has often been criticized for slow disbursements and conditionalities compared to China's more immediate financial assistance. The EU plans to build these new partnerships with what it considers to be its economic and geopolitical allies. As a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, relaunching FTA negotiations and deepening ties with India are essential if the EU is to diversify its trade, secure its supply chains, meet global challenges and counterbalance China's influence. As a hub of economic growth and innovation in the Asia-Pacific region, the EU is also keen to strengthen its economic, trade and security relations with Japan and New Zealand, and explore opportunities for collaboration with ASEAN + Korea and Australia in the fields of maritime security, cyber threats, clean trade and renewable energies.

Reshaping Multilateralism for Today's World

Building on her goal of reforming the WTO, she now aims to reform the international system, promoting EU values and ideas to revitalize multilateral cooperation so that the international community can better address pressing global challenges. Yet global economic and political power dynamics are shifting away from the EU, and emerging economies and regional blocs are increasingly challenging the legitimacy and dominance of Western-led global institutions. The success of the BRICS has created a counterweight, fostering a “ the West against the rest” narrative, where the Global South perceives the international system (e.g. the UN system, the IMF, the World Bank) as clinging to outdated notions of superiority stemming from the historically colonial and dominant post-World War II position 79. As a result, the EU's approach to promoting a rules-based order needs to evolve to adapt to the realities of a diverse, multipolar world, distancing itself from a seemingly paternalistic method of imposing values. With more humility, the EU must listen to demands for rebalancing governance and redistributing global power, which also means that the EU will have to do a lot more to make a significant impact 79, 80. For example, the EU should support reforms to make voting rights (e.g. in the UN Security Council) and resource allocation more equitable, as well as improving the representation of emerging economies in decision-making processes, or promoting democracy and human rights while recognizing and correcting perceptions of double standards on the part of the EU. Only through such efforts can the EU retain its relevance and credibility in a world where its values and leadership are increasingly being called into question.

A New Budget Fit for Our Ambitions

Ursula von der Leyen's proposal on the EU budget aims to reshape the allocation of the Union's financial resources and better align them with the Union's long-term priorities and objectives. First, she advocates a shift from traditional program-based budgets to policy-based budgets. The shift from predefined programs (e.g. Horizon Europe, Erasmus +, ESF+, Digital Europe Program) to broader EU priorities (e.g. green transition, digital transformation, defense, and security) will allow for greater flexibility and adaptability. Second, she seeks simplification and better integration of budgets, reducing bureaucratic complexity and aligning Member States' reforms and investment programs with EU priorities. However, vdL could face political resistance, as it could be seen as a violation of national sovereignty, particularly in sensitive areas such as the rule of law, social policies or defense. Third, she wants to maximize the financial impact of the budget by being able to mobilize more investment from the public and private sectors. However, it will be very important to make sure that this budget does not prioritize only sectors with higher returns on investment (ROI), which could undermine traditional cohesion policies by increasing disparities between Member States and regions.

An Ambitious Reform Agenda for Europe

The President of the Commission stressed that she was committed to continuing to work on the 49 recommendations made by CoFoE in 2022, turning them into tangible policy reforms and supporting treaty change where necessary. However, her past actions to strengthen democratic accountability and encourage institutional reform have been less clear-cut, reflecting a gap between ambitious rhetoric and practical implementation. She has also promised to present, within the first 100 days of her mandate, a review of pre-enlargement policies to ensure that the new Member States are institutionally and politically ready. These measures will be complemented by proposals to strengthen the EU's capacity for action by reforming decision-making processes (i.e. moving away from unanimity in certain areas), particularly with a view to eventual EU enlargement. However, this task will be extremely difficult, as it is unlikely that Member States will agree to cede power, especially given the influence of the far right in many EU countries.

Delivering Together with the European Parliament

Despite vdL's reluctance to propose binding changes to give Parliament a formal right of initiative during its first term, she still stressed the importance of strengthening the EP's role in proposing legislation. As such, the most likely scenario is for the Commission to draft legislative proposals in response to Parliament's requests, as in the case of the DMA and DSA. She also wants to strengthen Commissioners' engagement with parliamentary committees, through “ question hours" and committee dialogues, responding to criticism of superficial dialogues based on Commissioners’ pre-prepared answers. To this end, she intends to revise the framework agreement governing relations between the Commission and Parliament, in order to enhance the European Parliament's oversight role and ensure more regular and substantive dialogues. Although ambitious, her review of the last five years shows once again that progress in translating previous similar objectives into concrete changes has been limited.

In two words: “Invest Europe”. This is the new motto for von der Leyen's second mandate. Preparing the Union for the challenges of the coming decade (e.g. long-term competitiveness, geopolitical pressure, internal reforms) must be achieved through targeted investment to strengthen Europe's economic, strategic and geopolitical foundations. In one number: €800 billion (per year!). This is the amount Mario Draghi says is needed to boost investment. Yet, this simplicity conceals many of the complex problems of the EU-27. As Draghi argues, there are so many internal problems to solve, which were caused by austerity and regulatory policies in Europe, that it will require far too much effort to focus on secondary objectives. They are not secondary because they are “less important”, but because the European Union lacks the administrative, financial and political capacity to focus effectively on all fronts simultaneously. On the one hand, economic stability (e.g. inflation, public debt, energy prices), migration (e.g. migration flows, asylum rules, human rights), social issues (e.g. unemployment, housing crisis, inequalities), the rule of law (e.g. democratic backsliding), and security (defence, foreign interference) will be seen as primary objectives. Achieving these goals will require a considerable amount of bureaucracy, consume a sizable portion of an already tight budget, and require agreement in an already politically divided Union confronted with the growing influence of populist governments. On the other hand, secondary objectives include climate neutrality (e.g. economic pressure versus Green Deal objectives), enlargement (e.g. underperformance of the EU versus smooth enlargement) and foreign policy priorities (e.g. the Russian threat versus engagement in Africa, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East).

So, while trade-offs between 'primary' and 'secondary' objectives are inevitable, it is important not to neglect these “secondary” objectives, as this would derail the Union's long-term vision and weaken its global role (and therefore influence). To address this challenge, von der Leyen should embrace a shift in strategy, one that focuses on the ends rather than the means. A goal-oriented approach that focuses on impactful results would allow the EU to adapt to a changing environment (e.g. economic downturn, geopolitical pressures, crises) and thus increase flexibility, efficiency and credibility. Taking the priority of climate neutrality as an example: energy crises and economic pressures make it difficult to achieve the ambitious targets of the Green Deal. Instead of focusing solely on meeting timelines and percentages, the focus should be on implementing the most effective measures (e.g. investing in green technologies, decarbonizing key sectors), even if this means adjusting interim targets. Another example is enlargement, where progress is currently slow because it is blocked by Member States' bilateral disputes with candidate countries and stalled by institutional reforms. Instead of waiting for full institutional reforms, candidate countries could gain access to key EU framework programs (e.g. Single Market, Green Agenda, Erasmus programs) or be granted “observer status” in the EU institutions as a gradual path to membership. Such a shift also requires that the Commission no longer works in silos, i.e. that Directorates-General and Commissioners focus narrowly on their individual mandates without sufficient coordination or consideration of broader EU priorities. With the recent creation of the Commission's fourteen project groups, there is an opportunity to improve interconnectedness and closer cooperation between Commissioners and their portfolios 81, 82. Indeed, each group will focus on a specific policy area (thematic focus), while Commissioners from different policy areas but dealing with common priorities will come together (interdepartmental cooperation) 81. This holistic approach will ensure that policies are not developed in isolation, thus contributing coherently to the overall EU objectives and avoiding contradictory policies.

This will prove particularly relevant and important given the inevitable contradictions between the key priorities and their competing objectives, which require compromises. First, increasing defense spending to strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy and security is at odds with the objectives of the Green Deal. Investments in energy-intensive industries and technologies (e.g. tanks, fighter planes, submarines) will increase greenhouse gas emissions, underlining the need to balance military needs and environmental commitments. Second, investments in digital transformation (e.g. big data, automation, artificial intelligence) will improve efficiency, but could also increase social inequalities by exacerbating the digital divide and displacing low-skilled workers through job losses in traditional sectors. Third, the pursuit of economic growth means expanding industries to increase GDP, which could undermine sustainability efforts and delay progress towards the Green Deal. Fourth, the idea of the EU as a global leader is undermined by internal divisions between member states and disagreements over foreign policy approaches (e.g. relations with China, the US and Russia). Fifth, the pursuit of technological innovation in data-driven industries and the promotion of AI adoption may clash with the EU's strict data protection rules to protect citizens' rights. This could lead to tensions between innovation and the protection of privacy rights.

All in all, von der Leyen will have to lead a Union that must do more with less. And the success of her decade will depend on her ability to rise above internal divisions and external pressures while going beyond symbolic measures in order to achieve tangible, impactful results that can appeal to citizens and politicians alike.

(1) Baker, J., (2024). Europe’s green future needs more private investment, urgently. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/eet/news/europes-green-future-needs-more-private-investment-urgently/

(2) Pisani-Ferry, J., Tagliapietra, S. (2024). An investment strategy to keep the European Green Deal on track. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/investment-strategy-keep-european-green-deal-track

(3) European Commission. (2023). Investment and funding needs for the Digital Decade connectivity targets. European Commission. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/investment-and-funding-needs-digital-decade-connectivity-targets

(4) Weatherbed, J. (2024). Apple receives EU warning to end ‘discriminatory’ geo-blocking practices. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2024/11/12/24294554/apple-eu-warning-geo-blocking-practices-app-store

(5) European Investment Bank. (2024). Investment barriers in the European Union 2023. https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230330_investment_barriers_in_the_eu_2023_en.pdf

(6) Climate Action Tracker. (2024). EU: Country Summary. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/

(7) Gros, M., Coi, G. (2025). 5 green targets EU countries will (mostly) miss in 2025. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-green-targets-environmental-protection-pollution-greenhouse-gas-nature-biodiversity/

(8) Makaroff, N., et al. (2024). High expectations for the first 100 days of the new Commission. Strategic Perspectives. https://strategicperspectives.eu/high-expectations-for-the-first-100-days-of-the-new-commission/

(9) European Investment Bank. (2023). 2023 Investment Survey. https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230285_econ_eibis_2023_eu_en.pdf

(10) Auclair, D., Thévenet, V. (2024). Single ticketing is not enough to get business travellers onto trains. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/eet/opinion/single-ticketing-is-not-enough-to-get-business-travellers-onto-trains/

(11) Marsden, J. (2024). What would a single-ticket booking system mean for your next European train adventure? Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/travel/2024/11/12/what-would-a-single-ticket-booking-system-mean-for-your-next-european-train-adventure

(12) European Commission. (2024). REACH Regulation. European Commission. https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/chemicals/reach-regulation_en

(13) Verband der Chemischen Industrie. (2024). New Commission, New Approach: Designing the New Chemicals Industry Package. https://www.vci.de/ergaenzende-downloads/vci-position-chemicals-industry-package.pdf

(14) Pharmaceutical Technology. (2024). EU Critical Medicines Act: closer to ending overreliance on Asian manufacturers. https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/preparing-for-the-eus-new-approach-to-critical-medicines-and-medicine-shortages-a-new-critical-medicines-act

(15) Roox, K., Navin-Jones, M. (2024). Preparing for the EU’s New Approach to Critical Medicines and Medicine Shortages: A New ‘Critical Medicines Act’? Crowell. https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/analyst-comment/eu-critical-medicines-act-overreliance-asian-manufacturers/?cf-view&cf-closed

(16) MedTechEurope. (2024). COCIR and MedTech Europe Vision for Strengthening Cybersecurity in Europe's Future Healthcare Systems. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/eu-commission-healthcare-cyber-plan/

(17) Poireault, K. (2024). New EU Commission to Unveil Healthcare Cybersecurity Plan in First 100 Days. Infosecurity Magazine. https://www.medtecheurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/20241118-cocir-medtech-europe-european-action-plan-on-cybersecurity-of-health.pdf

(18) Violante, G., Di Felice, A. (2024). Strengthening healthcare cybersecurity: Focus on implementation, not new legislation. Digitaleurope. https://cdn.digitaleurope.org/uploads/2024/12/DIGITALEUROPE_Strengtheninghealthcarecybersecurity-1.pdf

(19) European Commission. (2024). AI Factories. European Commission. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-factories

(20) Reddel, M. (2024). Op-ed: Why EU's AI development needs a CERN moment. The Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/oped-why-europes-ai-development-needs-a-cern-moment

(21) Ivanova, I. (2024). Viewpoint: Time to strengthen Europe’s leadership through AI in science. Science Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/viewpoint/ai/viewpoint-time-strengthen-europes-leadership-through-ai-science

(22) European Commission. (2024). DG RTD. https://ec.europa.eu/assets/rtd/srip/2024/ec_rtd_srip-report-2024-chap-03.pdf

(23) Eurostat. (2024). R&D expenditure. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=R&D_expenditure&oldid=645219

(24) Cino Pagliarello, M. (2024). Internationalisation of European Universities Alliances: The New Frontiers. EU Green. https://eugreenalliance.eu/internationalisation-of-european-universities-alliances-the-new-frontiers/

(25) LERU. (2024). Maximizing the impact of European Universities alliances. https://www.leru.org/files/European-Universities-alliances_LERU-Paper.pdf

(26) Scitodate. (2024). More Future Biotech Opportunities in Europe: 2025 EU Biotech Act. LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/more-future-biotech-opportunities-europe-2025-eu-act-scitodate-o1ate/

(27) European Commission. (2024). Press Release: Commission takes action to boost biotechnology and biomanufacturing in the EU. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1570

(28) EuropaBio. (2024). The Future of Biotech: The Role of Legislation on Investment for Innovation – Recommendations. https://www.europabio.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Final_merged-1.pdf

(29) Greenacre, M., Francica, E. (2024). Von der Leyen vows to increase EU research spending in new term. Science Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/horizon-europe/von-der-leyen-vows-increase-eu-research-spending-new-term

(30) Palmowski, J. (2024). Recasting of Commission roles puts research centre stage. The Guild.https://www.the-guild.eu/blog/recasting-of-commission-roles-puts-research-centre-stage.html

(31) Brent, T., Francica, E. (2024). High-profile report urges EU to create a ‘fifth freedom’ of research and innovation. Science Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/horizon-europe/high-profile-report-urges-eu-create-fifth-freedom-research-and-innovation

(32) Martens, B. (2024). Research, innovation and data: a fifth freedom in the EU single market? Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/research-innovation-and-data-fifth-freedom-eu-single-market#footnote5_teoe1ha

(33) European Commission. (2024). The Net-Zero Industry Act: Accelerating the transition to climate neutrality. European Commission. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en

(34) Deutsche Börse Group. (2024). Towards an EU Savings and Investments Union. https://www.deutsche-boerse.com/resource/blob/4195814/f1a44160d0ab7623cf9c61813a4eb0d3/data/Towards%20an%20EU%20Savings%20and%20Investments%20Union.pdf

(35) Lannoo, K. Et al. (2024). From a Capital Markets Union towards a robust Savings and Investment Union. CEPS. https://www.ceps.eu/from-a-capital-markets-union-towards-a-robust-savings-and-investment-union/

(36) European Commission. (2024). Approved integrated Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI). European Commission. https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/approved-ipceis_en

(37) Fusion Industry Association. (2024). New EU Commission Wants to Increase Investment for Cleantech and Further Promote Research and Innovation. https://www.fusionindustryassociation.org/new-eu-commission-wants-to-increase-investment-for-cleantech-and-further-promote-research-and-innovation/

(38) Lappe, M., Nicoli, F. (2024). European Union public procurement reform: a difficult but essential balancing act. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/european-union-public-procurement-reform-difficult-essential-balancing-act

(39) European Federation of Building and Woodworkers. (2024). Revision of the public procurement Directives must support fair competition and quality jobs in construction. EFBWW. https://www.efbww.eu/news/revision-of-the-public-procurement-directives-must-support-fair/4257-a

(40) European Commission. (2024). Commission launches call for evidence and public consultation on the evaluation of the Public Procurement Directives. European Commission. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-call-evidence-and-public-consultation-evaluation-public-procurement-directives-2024-12-13_en

(41) Momtaz, R. (2024). Taking the Pulse: Is Having a European Commissioner for Defense a Mistake? Carnegie. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/09/taking-the-pulse-is-having-a-european-commissioner-for-defense-a-mistake?lang=en

(42) Clapp, S. (2024). Reinforcing Europe's defence industry. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/749805/EPRS_BRI(2023)749805_EN.pdf

(43) Olsson, P. (2021). The European Defence Market — Unevenly Fragmented. FOI. https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%207730

(44) Koening, N., Schütte, L. (2023). Procurement Process: Spending Together, Transforming European Militaries in Times of War. https://securityconference.org/publikationen/sonderausgaben/defense-sitters/procurement-processes/

(45) Vohra, A. (2024). Rights groups criticize EU plans to strengthen Frontex. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/rights-groups-criticize-eu-plans-to-strengthen-frontex/a-70138773

(46) Martin, I. Appointment of the New European Commission I: What Mediterranean for the European Union? Policy Center. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/appointment-new-european-commission-i-what-mediterranean-european-union

(47) EuroHealthNet. (2024). The European Pillar of Social Rights at the core of the EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. https://eurohealthnet.eu/wp-content/uploads/publications/2024/2024_02-eurohealthnet-input-towards-la-hulpe-declaration-on-the-future-of-social-europe.pdf

(48) Eurostat. (2024). Living conditions in Europe - poverty and social exclusion. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_poverty_and_social_exclusion

(49) EAPN. (2024). EAPN Roadmap Towards an EU-Anti-Poverty Strategy. European Anti-Poverty Network. https://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/eapn-EAPNs-roadmap-towards-an-EU-Anti-Poverty-Strategy-5991.pdf

(50) Council of the European Union. European Child Guarantee: How the EU Protects Children. Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/european-child-guarantee

(51) European Parliament. (2024). Rising housing costs in the EU: the facts (infographics). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20241014STO24542/rising-housing-costs-in-the-eu-the-facts-infographics

(52) Eurostat. (2023). When do young Europeans leave their parental home? European Commission.https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230904-1

(53) European Union. (2024). New European Bauhaus. European Union. https://new-european-bauhaus.europa.eu/index_en

(54) Lazarevski, B. (2024). Cutting the Erasmus+ budget would be a disaster for Europe’s future. Emerging Europe. https://emerging-europe.com/opinion/cutting-the-erasmus-budget-would-be-a-disaster-for-europes-future/

(55) Sacco, C. (2024). Erasmus’ funding slashed in EU’s 2025 budget plans. The Journal MT. https://thejournal.mt/erasmus-funding-slashed-in-eus-2025-budget-plans/

(56) Batura, J. (2024). A Union of Equality? Verfassungsblog. https://verfassungsblog.de/a-union-of-equality/

(57) Hubert, A. (2024). The ‘union of equality’ requires leadership. Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-union-of-equality-requires-leadership

(58) Dell’Aquila, M. (2024). A ‘nearly’ gender-balanced Commission isn’t good enough. It’s actually an ominous omen for advancing gender equality in the EU. CEPS. https://www.ceps.eu/a-nearly-gender-balanced-commission-isnt-good-enough-its-actually-an-ominous-omen-for-advancing-gender-equality-in-the-eu/

(59) Rankin, J. (2024). Von der Leyen set to miss gender-balance target for EU top jobs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/26/von-der-leyen-set-to-miss-gender-balance-target-for-eu-top-jobs

(60) Coi, G., Cokelaere, H. (2024). Von der Leyen’s new Commission: Male and slightly less stale. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyens-new-commission-male-gender-balace-young/

(61) European Commission. (2024). Press statement by President von der Leyen on the next College of Commissioners. European Commission. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-president-von-der-leyen-next-college-commissioners-2024-09-17_en

(62) Banchereau, M. (2024). The EU says it won’t renew a fishing agreement with Senegal criticized by many in the country. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/senegal-european-union-fishing-agreement-59a1ffab970df93c8ad8267e8a32fe22

(63) European Court of Auditors. (2020). EU protection of marine environment is shallow. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/INSR20_26/INSR_Marine_environment_EN.pdf

(64) Allegri, M. R. (2024). The Impact of Disinformation on the Functioning of the Rule of Law and Democratic Processes in the EU. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Development, 11(1 S1), 99, 100. https://doi.org/10.56345/ijrdv11n1s116

(65) Bradshaw, S., & Centre for International Governance Innovation. (2020). Influence Operations and Disinformation on Social Media. In Modern Conflict and Artificial Intelligence. Centre for International Governance Innovation. 44, 45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27510.9

(66) Franco, M. (2021). Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it. Egmont Institute. 8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28885

(67) Benková, L. (2018). The Rise of Russian Disinformation in Europe. Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik. 1, 3. https://www.aies.at/download/2018/AIES-Fokus_2018-03.pdf

(68) Marsh, S., Escritt, T. (2025). Musk hosts German far-right leader on X, stirs angst about election meddling. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/musk-host-german-far-right-leader-x-stirs-angst-about-election-meddling-2025-01-09/

(69) Gera, V. (2025). Musk uses X livestream to amplify German far-right leader’s views ahead of an election. APNEWS. https://apnews.com/article/germany-elon-musk-afd-alice-weidel-521a8fb77250ee0f354fa4e76c1ce63d

(70) Paternoster, T. (2025). Germany's far-right AfD chief pushes back on Nazi claims in chat with Elon Musk on X. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/01/09/elon-musk-and-germanys-far-right-chief-host-online-chat-the-eu-warns-could-be-illegal

(71) Gilbert, D. (2025). Elon Musk and Far-Right German Leader Agree ‘Hitler Was a Communist’. Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-far-right-german-leader-weidel-hitler-communist/

(72) More, R. (2025). Germany's Scholz responds to Musk, saying freedom of speech must not back extreme-right. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/germanys-scholz-responds-musk-saying-freedom-speech-must-not-back-extreme-right-2025-01-21

(73) Khan, M. (2024). EU ‘must expand or integrate’ to close income gap with America. The Times. https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/economics/article/eu-must-expand-or-integrate-to-close-income-gap-with-america-q5bbg6l8t

(74) Stanicek, B., et al. (2023). Enlargement policy: Reforms and challenges ahead. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/757575/EPRS_BRI%282023%29757575_EN.pdf

(75) Buras, P., Morina, E. (2023). Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu

(76) European Commission. (2024). Global Gateway. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en

(77) European Commission. (2024). Global Gateway in Sub-Saharan Africa. European Commission. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa_en

(78) European Commission. (2024). Global Gateway in Latin America and the Caribbean. European Commission. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-latin-america-and-caribbean_en?page=2

(79) Gattolin, A., Véron, E. (2024). The BRICS, a geopolitical challenge overlooked by the European Union. Schuman Papers n°736. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/736-the-brics-a-geopolitical-challenge-overlooked-by-the-european-union

(80) Lehne, S. (2024). The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/the-eu-and-the-global-battle-of-narratives?lang=en&center=europe

(81) European Commission. (2025). President von der Leyen establishes fourteen Project Groups to deliver on political priorities. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_221

(82) Portala, J. (2025). Project groups point to new power structures within the Commission. Science Business. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/research-and-innovation-gap/project-groups-point-new-power-structures-within-commission

Leave Us A Comment